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ARTICLES
THE CHRYSANTHEMUM, THE SWORD, AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
DISENTANGLING CULTURE, COMMUNITY,
AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

RONALD

J.

KROTOSZYNSKI, JR.*

At one time, America had a virtual monopoly on constitutional judicial review,
and if a doctrine or approach was not tried out here, there was no place else to look.
That situation no longer holds. . . . [Miany countries have adopted forms of judicial
review.... These countries are our "constitutional offspring" and how they have dealt
with problems analogous to ours can be very useful to us when we face difficult
constitutional issues. Wise parents do not hesitate to learn from their children.'

The First Amendment has proven to be one of the United States's
most successful legal exports. Most constitutions now guarantee to their
citizens the freedom of speech.2 Not only has the First Amendment's
*
Assistant Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis; J.D.,
LL.M., Duke University; B.A., M.A. (Philosophy), Emory University. I would like to
thank Dean Roland Hjorth and the faculty of the University of Washington School of Law
for hosting me during the summers of 1996 and 1997 as a visiting scholar in residence,
thereby facilitating my research on this Article. I wish to acknowledge the assistance of
Professors John Haley, Frank Upham, Dan Foote, Mark Levin, and Dean Percy Luney,
who provided invaluable insights into the Japanese legal system. In addition, Charles W.
Logan and Professors S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Jeff Cooper, Lyrissa Lidsky, and E. Gary
Spitko all provided extremely useful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Finally,
I would like to acknowledge the support of an Indiana University Research Grant, which
funded my efforts while at the University of Washington School of Law. The usual
disclaimer applies: any and all errors or omissions are mine alone.
1.
United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring); see also Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 519-20 (1992) ("My goal is rather to advance the proposition that
American thinking about rights and welfare would benefit from examining the experiences
of other liberal democracies, and to speculate about the insights that might emerge from

such a comparative analysis.") (footnote omitted); Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and
Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty,
94 MICH. L. REV. 245, 249 & n.13 (1995) (noting the potential benefits and pitfalls
associated with comparative constitutional inquiries). In addition, Justice Breyer recently
endorsed the use of comparative constitutional analysis when faced with difficult questions
of constitutional interpretation. See Printz v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 2404-05
(1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2.
See, e.g., DANMARKS RIGES GRUNDLOV [Constitution] art. 77 (Den.) ("Any
person shall be entitled to publish his thoughts in printing, in writing, and in speech,
provided that he may be held answerable in a court of justice."); CONSTITUTION DE LA
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free speech guarantee found its way into most modem constitutions, it has

even been enshrined in various international instruments, notably the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights3 and the European Convention
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 4
The value of such constitutional and quasi-constitutional promises

correlates, of course, with the strength of the rule of law in a particular
nation. For example, China's current constitution promises respect for
REPUBLIQUE GABONAISE art. 1 (Gabon) ("[T]he freedom of conscience, thought, opinion,
expression, communication, the free practice of religion, are guaranteed to all, under the
reservation of respect of public order. . . ."); GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 5
(F.R.G.) ("Everyone shall have the right to freely express and disseminate his opinion by
speech, writing, and pictures and freely to instruct himself from general sources."); INDIA
CONST. art. 19 ("All citizens shall have the right . . . to freedom of speech and
expression . . . ."); NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria) §
38(1) ("Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference."); SRI
LANKA CONST. ch. I, § 14(1) ("Every citizen is entitled to ... the freedom of speech
and expression including publication; the freedom of peaceful assembly; the freedom of
association.. . ."); REGERINGSFORMEN [Instrument of Government] ch. 2, art. 1 (Swed.)
("All citizens shall be guaranteed the following in their relations with the public
administration: ... freedom of expression: the freedom to communicate information and
to express ideas, opinions and emotions, whether orally, in writing, in pictorial
representations, or in any other way .... ."). Of course, merely enshrining rights on a
piece of paper titled a constitution does not ensure that those rights will be enjoyed. See
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Brind & Rust v. Sullivan: Free Speech and the Limits of a
Written Constitution, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1994); see also Glendon, supra note 1.
3.
UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d mtg.,
G.A. Res. 17, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), art. 19 ("Everyone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless
of frontiers.").
4.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (1955). Article 10 provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for
the protection of reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
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freedom of speech,5 but the specter of Tiananmen Square provides
powerful testimony against placing any stock in this ersatz guarantee. 6
One might well ask how these constitutional children are faring.
After all, adoption of a free speech guarantee in nations observing the
rule of law should restrict the government's ability to censor or otherwise

restrict expressive activity; constitutional guarantees of free speech should
significantly expand the protection afforded to expressive activities.' At

the same time, however, there exists a constant danger of cultural
essentialism: One should not arbitrarily assume that the U.S. conception
of a particular human right necessarily has transnational significance-that
it somehow epitomizes the universal or a priorinature of that right.8
Culture informs both law and morality; 9 it would require hubris of
the highest order to assume that the exposition of a right by the United
States Supreme Court represents the only possible, much less the "best,"

iteration of a particular right. 0

Even granting the relevance and

importance of legal and cultural differences, however, the experience of

a foreign nation "may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem."'"
5.
See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [Constitution] art. 35 (P.R.C.)
(1982) (providing guarantee to citizens of "freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly,
of association, of process, and of demonstration").
6.
See Scott E. Feir, Comment, Regulations Restricting Internet Access:
Attempted Repair of Rupture in China's Great Wall Restraining the Free Exchange of
Ideas, 6 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 361, 377 (1997). The former Soviet Union's
constitution likewise protected freedom of expression. See KONSTITUTSIIA SSR arts. 47,
50 & 51. Of course, it too was a worthless promise. A constitutional guarantee generally'
requires the rule of law to be enforceable.
See WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE,
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 47-49 (1984) [hereinafter VAN ALSTYNE,
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT]; see also WILLIAM W.

VAN ALSTYNE,

FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 7-8 (2d ed. 1995).

7.
See Krotoszynski, supra note 2, at 31-34 (arguing that constitutional
guarantees of rights legitimize judicial protection of the enumerated interests, but noting
that good-faith application by the judiciary is essential to the effectiveness of such
guarantees).
8.
See Josiah A.M. Cobbah, African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An
African Perspective, 9 HuM. RTS. Q. 309 (1987); Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in FeministLegal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Tracy E. Higgins,
Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 89 (1996).
9.
See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 62-68 (1990); see also
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Building Bridges and Overcoming Barricades:Exploring the
Limits of Law as an Agent of TransformationalSocial Change, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
423, 432-36, 442-44 (1997).
10.
See L. Amede Obiora, Bridges and Barricades:Rethinking Polemics and
Intransigencein the CampaignAgainst Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
275, 276-84 (1997).
11.
Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2405 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Thus, as Judge Calabresi admonishes, we should be willing to learn from
those who have come to share our constitutional values.
In the case of the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment, the
constitution of Japan presents perhaps the best candidate for cross-cultural
study. 2 This is because Japan intentionally and self-consciously (though
perhaps not voluntarily 3 ) decided to guarantee freedom of speech from
government abridgment. 4 Japan did so in the aftermath of the Second
World War by adopting the Constitution of 1947, which contains a
provision that explicitly protects freedom of expression." Prior to the
adoption of the Constitution of 1947, Japanese citizens did not enjoy an
effective generalized right of freedom of expression. 6 On the contrary,
12.
Cf. Frank K. Upham, The Place of Japanese Legal Studies in American
Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 639 (noting the relative lack of interest in Japan
among American comparative law scholars and positing the possible explanations for this
state of affairs).
13.
See JAPAN'S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE FINAL REPORT 24-31,
207-44 (John M. Maki ed. & trans., 1980); see also KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR'S
JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL STUDY OF ITS MAKING 6-37
(1991). Notwithstanding the historical circumstances surrounding the adoption of the
Constitution of 1947, the Japanese people have never amended it and today the
Constitution enjoys a very high degree of popular legitimacy. See John M. Maki, The
Constitution of Japan:Pacifism, Popular Sovereignty, and Fundamental Human Rights,
in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39, 52-53 (Percy R. Luney, Jr. & Kazuyuki
Takahashi eds., 1993); see also Yasuhiro Okudaira, Forty Years of the Constitution and
Its VariousInfluences: Japanese,American, andEuropean,in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, supra, at 1, 6-20, 25-32.
14.
See infra notes 106-126 and accompanying text.
15.
See NIHONKOKU KENPO [Constitution] [KENP6] art. 21, para. 1 ("Freedom
of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are
guaranteed."). Canada, like Japan, has adopted a constitutional analog to the First
Amendment. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), pt. I (Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms), § 2 ("Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: ... (b)
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including the freedom of the press and
other media of communication . . . ."). It too would present an excellent candidate for
a comparative study in freedom of expression. Although Japan and Canada could be wellpaired in a study of freedom of expression, such a project would easily exceed the scope
of a single law review article. Accordingly, this article will focus exclusively on the
Japanese free speech tradition, leaving for another day an analysis of freedom of
expression in Canada.
16.
In Japan, although the Meiji Constitution of 1889 ostensibly guaranteed the
citizenry certain basic rights, in practice these guarantees were generally not judicially
enforceable and even when nominally enforceable, the judiciary lacked the power to
provide meaningful remedies to successful litigants. See CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY ASIA 135-40, 156, 225, 230 (Lawrence W. Beer ed., 1992);
J.W. DOWER, EMPIRE AND AFTERMATH 52-54, 318-29, 349-57 (1988); JOHN W. DOWER,
Sensational Rumors, Seditious Graffiti, and the Nightmares of the Thought Police, in
JAPAN IN WAR AND PEACE 101, 101-54 (1993); JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY
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from the Meiji Restoration in 1868 to Emperor Hirohito's surrender on
General MacArthur's battleship in Tokyo Bay. in 1945, constitutional
rights under the Meiji Constitution were subject to legislative
abrogation.' 7 As a general matter, the relationship of imperial subjects
to the Emperor and his government revolved around the duties and
obligations that the former owed to the latter. The idea of asserting
formal legal rights against the Chrysanthemum Throne was a theoretical
possibility, but even in the absence of legislative abrogation had little, if
any, cultural salience. 8
Japan also presents a good candidate for a case study because it, like
the United States, is an industrialized democracy.' 9 Both the United

States and Japan have enjoyed a long period of economic prosperity in the
latter half of the twentieth century. 2 To the extent that differences exist
WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 77-80, 134 (1991); THE JAPANESE

LEGAL SYSTEM 637-41 (Hideo Tanaka ed., 1976); Lawrence W. Beer, Freedom of
Expression: The Continuing Revolution, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 45 (1990);

Takeshi Ishida, Fundamental Human Rights and the Development of Legal Thought in
Japan, 8 LAW IN JAPAN 39, 62-66 (Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Beverly Braverman trans.,
1975). One should keep in mind, however, that the Meiji Constitution on its face made
the rights of the citizenry subject to legislative abrogation. In this sense, then, the failure
to respect constitutional rights was less a failure of the Japanese judiciary than of the
foundational document itself.
17.
For an excellent history of the framing of the Japanese Constitution of 1947,
see KOSEKI SHOICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN'S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION (Ray A. Moore
ed. & trans., 1997).
18.
See INOUE, supra note 13, at 53-54. At the same time, however, the rule of
law did exist during the Meiji period. Courts of law applied the statutes and regulations

issued in the Emperor's name and, in some instances, exhibited a fair amount of
independence. For example, judicial review of administrative regulations for consistency
with legislative delegations took place, with the courts of law striking down regulations
that departed from legislative mandates or general principles of statutory construction.
See HALEY, supra note 16, at 83-104; John Owen Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant
Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359, 373-78 (1978). Indeed, even in the years of the
Tokugawa Shogunate, the idea of enforcing formal duties, as opposed to rights, existed.
See RUTH BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD: PATTERNS OF JAPANESE

CULTURE 70-71 (1946). On the other hand, actually lodging a formal claim with the
Shogun against a superior could have dire consequences. See id. at 65-67 (describing how
a Tokugawa Shogun granted a farmers' petition for relief against their local daimyo, or
overlord, only to then order the farmers put to death for insubordination).
19.
One could study the free speech tradition in Sri Lanka or Gabon, but basic
differences from the United States in both culture and economic development would make
such comparisons less useful.
20.
Notwithstanding Japan's current economic difficulties, the Japanese economy
remains the second largest in the world, and the vast majority of Japanese citizens

continue to enjoy a high standard of living. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Shrugging off
Doom, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21. 1998, at A1; PresidentPraisesJapan'sEconomic Reforms,
WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1998, at A7.

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
in legal norms, they are not the products of radically different economic
circumstances.
On the other hand, many commentators have argued that Japanese

society is radically different from the United States in myriad ways: Japan
is much more homogeneous, Japanese are inherently conformists,
Japanese place much less reliance on lawyers and formal legal institutions

than do Americans, and so forth.21 Accordingly, one would not expect
the Japanese version of the First Amendment to bear much resemblance

to its American cousin. As it happens, one would be wrong to harbor
such an assumption. In fact, the Japanese Supreme Court seems to share
many of the same theoretical assumptions about the role and importance
of free speech that the United States Supreme Court has articulated over
the past half century. At the same time, however, the Supreme Court of
Japan has failed to use its power of judicial review to vindicate

consistently these shared ideological commitments. The Supreme Court
of Japan, for example, has framed free speech questions in terms
immediately familiar to students of the First Amendment, routinely
linking free speech values with the project of democratic self-government.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court largely has failed to strike resounding
blows in favor of freedom of speech, principally for reasons related to the
Japanese Supreme Court's view of its proper institutional role within the
21.
See Lawrence W. Beer, Freedom of Expression: The ContinuingRevolution,
in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 221, 224-26, 245-47 (Percy R. Luney, Jr. &
Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993) [hereinafter Beer, Freedom of Expression];Lawrence W.
Beer, The Public Welfare Standard and Freedom of Expression in Japan, in THE
CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-67, at 205, 210-20 (Dan
Fenno Henderson ed., 1968) [hereinafter Beer, Public Welfare]; CHIN KIM, The Law of
the Subtle Mind: The TraditionalJapanese Conception of Law, in SELECTED WRITINGS
ON ASIAN LAW 41, 48 (1982); CHIE NAKANE, JAPANESE SOCIETY 26-40, 83-84, 103,
147-51 (1970); CLYDE V. PRESTOWITZ, JR., TRADING PLACES: HOW WE ALLOWED
JAPAN TO TAKE THE LEAD 82-86 (1988); Paul Lansing & Tamra Domeyer, Japan's
Attempt at Internationalizationand its Lack of Sensitivity to Minority Issues, 22 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 135, 139-40 (1991); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American
Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1906-10 (1991); Richard B. Parker, Law,
Language, andthe Individualin Japanand the United States, 7 WIS. INT'L L.J. 179, 18393 (1989); Note, Prosecution Review Commissions: Japan'sAnswer to the Problem of
ProsecutorialDiscretion,92 COLUM. L. REV. 684, 709-11 (1992); cf. HALEY, supranote
16, at 108-18, 170-91, 196-200 (rejecting traditional view that Japanese citizens are
inherently conformists in favor of view that complex and highly evolved systems of
economic and social interdependence cabin the ability of individuals to engage in
iconoclastic behavior and arguing that Japan enjoys "a special type of pluralism"
characterized by active competition and interplay between well-defined social, political,
and economic interest groups); Haley, supra note 18, at 378-90 (arguing that institutional
incapacity and limited authority to provide relief, rather than a general social aversion to
litigation, best explains Japan's relatively low per capita incidence of law suits).
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Japanese constitutional framework and within Japanese society more
broadly.'
Perhaps most importantly, an examination of the emerging Japanese
free speech tradition offers important insights into the theoretical
justifications mustered in support of protecting freedom of expression in
the United States. Professor Alexander Meiklejohn pioneered the
argument that the central purpose of the First Amendment is to facilitate
The principal competing theory of the
democratic self-governance.'
First Amendment is the Holmesian "marketplace of ideas" metaphor,
which trusts in the good sense of the citizenry, rather than in the abilities
of government censors, to determine the relative merit of an idea. 4 As
it happens, the Japanese Supreme Court largely has rejected the
marketplace metaphor in its free speech decisions.' To a considerable
degree, however, it appears to have embraced Meiklejohn's theory of
freedom of speech. Although this state of affairs suggests the existence
of an important link between culture and the rationales supporting the
protection of free expression, it also demonstrates that the relationship
between freedom of expression and democratic self-government can
transcend both political and cultural boundaries.
An examination of the principal free speech decisions of the Supreme
Court of Japan reveals that the Meiklejohn theory of free expression has
a distinctly communitarian cast. Unlike the marketplace of ideas
metaphor, the Meiklejohn theory necessarily presupposes general social
consensus regarding the proper modalities of free expression.2 In a
relatively homogeneous society, such a consensus might conceivably
exist. 27
Social pluralism, on the other hand, appears to raise
troublesome issues for adherents of the Meiklejohn approach.' In many
respects, this is the most important lesson that the United States legal
community can take from the Japanese experience with free speech as a
core constitutional value.

22.
23.'

See infra notes 354-399 and accompanying text.
See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND

GOVERNMENT

ITS RELATION TO SELF-

1-27 (1948).

24.
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629-31 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
25.
See infra notes 289-353 and accompanying text.
26.
See infra notes 52-73 and accompanying text; see also ROBERT C. POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT

268-76 (1995).

27.
On the other hand, one could still raise the objection that a minority should
not be denied voice within the community merely because it is particularly small and
relatively invisible.
See infra notes 410-425 and accompanying text; see also POST, supra note 26,
28.
at 274-75.

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
Part I of this Article explores the two basic theories of the First
Amendment that have predominated in the United States this century: the
marketplace of ideas metaphor and the democratic self-governance
paradigm. Examination of the underlying themes of the First Amendment
in the United States will facilitate a more nuanced and, therefore, more
enlightened examination of the decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court.
Part II examines the constitutional text and the constitutional style of the
Supreme Court of Japan.2 9 Part III surveys the treatment of political
speech in Japan, including consideration of how evolving theories of free
speech relate to their American counterparts. Part IV considers the case
of defamation and the question of seditious libel in Japan. Classic free
speech doctrine in the United States holds that libel against the state is
fundamentally inconsistent with democracy;' this Part considers Japan's
response to the problem of balancing protection of individual reputation
against freedom of expression. Part V then takes up the regulation of
sexually explicit speech in Japan, which demonstrates quite clearly the
limitations of the Meiklejohn theory of free expression. In Part VI, the
Article offers an explanation of the Supreme Court of Japan's overall
approach to protecting freedom of expression and the larger question of
the Japanese approach to judicial review. Finally, in Part VII, this
Article suggests that the Japanese conception of the importance of free
speech in a democratic society is largely consistent with Alexander
Meiklejohn's democratic self-government paradigm for freedom of
expression. Part VII also argues that the Japanese experience can and
should inform our domestic conception of the theoretical underpinnings
of freedom of expression and the proper scope and relative importance of
freedom of speech in a democratic society.
The Article concludes that while free speech plays an important,
indeed vital, role in both Japan and the United States, the relative
importance of free speech-and the protection accorded various types of
speech and the rationales offered to justify that protection-vary
considerably. In particular, the Japanese experience provides valuable
lessons about the potential for successful line-drawing based on the
relationship of speech to democratic self-governance. Moreover, Japan
29.
My citation conventions for decisions of the Supreme Court of Japan are as
follows: (1) whenever available, I have cited to the official English language translation
of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Japan, which are published by the General
Secretariat of the Supreme Court of Japan; (2) when official translations are not available,
I have cited to unofficial translations prepared and published by legal academics and have
provided a parallel citation to the official Japanese reporter in which the case may be
found.
30.
See Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the FirstAmendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191, 205.
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also offers a cautionary note on the potential importance of nongovernmental restrictions on freedom of speech. 3 ' At the end of the
day, Judge Calabresi's observation32 about the value of comparative
constitutional inquiry proves prescient: Examination of freedom of speech
in Japan leads to a more insightful understanding of our domestic speech
rights and a heightened awareness of the implicit costs and benefits
associated with maintaining these rights.
I. COMPETING THEORIES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Over the course of twentieth century, two basic models of the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause have emerged: the marketplace of ideas
metaphor and the democratic self-government paradigm. Both models
have appeared in decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and both
models enjoy significant support within the academic community. The
models differ in material respects, however, and these differences in
theory should lead to differences in results.
A. The Marketplace of Ideas
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's great dissents in Abrams33 and
Gitlowe evoked the metaphor of a "marketplace of ideas" in which
various ideas compete for acceptance within the community. Justice
Holmes best expressed this iteration of the underlying values behind the
First Amendment in Abrams:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground
31.

See generally OWEN M. Fiss,

LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH

20-30 (1996) (arguing that non-governmental
constraints on speech activity can be just as harmful to meaningful public discourse as
ham-handed attempts at state-imposed censorship).
32.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER

33.

See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J.,

dissenting).

34.
dissenting).

See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J.,

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any
rate is the theory of our Constitution. a'
The marketplace of ideas understanding of free speech embraces an
evolutionary process, not one predetermined by social, economic, or
political results. As Justice Holmes explained, "[e]very idea is an
incitement," and "[e]loquence may set fire to reason." 6
The Holmesian marketplace of ideas conception of the First
Amendment broadly embraces John Stuart Mill's liberty ethic37 and
reflects an abiding faith in the capacity of reason to facilitate the sifting
of wheat from chaff.3" Citizens are both free to speak and to listen as
they think best; truth is served by a free and full competition of ideas
within the community, rather than by paternalistic state-sponsored efforts
Ito protect citizens from the ill effects of bad ideas. At its best, the
Holmesian view ensures that non-dominant views are not squelched
simply because they are different; thus, the Heaven's Gate cult39 must
enjoy the same right to hold and disseminate its beliefs as the Republican
National Committee. Moreover, the competition of ideas within the
marketplace of public opinion may result in virtually any set of social,
economic, or political outcomes: "If in the long run the beliefs expressed
in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant
forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they
should be given their chance and have their way."'
The principal objection to this conception of the First Amendment is
that in practice it proves to be both overinclusive and underinclusive. It
is overinclusive because it mandates the protection of "low value" speech,
including both racist and sexually explicit speech activities. 4 The
marketplace metaphor is also underinclusive because it permits the
marginalization of speakers who lack the financial or political wherewithal
35.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan coined
the phrase "marketplace of ideas" in Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308
(1965). See Fiss, supra note 31, at 160 n.25.
36.
Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
37.
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaported., Hackett Publ'g
Co. 1978) (1859).
38.
See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15-34
(1982); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6-11 (1992).
39.
See Joel Achenbach et al., Group Awaited Spacecraft Behind Comet, WASH.
POST, Mar. 28, 1997, at Al; Frank Bruni, Death In a Cult: The Personality, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 1997, at Al; Todd S. Purdum, Death In a Cult: The Scene, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.

30, 1997, § 1, at 1.
40.
Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
41.
See SMOLLA, supra note 38, at 6-7; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND
THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 17-22, 34-38, 72-73, 249-52 (1993).
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to disseminate their views; market forces will drown out voices that
deserve to be heard.42

Notwithstanding these objections, the marketplace metaphor has
proven durable, both at the Supreme Court and within the legal
academy.4 3 The theory has an intrinsic appeal because it is completely

viewpoint neutral: The marketplace metaphor denies government the
power to pick and choose which speakers shall be heard and which shall
be silenced." In a pluralistic nation populated by persons hailing from
all points of the compass, government neutrality regarding the modalities

and content of free expression serves the citizenry very well.

The

marketplace of ideas metaphor generally requires government to avoid
making subjective value judgments about either the specific content of
speech or the means of communication. 5 Alternative theories of the

First Amendment require government officials (whether legislators,
executive branch personnel, or judges) to make inherently subjective
determinations about the nature of particular speech activity: For instance,
is the speech political, and does it properly relate to the project of
democratic self-governance?"
42.
See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405,
1410-21 (1986).
43.
See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997); McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341, 348 n.11 (1995); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 418, 429 (1989); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th
Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46
(1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 760 (1976); id. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Miami Herald Publ'g Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248, 251 (1974); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301,
308 (1965); MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 45-48
(1984).
44.
See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?,
76 VA. L. REV. 627 (1990) (arguing that government has neither the right nor the
responsibility to control the free flow of information within the marketplace of ideas,
whatever the motivations of the speaker).
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-26 (1971). See generally
45.
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cohen v. California: "Inconsequential" Cases and Larger
Principles, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1251 (1996).
46.
See POST, supra note 26, at 272-89 (arguing that "collectivist" theories of
freedom of expression, including the Meiklejohn theory, "impl[y] managerial control"
and, at least to some degree also entail the "discard [of] our commitment to democracy");
Kozinski & Banner, supra note 44, at 631-34, 651-53 (arguing that the problems
associated with the subjectivity inherent in non-market based approaches to protecting
freedom of speech cannot be overcome and that a unitary theory of the First Amendment
would avoid these difficulties); Paul G. Stern, Note, A PluralisticReading of the First
Amendment and Its Relation to Public Discourse, 99 YALE L.J. 925, 932-33 (1990)
(noting the various definitional difficulties associated with Meiklejohn theory of the First
Amendment).

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

To be sure, definitional difficulties haunt the marketplace metaphor.
Is flag burning speech or conduct?. 7 Does nude dancing come within
the protection of the First Amendment?'
Should commercial speech
enjoy the same First Amendment protection as non-commercial speech 9
The resolution of these questions involves the exercise of judgment, which
necessarily includes an element of subjectivity .5 Even if one makes this
concession, however, the marketplace metaphor offers a powerful and
internally coherent account of the First Amendment and its role in
facilitating the free exchange of ideas and information.5 1
B. Enhancing Democracy
Alexander Meiklejohn forcefully articulated the primary alternative

account of the First Amendment. 2 In his view, the free speech
guarantee of the First Amendment exists principally to facilitate
democratic self-governance. Invoking the metaphor of the town hall,
Meiklejohn argued that the First Amendment required not that all opinions
47.
Compare Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403-10 (1989) (holding a Texas
flag desecration statute unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds, at least as applied
to a political protest at which the protestors burned a United States flag) with United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (upholding a statutory prohibition against
the destruction of Selective Service registration certificates on the theory that the statutory
prohibition against destroying the certificates was totally unrelated to the suppression of
a particular viewpoint and was necessary to facilitate administration of the Selective
Service system).
See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
48.
49.
See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
50.
See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch:An Argument in
Favor of ConstitutionalMeta-Analysis in State Action Determinations,94 MICH. L. REV.
302, 333-35, 342-46 (1995).
51.
See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351 (1997) (invoking the marketplace
metaphor); 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 495-98, 503-04 (applying the marketplace
metaphor to protect alcohol advertising); id. at 518-23 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (embracing marketplace metaphor and arguing for equal
treatment of all speech); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-65 (1976) (invoking and applying the marketplace
metaphor to justify affording commercial speech significant First Amendment protection);
SMOLLA, supra note 38, at 6-8, 236-39 (describing merits of a market-based system of
speech regulation and noting consanguinity of such an approach with a free market
economy); Kozinski & Banner, supra note 44, at 651-53 (applying the marketplace
metaphor to support an argument in favor of treating commercial speech no less favorably
than non-commercial speech).
52.
See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 23; ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960) [hereinafter
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM]; Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment Is An
Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245.
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53
be heard, but rather "that everything worth saying shall be said."

Meiklejohn's theory of the First Amendment has attracted a distinguished

following of legal scholars, including Professors Harry Kalven, Owen
Fiss, and Cass Sunstein.'

Meiklejohn's theory of the First Amendment tolerates government
action aimed at ensuring that "everything worth saying" gets said. For
example, if concentrations of wealth or limited access to the electronic

media muzzled important voices within the community, the government
could adopt measures aimed at leveling the playing field, including
limitations on the use of wealth to disseminate a particular idea or

advocate the election of a particular candidate. 5 Likewise, government
could adopt regulations aimed at enhancing the relative voice of minorities

within the community to ensure that all relevant viewpoints are heard and
considered.56
The Meiklejohn theory of the First Amendment emphasizes Justice
Brandeis's linkage of the First Amendment to free and open democratic
deliberation in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California." Unlike
Holmes, Brandeis espoused a functional view of free speech:
Those who won our independence believed that the final
end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties;

and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail
over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as
a means. . . . They believed that freedom to think as you will
and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech
and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them,
53.

MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 52, at 26.

54.

See OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 15-26 (1996) [hereinafter
HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY
TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 150-78 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988);
SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 28, 34-43, 48-51, 121-29; Kalven, supra note 30, at 207-13,
221 & n.125; cf. POST, supra note 26, at 278-89 (rejecting both Meiklejohn and his
contemporary followers because so-called "collectivist" theories of free expression grossly
overestimate the abilities of government to establish truly viewpoint neutral, non-culturally
contingent speech regulations and faulting the Meiklejohn camp for disregarding the value
of individual autonomy, which traditional free speech theories greatly facilitate).
55.
Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down stateimposed restrictions on the use of corporate monies to influence the outcome of elections);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (striking down federal spending limits on
independent expenditures to influence the outcome of elections for federal office).
56.
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-91 (1969); Stephen A.
Gardbaum, Broadcasting, Democracy, and the Market, 82 GEO. L.J. 373 (1993).
57.
274 U.S. 357 (1927).

Fiss, IRONY]; Fiss, supra note 31, at 83-87, 117-20;
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discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government.58

For Brandeis, "the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely
supposed grievances and proposed remedies" and "the fitting remedy for
evil counsels is good ones." 9 In Justice Brandeis's view, freedom of
speech facilitates democratic self-government by generating open
-1
discussion of matters of public concern.'
Under the Brandeis approach, the deliberative process is a means
toward the end of effective self-government. Accordingly, bad ideas or
proposals should receive a full and free airing unless they present an
immediate and palpable threat to the community. As Brandeis puts it,
"[i]f there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence." 6"
This instrumentalist view of freedom of speech differs significantly
from the Holmesian marketplace paradigm.' For Holmes, free speech
is an end in itself, not a means to some other good.'
Although
Holmes's approach ostensibly seeks truth, "truth" in the Holmesian
tradition is socially constructed by operation of the market; hence, if
Marxist socialism proves sufficiently persuasive to enough voters, its
58.
59.

Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id.

60.
See id. at 377:
To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and
fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no
danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the

incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before
there is opportunity for full discussion.
See also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937):
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements
to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative
is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free
press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political
discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.
61.
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
62.
As Professor Cass Sunstein has noted, "[i]n Brandeis' conception, free speech

is emphatically 'a means' insofar as it is connected to the achievement of a certain
conception of democratic government." SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 27-28.
63.
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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tenets must be true.' In addition, socially constructed truth is valid only
within a community that shares a common set of premises. Thus, for
members of the Heaven's Gate cult, the Hale-Bopp Comet represented an
intergalactic taxi cab-although the general population did not concur in
this assessment of the available data.
Under the Holmesian approach, the First Amendment requires
tolerance of speech activity literally "fraught with death" absent a clear

and present danger of serious harm, harm so grave that "an immediate
check is required to save the country."' To the extent that Holmes
endorsed a functional role for free speech, it is the relation of free speech

to the search for truth that is paramount, not the relation of free speech
to good government. 66
Although the primary exponents of the Meiklejohn theory of the First

Amendment tend to be Civic Republicans (like Professor Cass Sunstein)
or traditional liberals (like Professor Owen Fiss), the theory has attracted
an eclectic following. For example, former Judge (and then-Professor)
Robert Bork embraced Meiklejohn's argument that the First Amendment
should protect only political speech.67 Needless to say, Bork is far from
liberal in his views.6
The principal attraction of Meiklejohn's theory is that it provides a

plausible rationale for protecting speech over other important values, such
as equality. When the Ku Klux Klan marches down the streets carrying
banners proclaiming racist, sexist, or homophobic messages, the

community's commitment to equality suffers.'

The Meiklejohn theory

64.
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
65.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
66.
Professor Cass Sunstein has noted the dichotomy between the Holmes and
Brandeis approaches to freedom of expression and endorsed Justice Brandeis's point of
view because it is consistent with the Madisonian Civic Republican tradition. See
SUNSTEIN,

supra note 41, at 23-28.

67.
See Robert H. Bork, Neutral PrinciplesandSome FirstAmendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); see also ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH:
MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 98-102, 146-50 (1996) [hereinafter BORK,
SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH]; ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 333-36 (1990) [hereinafter BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA].

68.
See BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH, supra note 67, at 193-225
(attacking modern feminism as anti-family and elitist); id. at 123-29 (denouncing modern
culture and art as violent, scatological, and obscene); BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA,
supra note 67, at 110-26 (decrying substantive due process as a form of unjustifiable
judicial activism).
69.
In this regard, consider Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, which prohibits
discrimination in the workplace. The federal courts have held that Title VII prohibits the
creation or maintenance of a "hostile environment" in the workplace. See Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
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supports the Klan's right to speak not on a libertarian basis (i.e., people
have the right to be racists if they so choose), but rests instead on the

notion that such activity assists the community in deciding who should
govern and what rules should apply to the community (i.e., given the

existence of these racist viewpoints, perhaps affirmative action remains
a necessary social policy).
The Meiklejohn theory both recognizes and celebrates the inexorable
connection between a functioning democracy and freedom of expression.

As Professor Robert Reich explained in his recent memoir documenting
his service as Secretary of Labor, representative government requires an
active and ongoing debate to legitimate the public policy choices advanced
by those holding office:
Democracy requires deliberation and discussion.

public inquiry and discovery.

It entails

Citizens need to be actively

engaged. Political leaders must offer visions of the future and
arguments to support the visions, and then must listen carefully

for the response. A health-care plan devised by Plato's
philosopher-king won't wash.7'
The Meiklejohn theory is both optimistic (for it posits that meaningful
self-government is possible) and pragmatic (for it acknowledges that
achieving and maintaining a participatory democracy will not be an easy

task).
The Meiklejohn theory's most significant drawback is its inability to
provide a cogent rationale for protecting speech unrelated to politics or
self-governance. 7 ' Meiklejohn himself argued that scientific and artistic
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Note, Gender-Based Harassment
and the Hostile Work Environment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1362-63. This obviously has
an impact on the ability of individuals in a given workplace to express themselves;
automobile mechanics might wish to festoon their workplace with sexually explicit
photographs and muse about the relative desirability of sexual relations with their female
colleagues. If this conduct were sufficiently pervasive, it could give rise to liability under
Title VII. Thus, Title VII constitutes a kind of content-based, government-imposed
restriction on free speech in the nation's workplaces. Nevertheless, it is quite doubtful
that the Supreme Court would sustain a First Amendment challenge to Title VII. We have
decided as a society not to tolerate unfettered freedom of speech in the workplace.
Logically, we could value equality above free expression in other contexts, such as college
and university campuses.

See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993);

Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, PressureValves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis
of PaternalisticObjections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 871 (1994).
70.
ROBERT B. REICH, LOCKED INTHE CABINET 108 (1998).
71.
See Stern, supra note 46, at 933. Professor Robert Post has suggested that
another significant drawback of the Meiklejohn theory is a failure to appreciate the
important role free speech plays in facilitating individual autonomy. See POST, supra note
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expression is necessary to enable people to make wise political decisions
and therefore should be deemed protected.'
However, the arts and
sciences themselves constitute positive social goods and ought to be (and
are) valued for themselves.'

C. The Supreme Court's Choice
Despite the ardor of the Meiklejohn adherents and the cogency of
their arguments, it is rather plain that the Supreme Court has not accepted
their vision of the First Amendment. Take, for example, the case of diala-porn services. It is difficult to fathom how the dial-a-porn industry or

its services further democratic self-governance.

On the contrary, one

could make powerful arguments that pornography-regardless of its
precise form-debases society and inhibits the creation of a polity capable
of rational self-governance. 74

Nevertheless, in Sable Communications v. FCC,75 the Supreme
Court held that dial-a-porn services enjoy significant First Amendment

protection.76 This result is inconsistent with the Meiklejohn theory of
the First Amendment, whether explicated by Fiss, Sunstein, Bork, or
Meiklejohn himself.' On the other hand, the result comports nicely
with the Holmesian marketplace of ideas model. If citizens wish to talk

dirty to each other over the telephone, so be it; the government cannot
prohibit such communications, however meager the civic value of such
speech activity.7 8
26, at 274-76, 282-86, 288-89.
72.
See Meiklejohn, supra note 52, at 256-57.
73.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (conferring upon Congress the power to
encourage "science and useful arts").
74.
See BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 67, at 128; ANDREA
DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1989); MACKINNON, supra note
69, at 71-110; SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 210-26; Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male
Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985).
75.
492 U.S. 115 (1989).
76.
See id. at 126-31. One might cynically conclude from this result that,
although there may not be a constitutional right to engage in consensual sodomy, citizens
of the United States do enjoy a First Amendment right to masturbate. Compare Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment protects the viewing
of pornographic materials within the confines of a person's home), with Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the substantive aspect of the Due Process
Clause does not protect consensual sodomy between adults).
77.
See, e.g., BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 67, at 128; FISS,
supra note 31, at 83-87; MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 23, at 22-27; SUNSTEIN, supra note 41,
at 215-26.
78.
See REDISH, supra note 43, at 68-76, 259-64; VAN ALSTYNE,
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 6, at 21-22, 40-49.
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The Meiklejohn theory of the First Amendment is also difficult to
square with the result in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.79 In 44

Liquormart, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protected
the right of liquor stores to advertise their prices, notwithstanding Rhode
Island's objection that price-based advertising would tend to promote

active price competition among retailers, result in lower prices to
consumers, and thereby increase the consumption of alcohol among its
citizens. I
Rhode Island asserted, reasonably enough, that the social ills
associated with the consumption of alcohol justified restrictions on alcohol
advertising.8" Under the Meiklejohn theory of the First Amendment,
Rhode Island should have prevailed: Advertising alcohol does nothing to
enrich civic life, encourage active citizenship, or otherwise improve the
overall state of well-being of the community. On the contrary, alcohol
advertising, like cigarette advertising, is likely to impose significant social
costs on the community. Advertising of this sort tends to generate
increased consumption of alcohol, both because of increased public

awareness of its availability and lower prices.82
In this respect, the Supreme Court's decision in Posadasde Puerto
Rico Ass'n. v. Tourism Co.,83 which sustained Puerto Rico's ban on

casino advertising, better comported with the Meiklejohn theory of the
First Amendment. Speech that does not directly or indirectly benefit the
79.
517 U.S. 484 (1996).
80.
See id. at 489, 506-16.
81.
See id. at 502-08.
82.
See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1994),
rev'd, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 747-51 & 748 n.8
(5th Cir. 1983) (en banc). See generally Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). I suppose one could argue that
virtuous Civic Republican citizens might use the savings realized through lower alcohol
prices resulting from active price competition to underwrite political causes they support
or perhaps to go to an ennobling form of entertainment, such as the opera or ballet. If
one could make this argument with a straight face, 44 Liquormartcould be brought within
the Meiklejohn vision of the First Amendment. Of course, it seems far more likely that
most consumers will simply buy more alcohol, or cigarettes, or perhaps both. Indeed,
advertising not only promotes competition between suppliers of a good or service, but also
promotes consumption of the good or service being advertised. See Penn Advertising,
Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318, 1321, 1325-26 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated and
remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996), modified, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996), and cert.
denied 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305, 130910, 1314-17 (4th Cir. 1995); Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 748 n.8; see also Regulations
Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect
Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. §
801).
83.
478 U.S. 328 (1986).
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community by facilitating its ability to oversee the government is outside
the First Amendment's free speech guarantee.
Notwithstanding its earlier precedent in Posadas, the Supreme Court
struck down the Rhode Island prohibition on price advertising, noting that
Rhode Island could directly regulate the sale of alcohol but could not
regulate speech associated with the sale of alcohol: "[A] state legislature
does not have the broad discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading
information for the paternalistic purposes that the Posadas majority was
willing to toierate."' Speaking for a plurality of four justices, Justice
Stevens emphasized that "the First Amendment directs that government
may not suppress speech as easily as it may suppress conduct, and that
speech restrictions cannot be treated as simply another means that the
government may use to achieve its ends."' This approach to protecting
commercial speech incorporates and reflects the Holmesian speech ethic.
All of this is not to say that the Meiklejohn theory of the First
Amendment has failed to influence the Supreme Court. On the contrary,
the Supreme Court has embraced Meiklejohn's assertion that freedom of
speech is intertwined inextricably with the project of democratic selfgovernment; thus, the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that political
speech is at the "center" or "core" of the First Amendment. In New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, for example, Justice Brennan's opinion for the
majority essentially embraced Meiklejohn's argument that freedom to
criticize the government is crucial to the proper functioning of a
democracy.86 Similarly, in cases involving "low value" speech, such as
nude dancing or dial-a-porn, the Supreme Court has carefully
distinguished marginal speech activities that lie at the "outer perimeters
of the First Amendment"87 from political, artistic, and scientific speech.
The Supreme Court's approach essentially adopts both the Holmesian
and Meiklejohn theories of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court
has embraced both the marketplace metaphor and the notion that political
84.
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 510.
85.
Id. at 512.
86.
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964); KALVEN,
supra note 54, at 162-63; Kalven, supra note 30, at 208-10. Justice Brennan was more
explicit in his later opinions and writings. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
867 n.20 (1982) (plurality opinion); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the
Meiklejohn Interpretationof the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1965). Other
members of the Supreme Court have also invoked Meiklejohn's theory from time-to-time.
See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.3 (1980);
CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 122 (1973).

87.

Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991); see also Sable

Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 777-78 (1978); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975); California
v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972).
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speech is a special concern of the First Amendment. Its decisions also
have recognized that the First Amendment protects individual autonomy,
even when individuals or corporations elect to exercise that autonomy in
ways inconsistent with the best interests of the community (or, for that
matter, their own best interests). Cases like Stanley v. Georgia,"s Sable
Communications,89 and 44 Liquormart reflect the Supreme Court's
willingness to vindicate individual liberty, even at the expense of the

community. In this way, it has maintained the Holmesian tradition of
liberty.

At the same time, the Supreme Court has signalled its basic
agreement with Meiklejohn's larger thesis.

While embracing the

marketplace metaphor, the Supreme Court has endorsed the proposition
that political speech and speech that otherwise facilitates democratic selfgovernance enjoys the most robust First Amendment protection; a degree
of protection more demanding than that applied to other forms of speech
activity. Unlike Judge Alex Kozinski and others in the law and
economics movement, 9 the Justices have rejected the argument that all
speech is of equal value for First Amendment purposes. Under a pure
market-based approach to the First Amendment, speech should be treated
the same regardless of its content. Its success or failure would be a
function of its ability to persuade. A flyer for a Macy's Labor Day sale
should receive no more, and no less, First Amendment protection than a

flyer for a candidate for political office. 2

To date, however, the

Supreme Court has maintained a dichotomy between political speech and

other kinds of speech activity.'
88.
394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment, in conjunction with
other provisions of the Bill of Rights, protects the possession and display of obscene
materials for non-commercial purpose within a private residence).
89.
492 U.S. 115 (holding unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds a
statutory provision criminalizing the distribution of certain indecent communications over
telephone systems).
90.
517 U.S. 484 (holding unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds a state
law prohibiting price advertising for alcoholic beverages).
91.
See, e.g., R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
32-33 (1977); R.H. Coase, The Economics of the FirstAmendment: The Marketfor Goods
and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. EcON. REV. 384 (1974); Kozinski & Banner, supra
note 44.
92.
See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 44, at 628; Steven Shiffrin, The First
Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1216 (1983); cf. William Van Alstyne,
RememberingMelville Nimmer: Some CautionaryNotes on Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA
L. REv. 1635, 1638-48 (1996) (arguing that political speech deserves a higher degree of
First Amendment protection than commercial speech).
93.
See Van Alstyne, supra note 92, at 1638-40, 1654-57.

1998:905

Chrysanthemum, Sword and FirstAmendment

925

There is, to be sure, a trend toward the marketplace metaphor in
contemporary Supreme Court cases. Increasingly, the Holmesian view
seems to be in ascendancy. 4 But the defenders of the Meiklejohn theory
have not ceded the field just yet.'
As Professor Sunstein has noted, the Holmesian and Meiklejohn
theories of free expression reflect a genuine dichotomy: Results in
concrete cases will differ depending on which theory one embraces.'
The Supreme Court's failure to make a firm choice may reflect an
ambivalence about the proper role of freedom of speech in a pluralistic
society. At the same time, an examination of the Japanese Supreme
Court's free speech case law shows that a society's choice between the
Holmesian and Meiklejohnian visions of the First Amendment may well
be a function of its sense of community and shared values.
Professor William Van Alstyne has suggested the metaphor of a
system of concentric circles to describe the First Amendment, with
political speech at its core and indecent speech at its periphery.' This
metaphor aptly captures the course the Supreme Court has charted in its
decisions: The First Amendment is concerned principally with political
speech, but it also provides protection to speech unrelated to democratic
self-governance.
D. Setting the Stage for a ComparativeAdventure
An examination of the case law arising under Article 21, the
Japanese analog to the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment,
should shed light on the relative strength of the Holmesian and
Meiklejohnian accounts of freedom of speech. Moreover, this exercise
should lead to a better understanding of the implicit values reflected in the
United States Supreme Court's embrace of both theories. It might even
suggest a proverbial "third way," an approach to freedom of speech that
rejects both accounts in favor of some other set of values.
Socrates admonished that an unexamined life is not worth living.98
So too, a circular jurisprudence that offers up its own conclusions as
See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997); City of Cincinnati v.
94.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993). See generally Van Alstyne, supra note

92, at 1638-48.
95. See FIss,

IRONY,

supra note 54, at 1-26;

SUNSTEIN,

supra note 41, at 17-5 1,

241-52.

96.

See SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 23-28.

97.
See VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supranote
6, at 40-49.
98.
See PLATO, The Apology, in FIVE DIALOGUES 23, at 41, para. 38 (G.M.A.
Grube trans., 1981).
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justifications is intellectually indefensible. With the onslaught from both
the left and the right,' traditional free speech advocates in the United
States must be prepared to make their case persuasively within the
academy, to the courts, and to the citizenry.'0° In the end, advocates
of strong First Amendment protection for free expression will prevail only
if we can offer compelling rationales for elevating speech over other
important (constitutional) values, such as equality or comity within the
community.
Consideration of free speech traditions in industrial
democracies that have self-consciously embraced freedom of speech as a
core social value will better prepare those who support freedom of speech
to meet both the present challenges and those that lie ahead.
Before embarking on an examination of the Japanese approach to
freedom of expression, a caveat or two about the limitations of
comparative legal scholarship is in order. Every culture-including legal
cultures-has its own patois, its own unique cadence. Those who grow
up within the culture learn these shorthands and master the iconography
of the legal landscape. 1°' On the other hand, those from outside a
99.
See, e.g., BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 67, at 333-36
(arguing that the Supreme Court's free speech case law is grossly overprotective of speech
unworthy of even minimal protection); MACKINNON, supra note 69, at 71-110 (arguing
that a genuine commitment to the principle of equality precludes the protection of sexist
and racist speech); SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 241-52 (arguing that government should
be permitted to enact viewpoint neutral laws aimed at improving the social and political
culture of the United States).
100.
Notwithstanding the current vogue of balancing away the intrinsic value of
freedom of expression, a number of distinguished scholars have continued to advocate
broad protection for expressive activity, even expressive activity that is offensive or
hurtful to particular segments of the community. See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 43, at
259-64; SCHAUER, supra note 38, at 154-63, 184-88; SMOLLA, supra note 38, at 15-17,
43-65, 330-42; NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND
THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS 14-15, 244-50 (1995); VAN ALSTYNE,
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 6, at 40-49.
101.
See STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 305-321, 328-34, 338-55 (1980) [hereinafter FISH, TEXT IN
THIS CLASS] (arguing that words derive their meaning within interpretative communities
and that this meaning inheres not from any objective connection between words and things
or ideas, but rather from a set of shared assumptions that confer meaning on symbols);
see also STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND
THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 120-60 (1989) [hereinafter
FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY]. For analysis and criticism of Professor Fish's
theories, see Peter Schanck, The Only Game in Town: An Introduction to Interpretive
Theory, Statutory Construction, andLegislative Histories,38 KAN. L. REV. 815, 830-37
(1990); Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO.
L.J. 37, 42-45 (1987).
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particular legal culture do not possess this information; in a very real
sense, they cannot effectively "talk the talk. "1t 2

Accordingly, any comparative law exercise comes with the inherent
danger of reading culturally-contingent meaning into legal terms of art.
For example, if a foreign court uses the term "consideration" to describe

a necessary prerequisite to the formation of a binding contract, an
American lawyer is apt to read into that term a host of rules and ideas
learned in the first semester of law school. Moreover, this conferral of
specific meaning on an otherwise general term largely occurs

subconsciously: The reader approaches the text and incorporates meaning
reflexively, without, as it were, skipping a beat. 3 Of course, in a
comparative context this assumed meaning may not-indeed probably does

not-apply.
If it were possible to remove one's cultural blinders at will, these
difficulties could be overcome quite easily. 1 4 Sadly, cultural blinders

are not like sunglasses: One cannot simply remove them and store them
in a convenient case. Instead, the comparativist must attempt to avoid
doing that which comes naturally, assuming the universality of culturally-

contingent meaning.
Notwithstanding the potential pitfalls, it is possible to examine
profitably a foreign legal system. The trick is to discern meaning by
reference to the foreign texts themselves; one must double-check unstated

assumptions by reference to other materials from the relevant legal
culture. In this fashion, one can avoid overreading, or underreading,
foreign legal texts."
102.
By way of example, consider the culturally-specific nature of various speech
idioms, e.g., "We had a ball last night." Taken literally, this sentence could convey any
number of meanings: (1) the group possessed a round, spherical object of some sort, but
lost it, (2) the group put on an elaborate dance, (3) it could constitute a kind of
scatological reference, (4) it could mean something else. As it happens, most users of
American English would select option four (4); the sentence means that the group had a
pleasant evening, without any reference to precisely what the group did. Legal language
is no different and is, therefore, culturally contingent. See Dan F. Henderson, Japanese
Law in English: Reflections on Translation, 6 J. JAPANESE STUD. 117 (1980) (noting that
problems of comparative legal studies include not only difficulties of connotation and
denotation of particular terms, but also encompass systemic difficulties associated with
differing views about the nature of precedent and the proper operation of the rule of law).
103.
See FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 101, at ix, 436-67;
FISH, TEXT INTHIS CLASS, supra note 101, at 13-17; see also Stanley Fish, Still Wrong
After All These Years, 6 LAW & PHIL. 401, 405-07 (1987); Stanley Fish, Working on the
Chain Gang: Interpretationin Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 551, 562 (1982).
104.
See BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 13-16; see also Daniel H. Foote, The Roles
of Comparative Law, 73 WASH. L. REV. 25 (1998).
105.
I would be seriously negligent if, in this context, I failed to note the
difficulties inherent in translation. With respect to Japanese legal materials, those without
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II. AN INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Although there are a number of surprising congruities between the
free speech jurisprudence of the United States and Japanese Supreme
Courts, the Japanese Supreme Court has charted its own unique approach
to the vindication of the Japanese Constitution's guarantee of freedom of
expression, an approach that differs significantly in a number of material
respects from that of the United States. As demonstrated more fully
below, these differences probably have much to do with differences in
institutional roles and perceived judicial competence. That said, there is
a difference in the scope of constitutionally protected free expression, in
part because of differences in core values about the importance and role
of free expression in a democratic polity. The free speech decisions of
the Supreme Court of Japan are much more consistent with Meiklejohn's
vision of freedom of expression than comparable decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. In fact, the Supreme Court of Japan has firmly
and consistently demanded a clear nexus between expressive activity and
the project of democratic self-government before affording speech activity
constitutional protection under Article 21.
Although the Japanese Supreme Court generally has proven unwilling
to interpose the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression over
legislative or executive acts,"° it has exhibited a strong and abiding
reading ability in Japanese (whether in Konji or romanized form) must rely upon the
copious English-language translations of Japanese legal materials. Obviously, reading
foreign law in translation simply compounds the difficulties associated with understanding
the meaning of the legal text. See Henderson, supra note 102, at 140-51. With respect
to this article, I have enjoyed the good fortune of having the benefit of assistance from
some of the foremost American experts in Japanese law: Professor John Haley, Professor
Dan Foote, and Dean Percy Luney. Hopefully, with such invaluable assistance and
reasonable diligence on my own part, I have managed to avoid the worst of the dangers
associated with attempting to understand foreign legal concepts in translation.
106.
See infra notes 154-288 and accompanying text.
107.
This observation does not hold true for the lower Japanese courts. Japanese
district and intermediate appellate courts have struck down both local and federal
regulations based on Article 21's guarantee of freedom of expression. See, e.g.,
Judgment on the Enshrinement of a Dead SDF Officer to Gokoku Shrine, Series of
ProminentJudgments of the Supreme Court of Japan upon Questions of Constitutionality
No. 25, at 1 (General Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan, 1991) (decided June 1, 1988)
(reversing district and high court rulings that Shinto enshrinement of a dead SDF officer
violated Article 20's prohibition of mandatory religious observances); Judgment Upon
Case of Constitutionality on Customs Inspection, Series of Prominent Judgments of the
Supreme Court of Japan upon Questions of Constitutionality No. 20, at i (General
Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan, 1985) (decided Dec. 12, 1984), 38 MINSH0 12, at
1308, reprinted in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE
LAW OF JAPAN,

1970 THROUGH 1990 at 453 (1996) [hereinafter Customs Inspection Case]
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appreciation for the importance of free speech in a participatory
democracy. Moreover, the Supreme Court consistently has read statutory
and administrative restrictions on freedom of expression narrowly in order

to minimize their impact. " At the same time, government authorities
have not attempted to censor speech activities on any wide-spread basis.
Indeed, Japanese political parties offer voters a much broader political
spectrum from which to choose than United States citizens presently

enjoy" and Japanese elections are usually highly competitive."'
(reporting and later reversing district court's holding that certain customs inspection laws
violated freedom of speech); Judgment Upon Case of the So-Called "Popolo Theatrical
Group Case," Series of Prominent Judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan upon
Questions of Constitutionality No. 8, at 1 (General Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan,
1965) (decided May 22, 1963) (reversing district court ruling that academic freedom
justified students' decision to beat undercover police who had infiltrated their
organization); Judgment Upon Case of the Metropolitan Ordinance, Series of Prominent
Judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan upon Questions of Constitutionality No. 5, at
1-2 (General Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan, 1962) (decided July 20, 1960)
(reversing the initial decision of the district court striking down Tokyo's mass
demonstration ordinance); see also LAWRENCE WARD BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
IN JAPAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 377-78 (1984)
(reporting the split among the lower courts regarding the constitutionality of various
provisions of the Election Law's speech restrictions). There are at least two possible
explanations for this phenomenon. Because the lower courts do not have the last word,
they may feel less of an institutional constraint on exercising the power of judicial review.
See, e.g., Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997);
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). There are also age differences
at work. Supreme Court Justices are usually in their sixties when appointed, whereas
lower court judges are often appointed at a considerably younger age. See Percy R.
Luney, Jr., The Judiciary:Its Organization and Status in the ParliamentarySystem, in
JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

supra note 13, at 123, 129-37.

Thus, "youthful

exuberance" may also help to account for the Japanese lower courts' relatively bold
approach to constitutional adjudication.
See, e.g., Customs Inspections Case, supra note 107, at 6-10 (reading an
108.
authorization to prohibit the import of materials that injure "the public morals" to restrict
only obscene materials); Judgment Upon Case of Defamation, Series of Prominent
Judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan upon Questions of Constitutionality No. 11, at
2 (General Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan, 1970) (decided June 25, 1969)
(interpreting broadly an exemption to liability for defamatory statements regarding matters
of public concern when such statements, although false, are made without reckless
disregard for truth); Judgment Upon Case of the Metropolitan Ordinance, supra note 107,
at 4 (reading Tokyo ordinance to require issuance of permission for mass demonstrations
absent a clear and present danger of imminent lawlessness).
109.
As George Wallace once wryly remarked in his 1968 independent presidential
quest, at least arguably "there ain't a dime's worth of difference" between Democrats and
Republicans. JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES?: THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION
OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 11
REICH,

(1995). To a large extent, this is true.

See

supra note 70, at 59-65, 118-19, 146-48 (describing the Clinton Administration's
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To the extent freedom of speech faces serious threats in Japan, these
threats are much more a function of privately imposed constraints than of
official government repression or censorship."' In this regard, the
Japanese experience offers a cautionary tale for the United States. It is

not always the government that is the enemy of freedom of
expression;" 2 corporations, churches, and communities can be far more
decision to pursue policies endorsed by Wall Street investment firms rather than the
human capital and physical infrastructure investment programs set forth by then-candidate
Bill Clinton during the 1992 election campaign). Consider, for example, the 1996
presidential election. The policy differences between President Clinton and Senator Dole
were not pronounced; both endorsed fiscal responsibility and sustainable growth as the
paramount national objectives. Notwithstanding Ross Perot's "success" in 1992 and with
the possible exception of Theodore Roosevelt's "Bull Moose" party in 1912, third parties
have not enjoyed significant support in the United States for over one hundred years. By
way of contrast, "marginal" parties in Japan, like the Communists, regularly elect

members to the Diet. See HITOSHI ABE ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF
115-38 (James W. White trans. 1994); GERALD L. CURTIS, THE JAPANESE WAY

JAPAN

18-44, 174 (1988); see also T.R. Reid, Maverick Takes Over in Japan,
Aug. 7, 1993, at A14. On the other hand, the Liberal Democratic Party's
historic dominance in the Diet, coupled with a parliamentary system of government,
significantly mutes the real-world impact of Japan's multi-party electoral system. See ABE
ET AL., supra, at 115-71, 182-89; Maki, supra note 13, at 44-46; Okudaira, supra note
13, at 29-31, 33; see also NORMA FIELD, IN THE REALM OF A DYING EMPEROR 27
(1993) ("Thus, the great Socialist victory in the upper house elections of July 1989 created
a painfully hopeful moment when it almost seemed as if one-party rule, which had already
blanketed four decades, did not have to stretch into infinity.").
110.
See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A
ComparativeApproach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 740-41 (1994).
111.
As one commentator has put it, "[tihe status of the freedom of expression in
Japan may be explained by the statement that 'Japan is politically free, but socially not
free.'" Okudaira, supra note 13, at 10; see also HALEY, supra note 16, at 183-86; James
J. Nelson, Culture, Commerce, and the Constitution:Legal andExtra-LegalRestraints on
Freedom of Expression in the Japanese PublishingIndustry, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J.
45 (1996). Professor Lawrence Beer, a noted expert on freedom of expression in Japan,
has offered similar observations: "In Japan . . .homogeneity, group orientation, social
hierarchy, quasi-parental-filial relationships (oyabun-kobun), reciprocal dependency
patterns (amae), and ethnic separatism join the civil law, common law, and conciliation
traditions to affect freedom and restraint of expression." Beer, Freedom of Expression,
supra note 21, at 224; see also John 0. Haley, Introduction:Legal vs. Social Controls,
17 LAW IN JAPAN 1, 3-5 (1984).
112.
See Owen M. Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner,26 SuFFOLK U. L. REV. 1,
2-3, 14-20 (1992) (arguing that the Supreme Court's public forum decisions fail to provide
sufficient public space for speech activities by those who lack access to private property
or capital); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787-89, 793-94
(1987) [hereinafter Fiss, Why the State] (noting the ability of wealthy and powerful
interests to limit meaningful public debate and arguing in favor of state efforts to
ameliorate these untoward effects in order to ensure full and robust public debate on
matters of community concern); see also THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 16,
OF POLITICS
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effective at stifling dissent than bureaucrats and misguided police
chiefs."'

A. The ConstitutionalText
As in the United States, freedom of expression in Japan enjoys
Article 21 of the Japanese Constitution
constitutional protection.
guarantees to all citizens "[fireedom of assembly and association as well
as speech, press and all other forms of expression."" 4 In addition, it
provides that "[n]o censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy

of any means of communication be violated."" 5
Like the United States's First Amendment, the right to freedom of
expression is unqualified as written; Article 21 does not invite the

judiciary to balance the right of freedom of expression against other
The textually unqualified nature of the right
public interests.
notwithstanding, the Supreme Court of Japan routinely has balanced the
individual's interest in freedom of expression against other private
interests' 6 and public interests." 7 The Supreme Court of the United
States has, of course, also engaged in similar balancing exercises."'
at 758 (noting that in Japan "every motion picture" is subject to review by a "Committee
for the Maintenance of Ethics in Motion Pictures"and explaining that this system of film
censorship "is maintained by motion picture companies without any government
participation").
113.
See FIELD, supra note 109, at 44-47, 132-36 (describing the informal social
pressure placed on dissidents in Japanese society); Fiss, IRONY, supra note 54, at 1-4, 1526 (describing the dangers that concentrations of wealth and media power can pose to
deliberative democracy); EDWIN M. REINGOLD, CHRYSANTHEMUMS AND THORNS: THE
UNTOLD STORY OF MODERN JAPAN 162-63 (1992) (describing the censorial efforts of the
Burakumin Liberation League). See generally Bill Carter, TV Sponsors Heed Viewers
Who Find Shows Too Racy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1989, § 1, at 1; Allen R. Myerson,
Southern Baptist Convention Callsfor Boycott of Disney, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1997, at
A18; Allen R. Myerson, Baptists Boycott the Magic Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
1997, § 4, at 2; Bruce Selcraig, Reverend Wildmon's War on the Arts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
2, 1990, § 6, at 22.
KENP6, art. 21, para. 1.
114.
Id.at art. 21, para. 2.
115.
116.
See, e.g., Judgment Upon Case of Defamation, supra note 108 (balancing
interest in freedom of expression and a free press against private interest in preserving
good name and reputation).
117.
See, e.g., Customs Inspection Case, supra note 107, at 8 (balancing right to
freedom of expression against community interest in "sexual order and maintenance of a
minimum sexual morality").
118.
See Meiklejohn, supra note 52, at 251-52; see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom
of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2417, 2438-44 (1996) (discussing the uses and abuses of balancing in the Supreme Court's
First Amendment strict scrutiny analyses).
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The Japanese Supreme Court's balancing is, to a large extent,
unavoidable. From time to time, rights collide and courts are forced to
establish a proper boundary line between competing constitutional
interests." 9
Moreover, the Japanese Constitution invites balancing, although it
does not require it. Article 12 provides that "[t]he freedoms and rights
guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the
constant endeavor of the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of
these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing
them for the public welfare. " " This notion of "abuse of rights"
establishes a textual justification for weighing the costs of an individual's
or group's exercise of a particular right against the relative cost of such
exercise to the community as a whole.' 2' As in the United States,
however, this balancing of interests does not necessarily redound in favor
of the state.1
Indeed, the mandate to balance has proven far less
deadly to the protection of constitutional rights in Japan than in Canada,
where textually-mandated balancing has led the Canadian Supreme Court
to reject speech claims routinely, sometimes in favor of other rights (such
3
as equality) and other times in favor of generalized social interests.'
119.
Consider, for example, the right to a fair trial and the right of the press to
report on pending cases. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., FundamentalPropertyRights,
*85 GEO. L.J. 555, 611 n.354 (1997).
120.
KENP6, art. 12; see Judgment Upon Case of Translation and Publication of
Lady Chatterly's Lover and Article 175 of the Penal Code, Series of ProminentJudgments
of the Supreme Court of Japan upon Questions of Constitutionality No. 2, at 11-12
(General Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan, 1958) (decided Mar. 13, 1957) [hereinafter
Lady Chatterly's Lover] (discussing and applying Article 12); Beer, Public Welfare, supra
note 21, at 207-10 (discussing the operation of Article 12).
121.
See Judgment Upon Case of the Metropolitan Ordinance, supra note 107, at
2-3, 5-6 (invoking Article 12 incident to a balancing analysis that weighed the interest of
the general public in using streets and other public spaces for their intended uses against
interest of protestors in using such properties for their speech-related activities); see also
Christopher A. Ford, The Indigenizationof Constitutionalismin the JapaneseExperience,
28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 3, 22-29 (1996) (discussing and analyzing Japan's evolving
"abuse of rights" doctrines).
122.
See, e.g., Japan v. Kanemoto, 396 HANREi JIHO 19 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 21,
1964), reprinted in HIROSHI ITOH & LAWRENCE WARD BEER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CASE LAW OF JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1961-70, at 242 (1978)

(rejecting State's argument that Article 12 balancing justified suppression of allegedly
subversive political tracts).
123.
See KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES,
AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 12-16, 64-70 (1995); MACKINNON, supra note 69, at 97-107;
supra note 100, at 229-46; see also Franklin R. Liss, Comment, A Mandate
to Balance:JudicialProtectionofIndividualRights Underthe CanadianCharterofRights
and Freedoms, 41 EMORY L.J. 1281, 1283-92, 1296-1306 (1992).
STROSSEN,

1998:905

Chrysanthemum, Sword and First Amendment

933

Significantly, the Japanese Constitution, unlike its American
counterpart, directly vests the judiciary with the power of judicial review.
"The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine
the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act."'u
Finally, the Supreme Court of Japan, like the United States Supreme

Court, has required a showing of state action as a prerequisite to invoking
successfully a constitutional right. Thus, a private company's decision to
fire three employees who circulated to their fellow employees communist
tracts critical of the company and its policies did not implicate Article
21's guarantee of freedom of speech." 2 Government played no role in
the decision, and therefore Article 21 simply did not apply; the dispute
was purely a private matter. 126
B. The Japanese ConstitutionalStyle
Although the Japanese Supreme Court enjoys a textual mandate to
protect freedom of expression and a textual right to exercise the power of
judicial review, it has never struck down a local, prefectural, or national
ordinance or law on free speech grounds. 27 It has, however, recently
124.

KENPO, art. 81; see Hanreishri, VI, No. 9, at 783 (The Suzuki Decision)

(Sup. Ct., Oct. 8, 1952), reprintedin JOHN M. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN
JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1948-60, at 362, 363-64 (Ikeda Masaaki
et al. trans., 1964); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (discerning
a power of judicial review in the system of separated and divided powers created by the
United States Constitution).
See Hanreishfi, V, No. 5, at 214 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 4, 1951), reprinted in
125.
MAKI, supra note 124, at 285, 287 (holding that "limitations on such freedoms by
obligations freely contracted under special public or private law are unavoidable"); see
also Judgment on the Enshrinement of a Dead SDF Officer to Gokoku Shrine, supra note
107, at 8-11 (rejecting Article 20 claim against state-sponsored religious observances
because ostensibly private veterans' association maintained shrine and oversaw Shinto
ceremony); id. at 18-21 (Nagashima, J., concurring) (arguing that nexus between
veterans' association and government officials was too attenuated to attribute Shinto
enshrinement ceremony to government).
126.
Cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that
a private utility company's decision to terminate services to customer for non-payment of
bills did not constitute state action and, therefore, the customer could not claim a
deprivation of due process incident to the termination).
See BEER & ITOH, supra note 107, at 49-52; HIROSHI ITOH, THE JAPANESE
127.
SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES

186 (1989); Itsuo Sonobe, Human Rights

and Constitutional Review in Japan (Masako Kamiya trans.), in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 135, 174 n.60 (David M. Beatty ed.,
1994). Professor Haley suggests the Japanese Supreme Court's failure to enforce Article
21 through the exercise of judicial review could reflect a dearth of cases rather than a lack
of institutional commitment to freedom of expression. See Interview with Professor John
0. Haley, University of Washington (July 9, 1998). Professor Haley posits that because
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signalled that it will not sustain every governmental program abridging
academic freedom. A panel of the Supreme Court of Japan has held that

the Ministry of Education's program of approving textbooks for use in the
public schools violates the academic freedom of an author whose works
were rejected on purely ideological grounds." a Whether this decision
reflects a new trend or simply an additional datum on the pre-existing free
speech jurisprudential framework remains to be seen. Indeed, given that
the Japanese Supreme Court has struck down national legislation only five

times in as many decades,' 29 something more than a single five-Justice

instances of the government directly restricting or censoring speech activities are relatively
uncommon in Japan, litigation asking the Supreme Court of Japan to enforce Article 21
has been correspondingly infrequent. See id. This theory certainly provides a partial
explanation for the lack of Supreme Court decisions enforcing Article 21 by striking down
legislative or executive actions that burden speech activity. On the other hand, seeking
out judicial decisions featuring unqualified rejections of legislative or executive actions
might be the wrong inquiry. Many Supreme Court opinions nominally rejecting free
speech claims actually feature the judiciary imposing substantial restrictions on the
government's discretion to restrict speech activity. See infra notes 166-187, 213-222,
391-399 and accompanying text. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court of Japan's
technical refusal to find a violation of Article 21 arguably is a matter of semantics rather
than substance.
128.
See Japan v. lenaga, 51 MINSHO 2921-3618 (Sup. Ct., Aug. 29, 1997); Sonni
Efron, Japan'sHigh Court Rules Government May Not Tamper With Truth in Textbooks,
WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1997, at A28; Nicholas D. Kristof, Japan Bars Censorship of
Atrocities in Texts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1997, at A4. For additional background on
Professor lenaga's travails in the Japanese court system, see REINGOLD, supra note 113,
at 54, 56-57 (describing Japanese history textbooks' "whitewashing" of "Japanese colonial
depredations in China and Korea, Singapore, and elsewhere"); Ginko Kobayashiu et al.,
Changing Screening System, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Sept. 15, 1997, at 16; Sayuri
Saito, Reconsidering History Education, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Sept. 18, 1997, at 3.
For a history of Professor Ienaga's battles against the Ministry of Education's censors, see
Lawrence W. Beer, Education, Politics and Freedom in Japan: The lenaga Textbook
Review Cases, 8 LAw IN JAPAN 67 (1975); see also SABURO IENAGA, JAPAN'S LAST
WAR: WORLD WAR II AND THE JAPANESE, 1931-1945, at 247-56 (1979).
129.
See Hiraguchi v. Hiraguchi, 41 MINSHO 3, at 408 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 22, 1987),
reprintedin BEER & ITOH, supra note 107, at 327 (invalidating restriction on the division
of real property based on Article 29's protection of private property rights); Judgment
Upon Case of the Constitutionality of the Provisions of the Public Offices Election Law
on Election Districts, Series of ProminentJudgments of the Supreme Court of Japan upon
Questions of ConstitutionalityNo. 17 (General Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan, 1981)
(decided Apr. 14, 1976) (striking down the apportionment of seats in the Diet on equal
protection grounds); Judgment Upon Case of Constitutionality of the Act to Regulate
Location of Pharmacies, Series of ProminentJudgments of the Supreme Court of Japan
upon Questionsof ConstitutionalityNo. 16 (General Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan,
1976) (decided Apr. 30, 1975) (holding unconstitutional legislation proscribing the
operation of unapproved pharmacies as violative of the Article 22's guarantee of freedom
of choice of occupation); Judgment Upon Case of Constitutionality of Article 200 of the
Penal Code Providing Killing an Ascendant, Series of Prominent Judgments of the
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panel decision will be needed to establish the existence of a new, more
activist tradition. As the saying goes, one swallow does not a summer
make.
In its boldest line of cases to date, the Supreme Court declared the
Diet's electoral districts to be so badly malapportioned as to violate the
Japanese Constitution's guarantee of equal protection of the laws." 3

Even in this series of decisions, however, the Supreme Court declined to
void the election results, preferring instead to allow the (malapportioned)
legislative bodies at issue to take corrective action.'
Although the Japanese Supreme Court has proven exceedingly
reluctant to strike down legislative work product, it has given concrete
meaning to the Constitution's various guarantees, most often by
describing the contours of a constitutional right and the limits of
legislative discretion without holding that a particular law transgresses the
Supreme Court of Japan upon Questions of Constitutionality No. 13 (General Secretariat,
Supreme Court of Japan, 1975) (decided Apr. 4, 1973) (striking down on equal protection
grounds a provision of the Japanese criminal code that made the killing of a lineal
ascendant an aggravating factor for purposes of punishment and overruling its earlier
decision upholding this provision against an equal protection challenge); Nakamura v.
Japan, 16 KEISHO 11, at 1593 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 28, 1962), reprinted in ITOH & BEER,
supra note 122, at 58 (invoking Article 31 due process guarantee and Article 29 protection
of property rights to strike down legislation permitting, without prior notice or hearing,
government seizure of innocent third-party's goods or property when such goods or
property are used in an illegal smuggling operation); see also BEER & ITOH, supra note
107, at 24 (noting five instances of judicial invalidation of legislative work product);
Sonobe, supra note 127, at 167-68, 172-73; cf. BEER & ITOH, supra note 107, at 50-51
(arguing that there have been only "three instances of judicial activism" in which the
Supreme Court struck down legislation on constitutional grounds).
130.
See Judgment Upon Case of Constitutionality of the Provisions of the Public
Offices Election Law, Series of ProminentJudgments of the Supreme Court of Japan upon
Questions of Constitutionality No. 21, at 8-9 (General Secretariat, Supreme Court of
Japan, 1986) (July 17, 1985) (holding apportionment ratios for seats in the Diet to be
unconstitutional); Judgment Upon Case of Constitutionality of the Provisions of the Public
Offices Election Law on Election Districts, supra note 129, at 8-10 (same); Koshiyama
v. Chairman, Tokyo Metro. Election Supervision Comm'n, 18 MINSHO 2, at 270 (Sup.
Ct., Feb. 5, 1964), reprinted in ITOH & BEER, supra note 122, at 53; see also BEER &
ITOH, supra note 107, at 38-41 (describing the series of cases in which the Japanese
Supreme Court found malapportioned electoral districts to be unconstitutional, but in each
instance declining to void the election results).
131.
See Judgment Upon Case of Constitutionality of the Provisions of the Public
Offices Election Law, supra note 130, at 9-11; Judgment Upon Case of the
Constitutionality of the Provisions of the Public Offices Election Law on Election
Districts, supra note 129, at 10-13; see also HALEY, supra note 16, at 189; Koshiyama,
18 MINSHO 2, at 270, reprinted in ITOH & BEER, supra note 122, at 53, 54-55. For an
examination of the Supreme Court's ineffective remedial efforts and the practical and
institutional constraints under which the Supreme Court of Japan operated, see Haley,
supra note 18, at 387-88.
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line established by the Court. 3 2 Lower Japanese courts, including both
district courts and the high courts (the intermediate courts of appeal),
have not proven so reticent: A number of the Supreme Court's free

speech decisions reverse lower court decisions that held in favor of the
33

litigants challenging the government behavior at issue.1
One could conclude that the Japanese Supreme Court's unwillingness
to hold unconstitutional legislative work product or executive branch

behavior demonstrates the weakness of Article 21's guarantee of freedom
of expression. Although this interpretation is tenable, it is too simplistic
and fails to appreciate the effect of the Supreme Court's line drawing
efforts.13' Moreover, to the extent that it implies a lack of appreciation
for the value of freedom of expression on the part of the Japanese
Supreme Court, it is also quite inaccurate.
Before the promulgation of the Constitution of 1947, the Japanese
courts did not enjoy the power of judicial review over properly
promulgated legislative enactments that specifically overrode particular
constitutional guarantees. 35
Japan's Meiji Constitution borrowed
heavily from the German and French civil law traditions. These
traditions largely relegated the judiciary to enforcing the code provisions
adopted by the Diet and approved by the Emperor;' 36 as in the presentday United Kingdom, the courts did not possess the constitutional
137
authority to strike down legislation or executive action.
The Constitution of 1947 modified this scheme. Japan currently

maintains a parliamentary system of government with an independent
judiciary that enjoys the power of judicial review.

3

To date, however,

132.
See, e.g., Judgment Upon Case of the Metropolitan Ordinance, supra note
107, at 3-6 (upholding Tokyo ordinance requiring notification of police before engaging
in mass parades or demonstrations).
133.
See supra note 107; see also THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 16,
at 772-74.
134.
See HALEY, supra note 16, at 189.
135.
See BEER & ITOH, supra note 107, at 7-8; THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM,
supra note 16, at 686-87; cf John 0. Haley, Comment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
201-02 (1990).

136.

See Okudaira, supra note 13, at 2-4.

137.
See ITOH, supra note 127, at 9-12, 204-12; Luney, supranote 107, at 125-26;
Okudaira, supra note 13, at 7-9.
138.
See KENPO, art. 81; see also ITOH, supra note 127, at 159-62; Percy R.
Luney, Jr., Introduction to JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 13, at viii, x-xi;
John 0. Haley, Judicial Independence in Japan Revisited, 25 LAW IN JAPAN 1, 17-18
(1995). As Professor Merryman has put it, "[both the civil law and the common law
traditions, to the extent that they are in force in Japan, are of course imposed on a prior
legal tradition that retains some force but is in no way related to either the civil law or
the common law." JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 5
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the judiciary has proven to be extremely deferential to the political
branches of government.139 In a functioning participatory democracy,
this deference makes a great deal of sense: the political branches are
directly accountable to the people, and their actions therefore deserve a

presumption of legitimacy." Thus, that the Japanese Supreme Court
has not routinely struck down laws or executive actions that burden the
exercise of speech rights reflects less a lack of respect for freedom of
expression than a lack of comfort with interposing the judiciary's will
over that of elected officials.141
This deference is hardly unique to speech rights. Across the board,
the Japanese Supreme Court has strained to sustain government actions
that appear to conflict with constitutional restrictions.1 42 The question
naturally arises: Of what value are constitutional rights if the Supreme
Court generally refuses to enjoin legislative or executive actions that
abridge them?
It is difficult to offer any simple responses. Litigants continue to
press the constitutional guarantees before both the Supreme Court and the
(2d ed. 1985).
139.
This may be something of an understatement, given that the Supreme Court
of Japan has directly overturned legislative work-product on constitutional grounds on only
five occasions. See supra note 129.
140.
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
141.
See BEER & ITOH, supra note 107, at 49-53; ITOH, supra note 127, at 27879.
142.
As Professor Hiroshi Itoh has put it, "[i]n the vast majority of constitutional
cases, the Court has upheld governmental actions." BEER & ITOH, supra note 107, at 49;
see, e.g., Judgment Upon Case of the So-Called "Sunakawa Case," Series of Prominent
Judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan upon Questions of Constitutionality No. 4
(General Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan, 1960) (decided Dec. 16, 1959) (sustaining
United States/Japan mutual defense treaty arrangements, including military bases on
Japanese soil, against challenge pursuant to Article 9's renunciation of "war as a
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling
international disputes"). Moreover, the Japanese Supreme Court "has also sustained
administrative discretion in sublegislation in most cases." BEER & ITOH, supra note 107,
at 49. This behavior may reflect a calculated effort at self-preservation: "The Supreme
Court might have acted the way it did as self-defense and self-preservation against the
much stronger political branches." ITOH, supra note 127, at 278; cf. Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (featuring amusing and important intellectual
acrobatics by Chief Justice Marshall to avoid finding that Madison had a duty to present
Marbury with his commission, perhaps because Marshall feared that Madison would

simply ignore such an order);

DONALD

0.

DEWEY, MARSHALL VERSUS JEFFERSON: THE

POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF MAR3URY V. MADISON 97-99 (1970) (describing Madison's
failure to respond to Marbury's suit). Professor Itoh has argued that by "minimiz[ing]
conflicts with the Diet and the executives" the Supreme Court of Japan has "consolidated
itself in the Japanese political system." ITOH, supra note 127, at 278.
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lower courts; if Japanese citizens viewed their constitutional rights as
empty, they would probably not bother to assert them at all.14 3
Moreover, the Japanese Supreme Court routinely selects "prominent"
cases for translation into English. Even a cursory perusal of these
documents reflects the perceived importance of Article 21 cases: Of the
twenty-seven cases selected for translation into English, ten involve claims
arising under Article 21.'"
It is unthinkable that the Justices of the Japanese Supreme Court
would undertake special efforts to make these decisions more widely
available outside of Japan if they thought these decisions would reflect
badly on the Japanese Supreme Court or the Japanese legal system as a
whole. 4
Thus, it seems likely that the Supreme Court's efforts to
circulate these decisions in the United States and other English-speaking
jurisdictions reflects pride in its work product and an implicit assumption
that the decisions will wear well in foreign jurisdictions.
Perhaps most importantly, Japanese citizens continue to press claims
premised on Article 21's guarantee of freedom of expression. In Japan,
"the threat of a lawsuit or criminal complaint may produce a positive
reaction" because of concerns that lawsuits, whether civil or criminal in
nature, "damage reputation. "16 According to Professor John Haley,
"[t]he social stigma of the disclosure of wrongdoing can function as an
143.
As Norma Field has explained, to undertake civil rights or civil liberties
litigation in contemporary Japan requires great fortitude. See FIELD, supra note 109, at
132-34; see also Rokumoto Kahei, The Law Consciousness of the Japanese, 9 JAPAN
FOUNDATION NEWSLETTER 5, 9-10 (1982) (describing a community's hostile reaction to
a lawsuit challenging restrictions on student hairstyles in the local public school). Field
explains that, "[t]o create an awkward moment is a sin in Japan; to cause disruption puts
one beyond the pale." FIELD, supra note 109, at 75. On the other hand, as Professor
Haley has noted, so-called "cause" lawyers do not hesitate to take cases designed to
challenge the status quo ante through litigation intended to embarrass the government and
promote social change. See HALEY, supra note 16, at 189; Haley, supra note 11, at 5-6.
144.
Of course, this could be more reflective of the Japanese Supreme Court's
assumption about what rights matter most to American lawyers; that is to say, the
Supreme Court has translated its major freedom of expression cases based on the
assumption that Americans care most about this right. Even if this rationale explains the
Supreme Court's decision to publish Article 21 cases in English, it does not explain why
litigants continue to expend time and money pressing such claims under Article 21.
145.
Both individuals and organizations in Japan view the loss of face, or kao, as
a very serious matter, to be avoided if at all possible. See MARK ZIMMERMAN, HOW TO
Do BUSINESS WITH THE JAPANESE 65-67 (1985); see also HALEY, supra note 16, at 176,
183; John 0. Haley, Sheathing the Sword of Justice in Japan:An Essay on Law Without
Sanctions, 8 J. JAPANESE STUD. 265, 275-76 (1982).
146.
HALEY, supra note 16, at 183; see also Haley, supra note 145, at 275-76
(describing the importance of reputation to both private and government entities in Japan).
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equally effective and far more efficient substitute for state coercion."147
Thus, whether a litigant prevails before the Supreme Court may not be as
important as the fact of the lawsuit itself; to the extent that a lawsuit
brings a government agency into direct conflict with members of the
community, it detracts from the agency's standing within the community.
In contemporary Japan, lawsuits constitute a powerful form of political
action. 141
This explanation of the existence and frequency of "hopeless"
lawsuits raising constitutional claims also makes sense in a society that
149
prizes social harmony, or wa, and consensus-based decision making.

In traditional Japanese villages, decision making took place through an
informal system of give-and-take aimed at reaching a unanimous

decision."15

Professor Nakane explains that in such villages, "[it is

most important that a meeting should reach a unanimous conclusion; it
should leave no one frustrated or dissatisfied, for this weakens village or
group unity and solidarity."1' Such an ethic empowers dissenters while
at the same time imposing a high opportunity cost on persistent
dissent-simply put, dissent is both effective and disfavored.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of consensus. For example,

Professor Benedict has reported that, even during World War II,
prominent Japanese leaders recognized the importance of free speech to
building consensus and to maintaining group commitment to a particular
objective or task.'52
On balance, it seems that the Supreme Court's reticence to strike
down legislative and executive actions burdening speech rights has much
less to do with the level of solicitude the Supreme Court grants freedom
147.
HALEY, supra note 16, at 183.
148.
See id. at 189. As Professor Haley explains in the context of "hopeless"
]o
litigation challenging the constitutionality of Japan's military "self-defense" forces, "[s
long as the issue continues to be litigated in well-publicized cases, a political consensus
against the Self-Defense Forces may be forged or at least one favoring their legitimacy
remains in doubt." Id.; see also FIELD, supra note 109, at 97, 131-36.
149.
See NAKANE, supra note 21, at 49-50, 65, 144-46.
150.
See id. at 145.
151.
Id.
152.
See BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 34-35. She quotes the following illustrative
newspaper editorial, which appeared in print in July 1944:
In these few years, the people have not been able to say frankly what they
think. They have been afraid that they might be blamed if they spoke certain
matters. They hesitated, and tried to patch up the surface, so the public mind
has really become timid. We can never develop the total power of the people
in this way.
Id. at 34. Another contemporaneous speaker noted that under the wartime miliary
government, "[flreedom of speech has been denied" and opined that "[t]his is certainly
not a proper way to stimulate [the Japanese people's] will to fight." Id.

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
of expression than with the Supreme Court's own view of its proper
constitutional role. Moreover, considered in cultural context, this
reticence may prove to be a distinction without a difference: "Protracted
litigation calls into question the legitimacy of the political system with
consequently greater likelihood-albeit no certainty-of a political
response."' 53 To the extent that litigation demonstrates the absence of
social consensus, it undercuts the legitimacy of the government's
objectives and impedes the government's ability to implement contested
policy objectives.
III. FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN JAPAN: RHETORIC, REVISION, AND
MEIKLEJOHN'S THEORY OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH

The Japanese Supreme Court has recognized and broadly endorsed
the proposition that freedom of speech is a necessary condition for
democratic self-government. As Justice Ito Masami of the Supreme Court
of Japan has explained, "[c]onstitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression forms the central pillar of a state based on liberalism, and the
United States and Japan have constitutional systems that provide the
strongest guarantees of this freedom in the world.""54 Sadly, however,
the decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court do not entirely support
Justice Masami's assertion that freedom of speech is a "central pillar" of
Japanese constitutional law.
A. Canvassing the Voters
Consider, for example, the severe restrictions that limit political
speech incident to elections.155 Japan maintains a pervasive system of
restraints that restrict the time, place, and manner of canvassing the
electorate for support; not only are candidates' activities restricted, but the
press is also subject to strict limitations on its coverage of candidates and
153.
154.

HALEY,

supra note 16, at 189.

Ito Masami, Forewordto BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION INJAPAN, supra

note 107, at 13, 14.
155.
See Koshokfi senkyoh? [Public Offices election law], Law No. 100 of 1950;
see also Takatsu v. Japan, 35 KEISH0 5, at 568 (Sup. Ct., July 21, 1981), reprinted in
BEER & ITOH, supra note 107, at 598; Nonaka v. Japan, 33 KEISHO 7, at 1074 (Sup. Ct.,
Dec. 20, 1979), reprintedin BEER & ITOH, supra note 107, at 604; Taniguchi v. Japan,
21 KEISHO 9, at 1245 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 21, 1967), reprintedin ITOH & BEER, supra note

122, at 149; BEER, supra note 107, at 372-78; Taisuke Kamata, Adjudication and the
Governing Process: Political Questions and Legislative Discretion, in JAPANESE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 13, at 151, 154-56.
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candidate activities." 6 The Supreme Court of Japan has both sustained
convictions and overturned reversals of acquittals for violations of the
Election Law's ban on door-to-door canvassing.' 57
These results
contrast vividly with the United States Supreme Court's treatment of
door-to-door canvassing in cases such as Cantwell v. Connecticut' and
on the First Amendment right of individuals to support or oppose
candidates for political office set forth in Buckley v. Valeo. 5 9
Although a number of American legal academics have advocated
public financing of political campaigns, limits on campaign spending, and
similar measures to level the playing field and reduce the influence of
special interest contributions," ° all of these proposals pale in
comparison to the restrictions imposed by the Election Law, such as
prohibitions on door-to-door canvassing by candidates for office and strict
limits on candidates' purchase of television and radio time for promotional
advertisements.1 6 ' To be sure, Japan conducts meaningful elections and
voters have access to information about candidates for political office
from myriad sources.
Professor Curtis has explained that:
[t]he result of this system of legal restraints and the
institutionalization of modes for circumventing them has been
to turn the election law into a kind of obstacle course through
and around which candidates move in their search for votes,
rather than an accepted and respected framework within which
campaigns are conducted. 6'
Thus, the net effects of the Election Law may be somewhat less
Draconian than one would otherwise expect. Essentially, Curtis is
asserting that the Election Law constitutes tatemae, or the official line,
156.
See BEER, supra note 107, at 373-74; Kamata, supra note 155, at 154-56;
Okudaira, supra note 13, at 35 n.52. For a description of the operation of the Election
Law and its attempt to establish a line of demarcation between "political activities," which
are largely unregulated, and "election activities," which are highly regulated, see CURTIS,
supra note 109, at 165-75.
157.
See BEER, supra note 107, at 377-78 & nn. 100-04 (citing cases reported in
Japanese language source materials).
158.
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
159.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
160.
See Fiss, IRONY, supra note 54, at 79-83; FISS, supra note 31, at 18-23, 2830; SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 85, 97-101; 0. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COL. L.
REv. 2470, 2476-83 (1997).

161.
162.

See CURTIS, supra note 109, at 167-69.
Id. at 174.
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rather than honne, or the actual situation."t
The problem, as seen
through American eyes,, is that the theoretical proposition that there can
be too much political speech is fundamentally inconsistent with the
guarantee of freedom of expression. Nevertheless, neither legislative nor
judicial change is in the air. "Although deregulation in other areas of
Japanese life has become a major thrust of recent government policy and
has been forced on often reluctant bureaucrats, there is no strong
constituency advocating the deregulation of election campaigning.""
The Election Law reflects a desire to minimize the disruptive impact
of elections, even at the cost of squelching speech and limiting the
channels through which candidates can reach the voters." s This
elevates civility over speech and limits deliberation to protect privacy.
Simply put, the Japanese have struck a radically different balance between
the respective rights of would-be speakers and their potential audience: In
Japan, the interests of the audience in being free from unwanted speech
in no small measure outweigh the interests of the speaker in being heard.
B. Time, Place, and Manner Regulations
In a series of cases beginning in the 1950s, the Japanese Supreme
Court has sustained a variety of time, place, and manner restrictions on
speech activities on public property. The United States Supreme Court
has, of course, endorsed the creation and enforcement of content neutral,
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on the use of public
property for speech activities." 6
This basic framework has been
supplemented with a "public forum" gloss that permits government to
further restrict access to certain public property: non-public and limited
purpose public forums. 67 Thus, in the United States, a citizen does not
enjoy an unfettered right of access to public spaces for the purpose of
engaging in speech activity. That said, unpopular political minorities do
have a right to use public spaces under the same terms and conditions as
other citizens; moreover, government may not unreasonably withhold its
163.
90-94.
164.

See HALEY, supra note 16, at 186-90; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 145, at 26,

CURTIS, supra note 109, at 171.
165.
Again, the effectiveness of the non-media restrictions is very much open to
question; Curtis reports that "there has been a virtual institutionalization of patterns of
evasion and circumvention of many of the law's restrictions." Id. at 173.
166.
See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
167.
See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990); see also Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Celebrating Selma: The Importance of Context in Public Forum

Analysis, 104 YALE L.J. 1411 (1995).
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permission or impose less favorable terms and conditions on disfavored

groups for the use of public forums for speech activities."
The Japanese Supreme Court has sustained local ordinances that, on

their face, confer effectively unfettered discretion on local authorities to
grant or withhold permission for the use of public property for speech
activity. Cases involving local ordinances from Niigata and Tokyo
provided the vehicles for the Supreme Court's review of the issue.
In the Niigata Ordinance Decision,"'9 a Niigata prefectural

ordinance prohibited citizens from engaging in public demonstrations
without first obtaining the permission of local police authorities. 7 °
These officials could refuse permission or place restrictions on the protest
activity in order to protect the public safety or welfare.17 ' However, if
they failed to respond to a request within twenty-four hours of a planned
march, the speech activity could proceed as though permission had been
granted. 7 2
The Japanese Supreme Court sustained the ordinance, reasoning that

it really required little more than advance notice of the planned speech
activity. "

The Court emphasized the limited nature of the local

authorities' discretion to deny a permit and suggested that permission
could be denied only "if it is foreseen that [the activity] may involve a
clear and present danger to the public safety."174 Essentially, the
Supreme Court saved the local ordinance by imposing a limiting
interpretation on the law enforcement authorities' discretion.'75
The Court had occasion to revisit its holding in the Niigata
Ordinance Decision in the Tokyo Ordinance Decision.176 Like the
168.
See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
169.
Hanreishfi, Vmfl, No. 11, 1866 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 24, 1954), reprintedin MAKI,
supra note 124, at 70.
170.
See id. at 71. Article I of the ordinance provided that "Parades, processions,
and mass demonstrations... shall not be conducted without obtaining a license from the
public safety commission which exercises jurisdiction over the area concerned." Id.
171.
See id. at 71-72.
172.
See id. at 72 (Article 4 of the Ordinance).
173.
See id. at 74-75.
174.
Id. at 75.
175.
See id. at 76-77. The United States Supreme Court maintains a similar
tradition of using limiting constructions of statutes and regulations to avoid holding such
enactments unconstitutional. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1991); id. at
204-07 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982);
Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 92 (1968). For a discussion of the reasons
supporting this policy, see Rust, 501 U.S. at 223-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See generally
Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1997) (discussing and
analyzing the federal judiciary's use of saving constructions and question avoidance).
176.
Judgment Upon Case of the Metropolitan Ordinance, supra note 107.

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
Niigata prefecture, the City of Tokyo adopted an ordinance requiring
notification and permission for mass marches and demonstrations."
The ordinance required the permission of the local public safety
commission before engaging in meetings or mass parades on public
property and for mass demonstrations, whether on public or private
property. 78 Article 3 of the ordinance required local police officials to
grant permission unless the proposed speech activity "is recognized as
clearly and directly dangerous to the maintenance of public peace.""
Unlike the Niigata ordinance, affirmative permission was required prior
to any covered speech activity; silence on the part of local officials did
not imply consent.
A group of protestors violated the ordinance, engaging in unapproved
protest activity. Following their arrest, the Tokyo district court acquitted
them of wrongdoing based on Article 21's guarantee of freedom of
expression and assembly." s The public prosecutor then took a direct
appeal (or "jokoku" appeal) to the Supreme Court, based on the
constitutional issues presented in the case.
The Supreme Court began its opinion by recognizing the importance
of the interest at stake:
There is no need to dwell upon the fact that the freedom of
assembly and association, as well as the freedom of speech,
press and all other forms of expression provided for in Article
21 of the Constitution of Japan, belongs to eternal and inviolate
rights, the basic human rights and that the absolute guarantee of
the above is one of the fundamental rules and characteristics of
democratic form[s] of government which distinguishes
democracy from totalitarianism.'
Nevertheless, Article 21 rights were subject to "abuse," and the Supreme
Court viewed its task as "protecting the freedom of expression, preventing
its abuse, maintaining harmony with the public welfare, and of drawing
a line which would provide a reasonable demarcation between the
freedom of the individuals and the welfare of the public with regard to
concrete indi[v]idual cases."'
177.
178.
179.
180.

See Metropolitan Ordinance, Law No. 44 of 1950, reprintedin id. at 38-39.
See id. at art. 1.
Id. at art. 3.
See Judgment Upon Case of the Metropolitan Ordinance, supra note 107, at

181.
182.

Id. at 2.
Id.

1-2.
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Noting the dangers associated with mass protest and movements, the
Court observed that "a local entity may be justified in imposing certain

restrictions with respect to the freedom of expression, involving group
demonstration notwithstanding the clear prohibition of pre-control, the

censorship of publications, etc."" 3 The majority then went on to adopt
a restrictive interpretation of the Tokyo ordinance. Although the text
seemed to adopt a permissive system of regulation, vesting substantial
autonomy with local officials to grant or deny requests, "in its substance

and in operation," the ordinance really "differs little from a notification
system."" The Court held that the "granting of permission is almost
imperative, and rejection, under strict restriction only under very rare

circumstances," namely, when a clear and present danger of public harm
exists. " The majority also rejected objections to the regulation of
speech activity on non-public property, noting that the harms associated
with mass demonstrations did not differ based on the ownership of the

property. "
The Japanese Supreme Court was comfortable vesting significant

discretion with local authorities, subject to the admonition that this
discretion should not be exercised absent an immediate threat of
substantial harm. Thirteen of the Supreme Court's fifteen justices
endorsed the opinion of the Court; two justices dissented. The decision

represented a major expansion of the limitations upheld in the Niigata
OrdinanceDecision. It is also doubtful that the United States Supreme

Court would have reached a similar conclusion on the facts presented." 7
In dissent, Justice Hachiro Fujita emphasized that "the full guarantee
of the freedom of expression provided in Article 21 . . . is one of the
183.
Id.at 3.
184.
Id.at 4.
185.
Id.
186.
See id. at 5-6; cf Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment absolutely protects political or ideological
speech activity on private property from governmental abridgement absent direct advocacy
of lawlessness coupled with a clear and present danger of such lawlessness occurring and
causing social harms of the highest order).
187.
See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133-36 (1992)
(holding that a permitting system for speech activities cannot vest unrestricted discretion
with local police authorities and that the exercise of viewpoint and content neutral,
properly channelized discretion by local authorities must be subject to prompt judicial
review). On the other hand, reflexive distrust of government is not a Japanese cultural
trait. "The State, in all its domestic functions, is not a necessary evil as it is so generally
felt to be in the United States." BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 86. Instead, "[tihe State
comes nearer, in Japanese eyes, to being the supreme good." Id. Accordingly, the idea
of vesting substantial discretion with local police officials to regulate speech activities is
less objectionable in Japan than in the United States.
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most important basic principles of [a] democratic form of
government."18 Fujita noted that the majority in the Niigata decision
only had sanctioned a system of prior notification, not a "general
permissive system."189
In his view, Article 21 precluded local
authorities from assuming a censorial role, even if that role were strictly
limited."9 He went on to cite Hague v. CIO 9 ' and Saia v. New
York' 92 for the proposition that freedom of speech is inconsistent with
discretionary permitting schemes administered by local functionaries. 9
Justice Katsumi Tarumi also authored a dissent."9 Tarumi objected
to the ordinance's attempt to regulate speech on both public and private
property,' 95 and to the drafters' use of vague standards' 96 and
definitions." 9 He also objected to the majority's attempt to place a
limiting construction on the Tokyo ordinance in order to save it from
being declared unconstitutional: "As long as it relates to the control of
freedom of expression, it seems highly improper to render construction
in such a way as to make it constitutional as . . . was done in the majority
opinion." 9 1
Notwithstanding the significant cultural differences that separate the
United States and Japan, Justice Tarumi's dissent echoes the main themes
of Justice Holmes's dissent in Abrams'99:
Every individual is capable of thinking freely of what is true,
good and beautiful through his concept in the fields of religion,
creed, morals, sciences, the world, and human existence; or in
his respective fields of endeavor in society, such as in politics,
economics, culture and arts.... If law and the government do
not exercise control over speech, and permit free competition of
expression, truth would finally prevail, and it may even be
possible for all the varieties of flowers to bloom in profusion
188.
Judgement Upon Case of the Metropolitan Ordinance, supra note 107, at 6
(Fujita, J., dissenting).
189.
Id. at 7.

190.
191.
192.
193.
I1 (Fujita,
194.

See id. at 8-10.
307 U.S. 496 (1939).
334 U.S. 558 (1948).
See Judgment Upon Case of the Metropolitan Ordinance, supra note 107, at
J., dissenting).
See id. at 11-30 (Tarumi, J., dissenting).

195.
196.
197.
198.

See id. at 12, 25-26.
See id. at 27-30.
See id. at 18-22.
Id. at 13.

199.

See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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and bear fruits in amity. A complete unanimity of mind should
be rejected."
Justice Tarumi plainly embraced Holmes's marketplace of ideas metaphor.
In turn, this intellectual commitment led him to reject the majority's
decision to leave the Tokyo ordinance in place. Any doubts in this regard
can be resolved by reference to his subsequent argument that freedom of
speech does not guarantee any particular outcomes.
After setting forth the litany of horrors associated with Soviet-style
communism, Justice Tarumi concluded that freedom of speech required
the government to tolerate those who advocated such a system. 2 1 As
Justice Tarumi explained, in Japan "[p]eople may listen to such a talk to
their heart's content. Such is the tolerance of thought embodied in the
liberal Constitution. "I
Both the majority and dissenting justices in the Tokyo Ordinance
Decision fully embraced freedom of expression. Moreover, both sides
defined the debate about the proper scope of Article 21 in terms
immediately familiar to students of the First Amendment. The majority
embraces Meiklejohn's community-based vision of the freedom of
expression, justifying the protection of freedom of speech by reference to
its role in facilitating democratic self-governance. Justice Tarumi's
dissent, on the other hand, invokes the Holmesian marketplace of ideas
metaphor. Notwithstanding the significant differences in culture, the
Justices framed the free speech issues in largely the same terms that the
United States Supreme Court would have used if faced with deciding the
case.
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, however, the Supreme
Court of Japan more fully embraced a community-based theory of
freedom of speech. It is not the individual's interest in self-expression,
but rather the community's interest in overseeing the government, which
is paramount. One could draw a preliminary conclusion that the
Meiklejohn theory of free speech better accommodates a communitarian
social ethic, whereas the marketplace metaphor presupposes a more
individualistic legal and cultural milieu.
Turning from theory to doctrine, the majority's opinion in the Tokyo
Ordinancecase places free expression at risk by trusting in the good faith
of local authorities to grant permission absent a clear and present danger
of public harm. The Japanese Supreme Court's rejection of a "bad
200.
Judgment Upon Case of the Metropolitan Ordinance, supra note 107, at 15
(Tarumi, J., dissenting).
201.
See id. at 16-17.
202.

Id. at 17.
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tendency" test, however, is far more intriguing than the inconsistency of
the majority's result with Hague and Saia. That is to say, not a single

justice endorsed the proposition that government may regulate speech
deemed potentially harmful to the public because of its ideological
content. Yet, less than a century ago, the United States Supreme Court
sustained criminal convictions on just such a theory.'
As recently as
1951, the Supreme Court sustained the conviction of a group of
communists based on a perilously overbroad "bad tendencies" theory of

the First Amendment. 2'
The Tokyo Ordinance majority's formulation of the problem also
implicitly reflects a commitment to the project of viewpoint neutrality.
Only danger to the public-not hostility toward the content of a particular
speaker's message-can serve as a basis for denying access to public
property for speech-related activities.
As Professor Sunstein has
explained, "[w]hen government regulates on the basis of viewpoint, it will
frequently be acting for objectionable reasons."2
By prohibiting local
officials from refusing permission for speech activities based on the

viewpoint or content of the speaker's message, the Supreme Court of
Japan conferred substantial protection on would-be speakers.'

Indeed, rather than snipe at the Japanese Supreme Court's workproduct, one should marvel at the fundamental transformation worked by
the Constitution of 1947: In the space of less than two decades, a nation
that had never recognized an unqualified legal right to freedom of
expression or participatory democracy embraced both concepts.2' 7 This
203.

See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1919); see also VAN
supra note 6, at 29-37.
204.
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
205.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 169.
206.
See SMOLLA, supra note 38, at 45-54; 184-85, 208-11; cf. SUNSTEIN, supra
note 41, at 239-40 (arguing that other values may, from time to time, justify departures
from content, or even viewpoint, neutrality in government regulation of speech activity).
Of course, the clear and present danger test affords meaningful protection to speech
activity if-and only if-the fact of public hostility to the speaker's message, the so-called
"heckler's veto," does not count as a condition that satisfies the test. See Forsyth County
v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133-36 (1992); see also Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518 (1972); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). The Tokyo and Niigata
cases do not speak to the problem of the heckler's veto. Accordingly, further guidance
from the Supreme Court will be necessary to ascertain the robustness of the clear and
present danger test in Japan.
207.
Of course, adoption of the Constitution of 1947 did not, as if by magic, alter
the public values of the Japanese people. See generally Krotoszynski, supra note 9, at
424-32. Instead, the Constitution of 1947 provided a legal framework through which the
transformation of Japan from a totalitarian regime in which the citizenry enjoyed its rights
at the pleasure of the Emperor was replaced by a system of participatory democracy and
constitutional rights. See ABE ET AL., supra note 109, at 3-13; Okudaira, supra note 13,
ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
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By way of comparison, the

United States Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798 only

seven years after the adoption of the First Amendment, and the Supreme
Court did not definitively reject the view that the state could punish
In
seditious libel until 1964, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.'
relative terms, then, the Japanese free speech tradition should be viewed
as a success.

C. Democratic Self-Government and the Meiklejohn Theory in Other
PoliticalSpeech Decisions of the Supreme Court of Japan
The Japanese Supreme Court, like its United States counterpart, has

tied freedom of expression to the project of democratic self-governance
in contexts other than public forum cases. Take, for example, Japan v.
A
Kanemoto,2°9 also known as the "Kanemoto Pamphlet Case."
number of radicals distributed pamphlets advocating the violent overthrow
of the Japanese government and were arrested, tried, and convicted of
violating the Subversive Activities Prevention Law. 210 The Nagoya
High Court, the intermediate appellate court, reversed the convictions on

the ground that mere advocacy of the violent overthrow of the
government was not a criminal act in the absence of a clear and present
danger of concrete acts against the state.21 The prosecutor appealed

this reversal to the Supreme Court of Japan.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Nagoya High Court's decision,

holding that the mere advocacy of insurrection against the government
was not a criminal act. In so doing, the Court expressly rejected the
prosecutor's argument that "speech whose very contents are contrary to
the public welfare . . .clearly constitute notable abuse of freedom of
expression beyond the bounds of Article 21 guarantees."212 This ruling
at 1-32; Nobushige Ukai, The Significance of the Reception of American Constitutional
Institutions and Ideas in Japan, in CONSTITUTIONALISM INASIA: ASIAN VIEWS OF THE
AMERICAN INFLUENCE 111, at 114-15 (Lawrence Ward Beer ed., 1979). As Professor
Benedict predicted, the Japanese have embraced rules of the new social order as reflected
and embodied in the Constitution of 1947, albeit not in precisely the same forms as these
rights existed (or presently exist) in the United States. See BENEDICT, supra note 18, at
295-96, 302-04.
376 U.S. 254, 273-76, 282 (1964); see Kalven, supra note 30, at 204-10.
208.
396 HANREI JIHO 19 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 21, 1965), reprintedin ITOH & BEER,
209.
supra note 122, at 242.
210.
See id. at 242.
211.
See id.
Id. at 243. In this regard, the case represents a change of position from that
212.
reflected in Hanreish-u, VI, No. 8, 1053 (Sup. Ct., Aug. 2, 1951), reprinted in MAKI,
supra note 124 at 123. In this case, a communist protestor distributed handbills urging
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is consistent with the Supreme Court's rejection of the "bad tendency"
test in the Niigata Ordinance and Tokyo Ordinancecases.
A more recent decision involving the use of the Narita Airport for
protest activities demonstrates the Supreme Court's continuing embrace
of the clear and present danger standard for the restriction of protest
activity. In Sanrizuka-ShibayamaAnti-Airport League v. Okuda,213 the

Supreme Court sustained a statute limiting protest activities at the new
Tokyo International Airport. 1 4
The new airport had proven
controversial and radical elements had attempted to impede its progress;
these efforts included acts of violence, such as driving a blazing vehicle

into the airport, throwing Molotov cocktails into the airport, and
destroying equipment inside the airport.2 5 In response to these acts of
terrorism, the Diet enacted a law to prohibit violent protest activities at
the new airport.2 6 Entitled "Law on Emergency Measures for the
Security of the New Tokyo International Airport," the measure

empowered the Minister of Transport to prohibit speech activity at the
17

airport when "violent and destructive activities" might be imminent.
Would-be anti-airport protestors challenged the constitutionality of this
law, arguing that it infringed their Article 21 right to freedom of

expression.
The Japanese Supreme Court sustained the law, but imposed a
limiting construction on its rather open-ended terms. Although the
provisions of the law did not specify the level of danger required to close

the airport to speech activities, the majority read the law to require a clear
and present danger of violence: "[I]t can be inferred that the phrase
'anyone who engages in, or is suspected of engaging in, violent
and

police to strike or "slowdown" the performance of their duties. See id. at 123-24. He
was convicted of violating a provision of the Local Public Service Law and appealed his
case to the Supreme Court of Japan. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding
that "abetment of this kind must be said to go beyond the limits of freedom of speech as
guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. at 125. In order to avoid criminal liability, the
defendant would have to offer proof that there was "absolutely no danger" that the police
would adopt the course of action suggested in the handbill. See id. Obviously, this result
is inconsistent with the result in the Kanemoto case. One can infer from the result in this
earlier case that between the early 1950s and the early 1960s, freedom of expression
gained significant ground in the Supreme Court of Japan.
213.
Judgment Upon Case of Constitutionality of the Provisions of the New Narita
Airport Law, Series of Prominent Judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan upon
Questionsof ConstitutionalityNo. 26 (General Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan, 1993)
(decided July 1, 1992).
214.
See id. at 1-2.
215.
See id. at 3-4.
216.
See id. at 4.
217.
Id.at 5.
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destructive activities' in Article 2(2) of the Law should be interpreted as
'anyone who actually engages in, or is highly likely to engage in, violent
and destructive activities'."218 In addition, the Supreme Court read the
phrase "when the structure is used, or is suspected of being used" for
prohibited activities to mean "when the structure is actually used, or is
found highly likely to be used" for such activities.
As written, the law appeared to confer virtually limitless discretion
on the Minister of Transport. The Supreme Court's gloss, however,
adroitly avoided a conflict between the law and Article 21 by strictly
limiting the Minister's authority to restrict speech activity under the law's
provisions. Though the United States Supreme Court would probably
have insisted on a system of independent review to ensure that the
Minister did not arbitrarily apply the law to discriminate against a
particular group or viewpoint,1 9 it is virtually certain that it would
sustain a statute aimed at ensuring that airports remain open and
accessible for those wishing to travel (which would necessarily imply an
airport free of protestors tossing about Molotov cocktails).'
Perhaps more important than the Japanese Supreme Court's limiting
construction of the statute was its frank recognition of the importance of
freedom of speech in a democratic society. The Supreme Court began its
analysis of the protestors' Article 21 claim by acknowledging the linkage
of freedom of speech to a functioning democracy:
In a modem democratic society, assembly by the people is
needed in order for them to develop and form their views and
personalities by being exposed to a variety of opinions and
information, and by conveying and exchanging opinions,
information and the like. It is also an effective means by which
they may make their views known to the general public.
Hence, the freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 21(1) of
218.
Id.
219.
See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 132-36 (1992);
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-78 (1941); see also C. Edwin Baker,
UnreasonedReasonableness:Mandatory ParadePermits and Time, Place, and Manner
Regulations, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 937, 992-1007 (1983); Vince Blasi, PriorRestraints on
Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1481, 1536-52 (1970). But see Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (holding that procedural safeguards must be available to
ensure fair application of licensing scheme for motion pictures).
220.
See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672
(1992) (upholding ban on solicitation in airports under a "reasonableness" standard of
review, but striking down a prohibition on mere leafletting in airports, again relying on
a "reasonableness" standard of review).
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the Constitution should be especially respected as one of the

fundamental human rights in a democratic society. 2
Alexander Meiklejohn himself could have authored these words; they
embrace and embody his conception of freedom of speech.' m The New
Narita Airport Decision not only demonstrates the extent to which the
Japanese judiciary has embraced freedom of expression as a preferred

freedom under the Japanese Constitution, but also reflects the justices'
essentially communitarian conception of the right.
D. The Importance of Community
Although recognizing the importance of the free flow of ideas and
information to democratic self-government, m the Japanese Supreme
Court has been very solicitous of communal interests. This is reflected,
in part, in its case law considering the constitutionality of the Election
Law's restrictions on candidate canvassing.'
It is also reflected in
Yamagishi v. Japan,' a case involving the use of public utility poles

for posters promoting a conference supporting a nuclear weapons
ban. 22 The protestors were charged and convicted of a misdemeanor
for hanging the posters without obtaining prior permission from the
owners. 27 They appealed their conviction to the Supreme Court,
arguing that the convictions violated their Article 21 right to free
221.
Judgment Upon Case of Constitutionality of the Provisions of the New Narita
Airport Law, supra note 213, at 2-3.
222.
See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 23, at 10-14, 25-27; MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM, supra note 52, at 115-20.
223.
See, e.g., Judgment Upon Case of Constitutionality of the Provisions of the
New Narita Airport Law, supra note 213, at 2-3.
224.
See supra notes 155-165 and accompanying text.
225.
24 KEISHO 6, at 280 (Sup. Ct., June 17, 1970), reprintedin ITOH & BEER,
supra note 122, at 244.
226.
See id. at 244-45. Yamagishi and his colleagues glued 84 posters to utility
poles owned by the local telephone companies and located on public rights of way; the
posters were emblazoned with messages such as "Let's Make A Great Success of the
Tenth World Conference to Ban Nuclear Weapons! Aichi Gensuikyo." See id.
227.
The utility poles at issue belonged to both publicly and privately owned utility
companies. See id. at 245. With respect to the privately held utility poles, no state action
existed and Article 21 simply would not apply, unless the Supreme Court construed
Article 21 to create a free speech easement on privately owned property. See, e.g.,
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). On the other hand, access to
publicly-owned utility poles presented a legitimate Article 21 question. See, e.g., City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
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expression. m Because the antiwar activists had not sought permission
to use the poles, the question of what standard to apply to a state actor's
denial of permission to use the poles for posting political messages was
not presented for decision. Rather, the issue before the Supreme Court
was whether publicly and privately owned poles could be unilaterally
commandeered for speech activity.
The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, observing that "a
means for outwardly expressing one's ideas has never been permissible
if that means is such as to do unfair damage to the property rights of
other persons." 9 Accordingly, the appellants failed to state a viable
Article 21 claim. The Yamagishi decision reaches the same result as a
similar United States Supreme Court decision, City Council v. Taxpayers
for Vincent.Y0 Moreover, it does so for similar reasons: freedom of
speech does not imply an unqualified right of access to public or private
property for use incidental to speech activities.
IV. THE CASE OF DEFAMATION: BALANCING THE PERSONAL AND THE
POLITICAL

Defamation provides another area of law in which the Japanese
Supreme Court has borrowed, at least to some extent, from the United
States. In Judgment Upon Case of Defamation," the Supreme Court
broadly construed an exceptions clause to create a right of fair comment
concerning matters of public concern. The defendant, Katsuyoshi
Kawachi, published a newspaper, the Yukan Wakayama Jiji. On February
18, 1963, he accused the publisher of a rival publication of extorting
monies from local officials. 2
The Japanese law at issue, which dated from the turn of the century,
punished defamation strictly: "A person who defames another by publicly
alleging facts shall, regardless of whether such facts are true or false, be
punished with imprisonment at forced labor or imprisonment for not more
228.
See Yamagishi, 24 KEISH0 6, reprintedin ITOH & BEER, supra note 122, at
244-45.
229.
Id. at 245.
230.
466 U.S. 789 (1984).
231.
Series of ProminentJudgmentsof the Supreme Courtof Japanupon Questions
of ConstitutionalityNo. 11 (General Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan, 1970) (decided
June 25, 1969).
232.
See id. at 1. The story, entitled "Wicked Acts of Tokuichiro Sakaguchi, the

Blood-sucker," reported that the publisher told an official .in
the public works section of
the Wakayama City Office that "[i]f you made a due offer, we should shut our eyes to
your deed."

Id.

Failing such an offer, Sakaguchi allegedly promised to publish

allegations of corruption involving the public works office. See id.
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than three years or a fine of not more than 1,000 yen." 23 3 However,
if a trial court found that the otherwise defamatory statement had been
"committed solely for the benefit of the public and regarding matters of
public concern and when, upon inquiry into the truth or falsity of the
facts, the truth is proved, punishment shall not be imposed."" 4 Thus,
the exceptions clause appears to require a defendant to establish the literal
truth of the allegedly defamatory statement in order to avoid liability;
however, the Supreme Court of Japan saw it differently.
Reversing the judgments of the trial and appellate courts, the
Supreme Court opined that freedom of expression and protection from
defamation had to be balanced in order to protect both "personal security
to honour of an individual and the freedom of speech provided for in
Article 21 of the Constitution. " '
Accordingly, the Supreme Court
construed the exceptions clause broadly to protect commentary on matters
of public concern:
Giving thought to the reconciliation and balance of these two
interests, it should be construed that, even if there is no proof
of the existence of the facts . . . , no crime of defamation was
committed because of the absence of mens rea, when the
publisher believed mistakenly in the existence of the facts and
there was good reason for his mistaken belief on the basis of
reliable information and grounds. 6
Because the record showed that the publisher had established a reasonable
basis in fact for believing the allegations to be true, he could not be held
237
liable for defamation.
Significantly, the Supreme Court did not declare any part of Article
230 of the Penal Code contrary to the Japanese Constitution; instead, it
simply rewrote the exceptions clause to make it compatible with Article
21's guarantee of freedom of speech. In so doing, it was able to achieve
two seemingly incompatible goals: protecting and enforcing freedom of
expression without upsetting harmonious relations between the judicial
and legislative branches. Of course, one could object to the Supreme

233.
Penal Code of Japan, Law No. 45 of 1907, art. 230-1, reprintedin Judgment
Upon Case of Defamation, supra note 108, at 6.
234.
Id. at art. 230-2, para. 1. A second exceptions clause excused liability when
the statement at issue concerned "a public servant or a candidate for public office, and
when, upon inquiry into the truth or falsity of facts, the truth is proved." Id. at art. 230-2,
para. 3.
235.
Judgment Upon Case of Defamation, supra note 108, at 2.
236.
Id.

237.

See id. at 2-3.
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Court's decision to revise unilaterally the text of the statute's exemptions
clause. This course of action arguably constituted a more aggressive-and
less legitimate-form of judicial activism than simply declaring Article
230 unconstitutional on its face.
Although the Japanese Supreme Court has recognized that freedom
of expression must at times take precedence over protection of an
individual's reputation, it has drawn the boundary between these two
interests decidedly in favor of protecting reputation. In Hoppo Journal
Co. v. Japan, 8 a divided Supreme Court affirmed an injunction against
the distribution of the Hoppo Journal. 9 The trial court issued the
injunction because the magazine contained defamatory statements about
Kozo Igarashi, a local mayor who was preparing to run for Governor of
Hokkaido.'
The April 1979 issue of the magazine contained a story
entitled "An Authoritarian's Temptation," which described Igarashi as
"skillful at lying, bluffing and cheating," "a born liar," "an opportunist
without scruples, doing anything for his own interest and his own
success."241 With regard to Igarashi's personal life, the article asserted
that "he divorced his innocent wife by dastardly means and caused her to
commit suicide in order to win a new woman."242 Nor were the editors
content to malign poor Kozo: they also went after his family: "His father
was a bold businessman famous in Asahikawa who had once been a
roadhorse man. He blindly loved a young beautiful young prostitute in
his old age and the masterpiece of the two was [Igarashi]."243 Suffice
it to say that the Hoppo Journalpulled no punches.
Igarashi sought and obtained, on an ex parte basis, an injunction
against the distribution of the magazine. Igarashi argued that the
statements were defamatory per se as a matter of law and, if released,
would cause him irreparable harm. The Sapporo High Court affirmed
and the Hoppo Journal brought an appeal to the Supreme Court. Before
the Supreme Court, the Hoppo Journal argued that the injunction
constituted an unlawful form of censorship and that the magazine enjoyed
the right to publish its news story on Igarashi under Article 21.
238.
Judgment Upon Case of Constitutionality of the Advance Injunctions Against
Publication of a Magazine in Relation to the Freedom of Expression, Series of Prominent
Judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan upon Questions of Constitutionality No. 22
(General Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan, 1988) (decided June 11, 1986) [hereinafter
Judgement Upon Case of Constitutionality No. 22].
239.
See id. at 8-10.
240.
See id. at 1, 7.
241..
Id. at 7-8.
242.
Id. at 8.
243.
Id. at 24 (Nagashima, J., concurring).
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The Supreme Court rejected the magazine's argument that the
injunction constituted "censorship" for purposes of Article 21's
prohibition against government censorship. It emphasized that censorship,
for purposes of Article 21, constituted viewpoint discrimination based on
ideological or political grounds.'
Because the magazine contained
materials that were defamatory as a matter of law, the lower court simply
had vindicated Igarashi's preexisting legal right without regard to the
magazine's motivations for writing the story.245
This approach differs significantly from New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.' Alabama argued that application of its common law of torts
did not constitute state action; accordingly, the First Amendment simply
did not apply to the dispute between Commissioner Sullivan and the
newspaper. Justice Brennan rejected this argument, explaining that "[t]he
test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever
the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised."247 Similarly,
the fact that the injunction issued was based on a finding that Igarashi's
legal rights were in jeopardy should not have resolved the issue of
censorship.
Instead, the Japanese Supreme Court should have directly addressed
the conflict between the censorial effect of the injunction and the legal
claim at issue. At bottom, the Hoppo Journalwas arguing that Article
21 protects defamatory statements. The Supreme Court could have
rejected this argument directly: prohibiting the distribution of defamatory
materials is not censorship because defamatory statements are not
protected under Article 21 unless made in good faith and with a
reasonable basis for belief in their veracity.248
Turning to the magazine's generalized claim of Article 21 protection,
the Supreme Court noted that freedom of speech is critical to the survival
of democracy:

244.
See id. at 2-3.
245.
On the other hand, had the Hoppo Journalpublished a complimentary story
that grossly overstated Igarashi's merits for office, one wonders if the same result would
have been obtained. Would the Supreme Court's solicitude for protecting the electorate
from falsehoods extend to falsely positive news stories? As a matter of logic, a candidate
competing with Igarashi for the prefectural governorship should enjoy the same right to
an injunction on a theory that a false story praising Igarashi also constitutes a kind of
fraud on the electorate. It is, however, rather doubtful that a magazine featuring a false,
but positive, story on Igarashi would in fact be enjoined.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
246.
247.
Id. at 265.
248.
See Judgment Upon Case of Defamation, supra note 108, at 2-3.
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In a democratic nation where sovereign power resides with the
people 9 the following is the foundation of its existence. That
is, the people as constituents of that nation may express any
doctrine, advocacy of doctrine and the like as well as receive
such information from each other, and by taking whatever he
believes rightful from among them of his own free will,
majority opinion is formed, and government administration is
determined through such process.3
Thus, when matters of public interest are at issue, speech must be
protected even if false, provided that the speaker reasonably believes the
speech to be truthful. 1 Consistent with the Meiklejohn approach,
speech associated with the project of democratic self-government must be
protected from government abridgment-not because everyone "has an
unalienable right to speak whenever, wherever, however he chooses" but
rather because "[t]he welfare of the community requires that those who
decide issues shall understand them."I 2 In the case at hand, however,
the Justices concluded that the magazine had intended to publish the
statements without the requisite good faith belief in their truth.
Accordingly, the magazine could be enjoined, on an ex parte basis, from
distributing the magazines containing the defamatory materials.
Returning to the theme of prior restraint, the Court noted that "it
should be said that in light of the purport of Article 21 of the Constitution
which guarantees the freedom of expression and prohibits censorship,
prior restraint on acts of expression is allowed only under strict and
definite requirements." 3
The Court later spelled out these
requirements: "[A]n injunction should be exceptionally allowed only when
it is obvious that the contents of expression are not true or its objectives
are not solely in the public interest, and, moreover, when the victim may
suffer serious and irreparable damage."'
Igarashi satisfied these
conditions and the Court therefore affirmed the district court's
injunction. 55
249.

Constitution.

This, incidently, reflects a major conceptual shift away from the Meiji

See

ABE ET AL.,

supra note 109, at 3-13;

ANN WASWO, MODERN

JAPANESE SOCIETY 1868-1994, at 8-34 (1996).
250.
Judgment Upon Case of Constitutionality No. 22, supra note 238, at 4
(footnote added).
251.
See id. at 5 ("Even if the truth is not proved, when there is good reason for
the perpetrator of the act to have mistakenly believed that the article was true, the
foregoing act should be construed to be not malicious or negligent.").
252.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 23, at 24-25.
Judgment Upon Case of Constitutionality No. 22, supra note 238, at 5.
253.
254.
Id. at 6.
255.
See id. at 6, 9-10.
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For the most part, the Supreme Court's logic is sound. To the extent
that defamatory statements are not protected under Article 21, it is
perfectly appropriate to provide injunctive relief burdening the publication
of such statements. The problem lies in the Court's argument that the
statements were obviously defamatory: if the statements were so obviously
false, then no one would believe them; if no one believes the statements,
then Igarashi suffers no harm. Indeed, the Hoppo Journal'sexercise in
attack journalism compares favorably with news stories in the United
States taking up the public and private character of prominent national
officials, such as Presidents Nixon and Clinton, and Speakers of the
House Newt Gingrich and Jim Wright.
Arguably, the United States case most directly on point is Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell. 6 In the now-infamous "Campari Ad," Larry
Flynt's pornographic magazine suggested that Jerry Falwell, a prominent
Baptist minister, first experienced sexual intercourse "during a drunken
incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse."257 In addition,
the "ad" suggested that Falwell abused alcohol regularly and preached
only when intoxicated. Falwell sued and a jury found Hustler Magazine
liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 5 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 9
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that Hustler's
parody of Falwell came within the protection of the First Amendment.
Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed:
The sort of robust political debate encouraged by the First
Amendment is bound to produce speech that is critical of those
who hold public office or those public figures who are
"intimately involved in the resolution of important public
questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of
concern to society at large."26°
In a fit of understatement, he then noted that "[s]uch criticism, inevitably,
will not always be reasoned or moderate; public figures as well as public
officials will be subject to vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks. "261
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
164 (1967))
261.

485 U.S. 46 (1988).
Id. at 48.
See id. at 49.
See Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986).
Falwell, 485 U.S. at 51 (quoting Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130,
(Warren, C.J., concurring).
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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The United States Supreme Court repeated its prior holding that false
statements made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard
Speech aimed at inflicting
for their truth or falsity remain actionable.'
emotional harm or holding an officeholder up to public ridicule, however,
enjoys First Amendment protection. "[I]n the world of debate about
public affairs, many things done with motives that are less than admirable
In order to recover against
are protected by the First Amendment."'
a publisher, a plaintiff must show "that the publication contains a false
statement of fact which was made with 'actual malice.""
If one read the Hoppo Journal story literally-and the Japanese
Supreme Court so read the story-the result in the Hoppo Journal Co.
case is not inconsistent with Hustler Magazine and New York Times Co.
It is difficult, however, to understand how the Supreme Court of Japan
could have read the story literally. The story made no attempt to be
objective or to justify its wildest assertions; moreover, it was sprinkled
with political invective: Igarashi is "an ugly character hiding behind a
beautiful mask," a "cockroach," an "opportunist," a "magician with
words and a street vendor quack," "a born liar," a "mayor like the rump
of the bitch," and a "viperous Dosan." The imagery is fantastical, not
Perhaps most importantly, the main point of the piece is
factual.'
political, not personal: Igarashi is "a useless and pernicious person to
Hokkaido" and "the Japan Socialist Party should change the candidate for
governorship immediately if reform is earnestly sought."26
No reasonable person reading the Hoppo Journal'sattack on Igarashi
would take it literally. Although in the form of a news story, in
substance the piece is an editorial. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court took
the article at face value. "This issue of [the] magazine, having an
expected first issue circulation of twenty-five thousand, was considered
to be capable of seriously and almost irreparably defaming the said
Appellee [Igarashi] .... ,
262.
See id. at 51-52, 55-57; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 279-80 (1964).
Falwell, 485 U.S. at 53.
263.

264.
Id. at 56.
265.
See Judgment Upon Case of Constitutionality No. 22, supra note 238, at 8
("A goblin named Kozo is now wriggling on the earth of Hokkaido. It turns into a
butterfly by day and a hairy caterpillar by night crying that (he) wants to live in the red
brick (prefectural office) building.").

266.
267.

Id.
Id. at 9; cf. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14-16, 20-21

(1990); Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50; Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6,

13-14 (1970).
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One is left with the firm conclusion that something in the Hoppo

Journal's catalog of insults and epithets truly irked the Justices. Yet, it
is difficult to identify a specific statement that explains the result.2'
It is certainly true that the Japanese traditionally have placed a very
Professor Benedict
high premium on their good name and honor.'

argues that giri (or duty) to one's name is a core component of Japanese
social ethics. Although Japanese society is highly structured and marked

by strong hierarchical patterns, personal insult invites-and perhaps even
demands-revenge, even at the cost of breaching pre-existing duties to
Perhaps the Supreme Court's decision simply
social superiors.27

reflects an implicit recognition of the salience of giri to one's name and
an assumption that a less protective rule would merely encourage resort
to extra-legal means of obtaining satisfaction. Whatever the precise
motivations for the decision, it is difficult to believe that any reasonable
reader would have taken the accusations against Igarashi literally.

Even the concurring Justice with the most expansive vision of
freedom of speech joined the majority's conclusion that the article was not
protected speech. Justice Masataka Taniguchi argued that in the context
of an election, "the circulation of information which is necessary and

useful to decision-making has priority over protection of reputation of the
public servants or the candidates for elective public offices." 2 7' In
order to avoid self-censorship and "to enable debate and decision-making
on public matters, it is necessary to permit false speech as well."'272

For Justice Taniguchi, as a general proposition, the solution to the
problem of false speech is not censorship, but counterspeech:

268.
See Beer, Freedom of Expression, supra note 21, at 234-35 (acknowledging
that the Hoppo Journal'sarticle on Igarashi was "so extreme in its insults, vulgarity, and
personal attack as obviously to lack credibility on a first reading," but arguing that the
Supreme Court's resolution of the case was not entirely unreasonable because "[t]o the
Court, character assassination trumped the public interest value of comment on a candidate
for public office"); cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 436-37 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens has generally been a strong supporter of broad and
comprehensive First Amendment rights; his vote in Johnson is utterly inconsistent with
his record in this area. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997) (striking down
portions of the Internet Decency Act on First Amendment grounds); see also
Krotoszynski, supra note 45, at 1253-56.
See BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 145-76.
269.
270.
See id. at 146-48, 159-64, 199-205. The Koreans apparently have a similar
social ethic and an even more protective rule of law regarding damaging truthful
statements. See Nicholas D. Kristof, News in U.S. Can Be 'Rumor' in Seoul, and Lead
to Jail, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1998, at A3.
271.
Judgment Upon Case of Constitutionality No. 22, supra note 238, at 27
(Taniguchi, J., concurring).
272.
Id. at 28.
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[E]ven if the contents of speech are false and statement of
opinion is based on such false facts, presentation of the opinion
and free debate will only compel reconsideration and reexamination of the dissenting opinion, and bring about deeper
recognition of the reason to support such opinion and better
understanding of the meaning of it.73
If false speech is made with actual malice (e.g., knowledge of its
falsehood), however, it loses its protected status. Justice Taniguchi
agreed with the majority that the Hoppo Journal's article included
knowingly false statements and was, therefore, not protected by Article
21.274

The defamation cases establish at least two important points: (1) the
Japanese Supreme Court views freedom of speech as an essential corollary
of democratic self-governance, and (2) the Justices are prepared to draw
clear lines between protected and unprotected speech activity. The two
positions need not be contradictory. In the United States, the Supreme
Court's commitment to viewpoint neutrality and its related anti-censorship
project have led the Justices to afford even marginal speech activity
significant First Amendment protection.27 5 The United States Supreme
Court has essentially overprotected marginal speech activities in order to
avoid creating a "chilling effect"276 on protected speech activities.
The Japanese Supreme Court has taken the opposite tack. Although
embracing freedom of expression insofar as speech relates to selfgovernance, it has refused to protect speech that does not directly further
this effort. From the Supreme Court's perspective, a gross parody of a
candidate for political office does not facilitate considered debate of his
relative merits for office. In consequence, the parody should not enjoy
Article 21 protection. Conversely, a newspaper reporting a story about
corruption in city hall should be immune from liability if the story turns
out to be false-provided that the newspaper had a good faith belief in the
truth of the story at the time it made its decision to publish it.
Implicit in the Japanese position is a rejection of the Holmesian
marketplace model of free expression in favor the Meiklejohn and
Brandeis conception of the town hall. If a person behaves in a rude,
obnoxious, or obscene fashion during a town hall meeting, the person is

273.
Id.
274.
See id. at 29-31.
275.
See, e.g., Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
276.
Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329,2332(1997); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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escorted from the chamber, not tolerated. 2'
Such behavior is
antithetical to the consideration of the issues facing the community.
The marketplace of ideas, by way of contrast, potentially belongs to
those with the deepest lungs or the fattest wallets, regardless of the merits
of their contributions. In a true marketplace, Larry Flynt is as free to
peddle his pornographic and scatological wares as a candidate for political
office is to distribute her position papers. Government may not restrict
Flynt's speech in order to enhance the relative voice of other speakers278
nor may it do so because Flynt's speech is genuinely perceived to present
a threat of harm to the community.27 9 Under this view, as Justice
Holmes explains, freedom of speech "is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment." 2 '
It implies toleration of speech, including "the
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with

death." 28 The Supreme Court of Japan has protected the expression of
ideas that it probably "loathes," 2 but has been unwilling to prohibit
government action aimed at restricting speech that is demonstrably

harmful to the community or potentially disruptive of normal political
processes.
The Japanese Supreme Court's defamation cases seem to reflect
Meiklejohn's observation that "[t]he town meeting, as it seeks for
freedom of public discussion of public problems, would be wholly
ineffectual unless [disruptive and counterproductive] speech were thus
abridged."283 For the Supreme Court of Japan, as for Meiklejohn,
freedom of speech is not "a dialectical free-for-all" but rather is "selfgovernment. 2 4

277.
As Meiklejohn put it, in the context of democratic deliberation about matters
of self-governance, "the talking must be regulated and abridged as the doing of the
business under actual conditions may require." MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 23, at 23.
Should a speaker "wander] from the point at issue" or prove "abusive or in other ways
threatenfi to defeat the purpose of the meeting, he may and should be declared 'out of
order.'" Id. Ultimately, a disruptive person who persists in obstreperous conduct "may
be 'denied the floor' or, in the last resort, 'thrown out' of the meeting." Id.
278.
See SMOLLA, supra note 38, at 220-39; cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 93105 (arguing that government attempts to limit the influence of wealth in elections should
not be deemed unconstitutional); Fiss, supra note 31, at 5-6, 19-23, 42-45 (same); Fiss,
supra note 160, at 2478-80 (same).
279.
See MACKINNON, supra note 69, at 97-110.
280.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
281.
Id.
282.
See Japan v. Kanemoto, 396 HANREI JIHO 19 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 21, 1964)
reprintedin ITOH & BEER, supra note 122, at 242.

283.

MEIKLEJOHN,

284.

Id.

supra note 23, at 23.
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Indeed, community values permeate the Japanese Supreme Court's
Article 21 jurisprudence. That is not to say that the Supreme Court has
stood idly by while government officials silenced unpopular political
minorities. Rather, the Supreme Court consistently has demonstrated a
concern for public values when articulating the scope of Article 21 rights.
Both the defamation and political speech cases reflect a strong
commitment to freedom of expression as it relates to democratic selfgovernance, but not as a means of individual self-actualization or liberty.
The community's interest in self-government justifies protecting speech
related to self-government, but not ancillary-much less whollyunrelated-speech. Thus, the Justices of the Supreme Court of Japan
would undoubtedly agree with Meiklejohn's assertion that:
[a]nyone who would ... irresponsibly interrupt the activities of
a lecture, a hospital, a concert hall, a church, a machine shop,
a classroom, a football field, or a home, does not thereby
exhibit his freedom. Rather, he shows himself to be a boor, a
public nuisance, who must be abated, by force if necessary.'
The Supreme Court of Japan has permitted government to "abate" such
free speech "nuisances," whether in the form of pesky candidates
canvassing door-to-door or, rather, in the form of a hyperbolic, counterfactual attack in a local magazine.
In short, the Justices of the Supreme Court of Japan have embraced
Meiklejohn's vision of freedom of speech as a means and not an end. In
so doing, they have laid bare some of the implicit costs and benefits
associated with Meiklejohn's theory of freedom of expression. Perhaps
most importantly, they have demonstrated the communitarian, grouporiented cast of Meiklejohn's philosophy of free speech. 86
In a society that can reach basic agreement about who shall serve as
the "parliamentarian" and what the rules of the debate shall be,
Meiklejohn's democratic self-government theory of free expression seems
to function effectively. The question remains, however, whether a
pluralistic society could agree on a common set of "floor rules." To the
extent that the Japanese experience demonstrates the viability of the
Meiklejohn theory for a group-oriented society that functions on the basis
of establishing community consensus, 2 7 it should lead one to question
the viability of such a theory in a society committed to individualism and
respect for cultural pluralism.

285.
286.
287.

Id. at 24.
See Post, supra note 26, at 268-78, 288-89.
See NAKANE, supra note 21, at 65-66, 143-51.

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

At the same time, one should not underestimate the costs associated
with government regulation of the modalities of speech-small, unpopular
minorities may be effectively silenced. Arguably, minority rights should
not be subjugated solely because the minority is really small. Yet, a truly
communitarian speech ethic will be hard pressed to avoid just such a
result. 28
It also requires something of a leap of faith to assume that
communitarian speech regulations will relate solely to the modalities of
speech without bleeding over into issues of content and viewpoint. A
small, unpopular minority committed to engaging in highly offensive
forms of speech activity is unlikely to find the Japanese courts particularly
receptive to its Article 21 claims. The communitarian impulse that
justifies the regulation of how one engages in speech activity is likely also
to affect judicial consideration of the content of speech activity.
V. THE PROBLEM OF OBSCENITY

Although the First Amendment has made strong inroads in Japan, the
Japanese High Court has certainly established a distinctly Japanese free
speech tradition. As noted above, one common theme is a concern for
the tranquility of the community and the protection of its values.
In this regard, the Japanese Supreme Court's treatment of obscenity
reflects a strong concern for maintaining the viability of Japanese cultural
values related to sexuality and gender relations. In a series of cases
beginning in the 1950s, the Japanese Supreme Court has endorsed
government efforts to restrict salacious materials-even when these
materials have significant and well-recognized artistic or literary value.
Beginning with its opinion in the Lady Chatterly's Lover
2 s 9 the Supreme
Decision,
Court of Japan has adopted the position that

obscene materials fall outside the scope of Article 21. 2 The facts of
the case are straightforward. Local prosecutors sought to suppress the
sale and distribution of a Japanese translation of D.H. Lawrence's Lady
Chatterly'sLover. Citing Article 175 of the Penal Code of Japan, which
288.
See generally id. at 103, 147-48; BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 219-20.
289.
Judgment Upon Case of Translation and Publication of Lady Chatterly's
Lover and Article 175 of the Penal Code, Series of Prominent Judgments of the Supreme
Court of Japan upon Questions of ConstitutionalityNo. 2 (General Secretariat, Supreme
Court of Japan, 1958) (decided Mar. 13, 1957), reprintedin MAKI, supra note 124, at 3;
see also BEER, supra note 107, at 347-49 (describing and discussing the Lady Chatterly's
Lover Decision); cf. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S. 684,
688-89 (1959) (holding non-obscene as a matter of law a film version of Lady Chatterly's
Lover).
290.
See Lady Chatterly's Lover, supra note 120, at 10-13.
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prohibits the distribution, sale, or public display of an "obscene writing,
picture, or other object," 291 the prosecution argued that the translator
and publisher of Lady Chatterly's Lover should be punished for
disseminating an obscene writing.2 2 The trial court found the novel
obscene as a matter of law and convicted the defendants. On appeal, the
defendants argued that Lady Chatterly's Lover was not obscene because
it had significant and well-recognized literary value, that Article 21
privileged their sale and distribution of the work, and that even if the
novel was obscene and did not enjoy Article 21 protection, they could not
be convicted because they did not know that the novel was obscene. The
Supreme Court rejected all three contentions.
With respect to the definition of obscenity, the Supreme Court cited
the earlier holdings of its predecessor, the Court of Cassation, interpreting
Article 175. Under these precedents, the term "obscene writings" as used
in Article 175 "refers to a writing, picture, and everything else which
tends to be an obscene matter" and "it must be such that it causes man to
The Court of
engender feeling[s] of shame and loathsomeness."2'
Cassation later refined this rather circular and vague definition: obscenity
includes any material "'which unnecessarily excites or stimulates sexual
desire, injures the normal sense of embarrassment commonly present in
a normal ordinary person, and runs counter to the good moral concept
pertaining to sexual matters.'"2
The Supreme Court then concluded that Lady Chatterly'sLover met
this definition of obscenity, based on twelve sexually-explicit
passages.' The Court explained that "the translation of the passages
under consideration far exceeds the bound of propriety generally accepted
in society." 296 This conclusion stood, notwithstanding the fact that
"unlike the usual type of pornographic writings, it [the novel] is not
entirely without literary characteristics."2" Describing the passages at
issue as "too bold, detailed, and realistic," the Court tossed out the baby
with the bath water, noting that "[a]rt, even art, does not have the special
privilege of presenting obscene matters to the public."298
291.
Japanese Criminal Code, art. 175, reprintedin Lady Chatterly's Lover, supra
note 120, at 36.
See Lady Chatterly's Lover, supra note 120, at 1-3.
292.

293.
Id. at 3.
294.
Id.
See id. at 3-9.
295.
Id. at 7.
296.
Id.
297.
298.
Id. at 7, 8. In a very similar case, the Supreme Court of the United States
reached the opposite conclusion. See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the
Univ., 360 U.S. 684, 688-90. (1959). Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart
characterized New York's effort to suppress a film version of Lady Chatterly's Lover as
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Moreover, the fact that the defendants did not have prior knowledge
that the novel violated Article 175 did not insulate them from

liability. 2' "Whether the writer had a complete knowledge as to the
obscene nature of his work or had only a vague recognition, or whether
he had no knowledge whatsoever, merely goes to the question of
mitigation. "I
Finally, the Justices turned to Article 21. They squarely rejected any
suggestion that Article 21 protects legally obscene materials. Invoking
Article 12's "public welfare" limitation, the Supreme Court characterized
the production and sale of obscene materials as an "abuse" of freedom of
expression.3 1 Nor did the prohibition of obscene material constitute a
Although a
form of censorship, also prohibited by Article 21. 0
number of Justices penned concurring opinions, not a single member of
the fifteen Justice Supreme Court dissented from the view that Lady

Chatterly's Lover constituted obscenity.
In 1969, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of obscenity in Ishii
v. Japan,' also known as the de Sade Case. The defendants argued
that the work in question, the Marquis de Sade's In Praise of Vice, was
not obscene because it had significant literary value. Restating its prior

holding in the Lady Chatterly's Lover Case, the Supreme Court held that
the book in question was legally obscene, even though de Sade's work
possessed significant literary value.3 " "When writings of artistic and
intellectual merit are obscene, then to make them the object of penalties

in order to uphold order and healthy customs in sexual life is of benefit
to the life of the whole nation."" 5

Thus, the Supreme Court strongly

an attempt "to prevent the exhibition of a motion picture because that picture advocates
an idea-that adultery under certain circumstances may be proper behavior." M. at 688.
Justice Stewart immediately rejected that proposition because "the First Amendment's
basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate ideas." Id.
See Lady Chatterly's Lover, supra note 120, at 9-10; cf. Smith v. California,
299.
361 U.S. 147 (1959) (holding that knowledge of a work's obscene nature was a
prerequisite to prosecution of a book store owner because permitting California to impose
liability without knowledge of a book's obscene content would unduly chill the availability
of books to the public).
300.
Lady Chatterly's Lover, supra note 120, at 10.
See id. at 11.
301.
See id. at 12-13.
302.
23 KEISHO 10, at 1239 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 15, 1969), reprintedin ITOH & BEER,
303.
supra note 122, at 183.
304.
See id. at 184-85 ("[T]here is no obstacle to holding obscene a literary work
with artistic and intellectual value.").
305.
Id. at 186; cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that works
possessing serious artistic, literary, scientific, or other social value may not banned as
obscenity, notwithstanding sexually explicit content). But see Susan Paynter, Two Police
Chiefs, Two Views of Obscenity, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 18, 1997, at C1
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reaffirmed its position that the fact that a work has significant literary,
artistic, or scientific value does not save it from prohibition under Article
175 of the Penal Code.
Commentators, both in Japan and abroad, have been highly critical
of these decisions.'
Some have even predicted that the Supreme Court
would eventually reverse itself, at least insofar as it has sanctioned the
prohibition of works that possessed serious social value.'
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has declined to oblige these critics. On
the contrary, the Court reaffirmed the validity of Lady Chatterly'sLover
and de Sade scarcely more than a decade ago,' citing its earlier
precedents and again reiterating its position that "[w]hen viewed from the
standpoint of maintaining and securing sound sexual morals in our
country, prevention of the unnecessary influx of matters of obscene
expression from abroad is in conformity with the public welfare. "I
What should one take from Lady Chatterly's Lover and its progeny?
Plainly, the Supreme Court's decisions do not fit into an overall
governmental commitment to protect the community from erotic or
sexually explicit speech-the commodification of sex is afait accompli in
Japan.310 Nor has the Japanese Supreme Court, like its Canadian
(describing Oklahoma City police chief's decision to prosecute video rental stores offering
customers The Tin Drum because of single scene involving attempted sexual activity
between minors).
306.
See BEER, supra note 107, at 233, 354-55; Masami Itoh, The Rule of Law:
Constitutional Development, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING
SOCIETY 205, 228 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed., 1963); Nathaniel L. Nathanson,
Human Rights in Japan:Through the Looking-Glass of Supreme Court Opinions, 11 How.
L.J. 316, 322-23 (1965).
307.
See Itoh, supra note 306, at 228; Interview with Professor John Haley,
University of Washington (July 11, 1996).
308.
See Customs Inspection Case, supra note 107, at 8. In this decision, the
Supreme Court upheld the Customs Service's decision to seize certain 8mm films under
a provision of the Customs Tariff Law prohibiting the importation of books or drawings
that "injure the public morals." Unlike the Lady Chatterly's Lover and de Sade cases,
however, the Supreme Court was divided. Four Justices of the 15 sitting issued a joint
dissent, arguing that the "public morals" standard was too vague to survive Article 21
scrutiny. See id. at 18 (Ito, Taniguchi, Yasuoka, & Shimatani, JJ., dissenting).
309.
Id. at 8.
310.
In Japan, erotic materials are ubiquitous: "spring books" and "spring movies"
are readily available, not to mention pornographic comic books. See BEER, supra note
107, at 339-40, 345-47 (discussing prevalence of sexually explicit films and books in
Japan); REINGOLD, supra note 113, at 92-101 (describing the irony of the Japanese
government's active censorship efforts against foreign erotica given the ubiquity of
domestically produced smut); John Burgess, Prostitute'sDeath From AIDS Alarms Japan,
WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1987, at AI ("Pornographic comic books are standard fare for men
commuting on subways."); David Remnick, Tokyo After Dark, WASH. POST, June 16,
1985, Book World, at 7 (describing the Japanese sex industry). Beyond dirty pictures,
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counterpart, made a conscious decision to elevate gender equality above
freedom of expression.31' Although Japanese women increasingly are
challenging traditional stereotypes"' about their proper role in
society,"' the Supreme Court's decisions do not invoke the equal
protection guarantee contained in Article 14, nor has the Court framed its
decisions in terms of avoiding the degradation of women. Perhaps this
is just as well, given the widespread availability of socially-correct
pornography in Japan-pornography that is thoroughly Japanese in its
outlook on proper sexual behaviors. 14

If the Lady Chatterly's Lover line of cases cannot be explained in
terms of a general social concern about pornography, nor in terms of a
commitment to gender equality that supercedes the protection of freedom
of expression, what then explains the Japanese Supreme Court's

willingness to turn a blind eye to state-sponsored censorship? Why has
the Japanese Supreme Court given its blessing to the state's efforts to
bowdlerize pornography (an oxymoronic task, to be sure)?
movies, and books, one can readily obtain the real thing in Japan; prostitution is not
uncommon and while not officially sanctioned, is an established fact. See Burgess, supra;
Mary Jordan, In Okinawa's Whisper Alley, GIs Find ProstitutesAre Cheap and Plentiful,
WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1995, at A31. "Prostitution is so imbued in society that late-night
TV programs feature live visits to establishments selling sex and interviews with the
women there." Burgess, supra. In fact, recent press reports describe a disturbing trend
of very young women selling their bodies in order to obtain the cash necessary to keep
up with the latest in fashion trends. See Nicholas D. Kristof, A Plain School Uniform as
the Latest Aphrodisiac, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1997, at A4.
311.
See Regina v. Butler [1992] S.C.R. 452 (Can.); GREENAWALT, supra note
123, at 113-23; MACKINNON, supra note 69, at 100-05.
312.
See, e.g., BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 279-80 (describing the differences
both in education and in formal and informal social status that stamp females as vastly
inferior to males in traditional Japanese society).
313.

See REINGOLD, supra note 113, at 103;

FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL

CHANGE INPOSTWAR JAPAN 124-65, 215-18 (1987); WASWO, supra note 249, at 147-55;
see also Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, Still Office Flowers: Japanese Women Betrayed By the
Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 83 (1995) (describing
women's historical roles in Japanese society and their recent willingness to challenge
traditional limitations and stereotypes); Andrew Pollack, It's See No Evil, Have No
Harassmentin Japan,N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1996, at DI (describing increasing willingness
of Japanese women to resist work-based sexual harassment and other forms of genderbased discrimination).
314. ' This presumably includes such publications as "Anatomical Illustrations of
Junior High School Girls," and "V-Club" that feature "pictures of naked elementary
school girls." See Kristof, supra note 310. Cy New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747
(1982) (holding that, consistent with the First Amendment, government may ban any
materials featuring nude pictures of children, regardless of their artistic or scientific
value).
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Arguably, the Lady Chatterly's Lover line of cases reflects a rather
clumsy and half-hearted attempt to protect the community from "bad
ideas" about sex and sexual relationships. It is not the sexually explicit

nature of the materials that caused the state to prohibit them, rather it was
their un-Japanese world view coupled with their primal subject
matter.31 The Supreme Court's approach seems to embrace the logic
that the average Japanese citizen can safely be exposed to foreign political
ideas, and even to foreign cultural materials; these materials can be

incorporated into Japanese society without altering its basic chemistry.
Foreign ideas about sex and gender relations are another matter entirely.
The Justices of the Japanese Supreme Court apparently believe that
foreign ideas about sex and gender relations are somehow potentially

more dangerous to the community; not only foreign pornography, but
even foreign works containing a substantial erotic element need not be
tolerated.316
Traditional taboos and social mores must be
31 7
maintained.
Needless to say, this kind of censorship is hardly consistent with the

marketplace of ideas model of freedom of speech. Moreover, it is also
inconsistent with most iterations of the Meiklejohn theory of the First

Amendment. Alexander Meiklejohn himself argued that art, literature,
and science are needed to make the citizenry capable of meaningful
participation in democratic self-governance.3 8 Such works also help to
315.
See, e.g., REINGOLD, supra note 113, at 92-97 (describing the irony of active
government censorship of foreign sexually explicit materials while turning a blind eye on
domestic, socially-conforming erotica).
316.
Cf. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S. 684, 689
(1959) ("[The First Amendment's free speech guarantee] is not confined to the expression
of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. It protects advocacy of the opinion
that adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or the single
tax.").
317.
This approach is at least arguably consistent with the writings of Robert Bork,
who argues that communities have a right to maintain minimum standards of decency, if
necessary through projects of governmental censorship. See BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS
GOMORRAH, supra note 67, at 140-53. It also comports with Justice Scalia's view that
communities should be free to prohibit speech activity that is "'contra bonos mores,' i.e.,
immoral."
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
318.
See Meiklejohn, supra note 52, at 256-57. Subsequent critics have argued
that this expansion of protected speech is not entirely justifiable. See Stern, supra note
46, at 932-33 (arguing that this rationale proves both too much and too little and
suggesting that it lacks a logical limiting principle).
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frame the terms of public debate.319 He also disapproved of viewpointbased censorship. 3"

Professor Meiklejohn's attempts to extend his democratic selfgovernment paradigm to encompass artistic, literary, and scientific
expression produced recurring criticism. As Professor Marty Redish
explained, "[a]lthough Meiklejohn in later years appeared to soften the
rigidity of his lines of demarcation by effectively extending his
doctrine-in a somewhat less than persuasive manner-to many forms of
apparently nonpolitical speech, other commentators have adopted his

initial premise and kept within its logical limits." 32 '

Meiklejohn's

attempt to expand his theory led to attacks from "those who believe that
the first amendment has no special political basis and by political 'purists'
who accept Meiklejohn's initial premise about the relationship between the
first amendment and the political process, but question the logic of his

extension. "322
The Japanese Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence amply
demonstrates that it is possible to protect political speech without
protecting non-political speech and, moreover, that such an approach is

not inconsistent with the maintenance of a functioning democratic polity.
Viewed in this light, the Lady Chatterly's Lover line of decisions
demonstrates the limits of Meiklejohn's theory of the proper scope of
freedom of expression.

On the other hand, most of Meiklejohn's intellectual descendants
have not endorsed the proposition that the government can attempt to
323
protect the citizenry from dangerous ideas about sex or gender roles.
319.
See Meiklejohn, supra note 52, at 257.
See id. at 261 ("Now if such ordinances are based upon official disapproval
320.
of the ideas to be presented at the meeting, they clearly violate the First Amendment. But
if no such abridgment of freedom is expressed or implied, regulation or prohibition on
other grounds may be enacted and enforced."); see also MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM, supra note 52, at 118-19:
[W]hen we speak of the Amendment as guarding the freedom to hear and to
read, the principle applies not only to the speaking or writing of our own
citizens but also to the writing or speaking of everyone whom a citizen, at his
own discretion, may choose to hear or to read.
321.
Martin H, Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 592
(1982) (footnote omitted); see also Stern, supra note 46, at 932-33.
322.
Redish, supra note 321, at 597 (footnotes omitted).
323.
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 224-26; Owen M. Fiss, Freedom and
Feminism, 80 GEO. L.J. 2041, 2044, 2056-57 (1992); Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and
State Censorship, 100 YALE L.J. 2087, 2091-92, 2103-04 (1991); cf BORK, SLOUCHING
TOWARDS GOMORRAH, supra note 67, at 99-102, 140-53 (arguing that some ideas are
fundamentally inconsistent with democracy and therefore may be suppressed); Bork, supra
note 67, at 20-35 (arguing that the state may suppress non-political speech without
violating the First Amendment).
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Even Catherine MacKinnon, who endorses the proposition that the state
should be permitted to punish the advocacy of certain bad ideas,3" does

not embrace the view that government can attempt to impose orthodoxy
in matters of intimate human relationships and gender roles.3'

The Japanese Supreme Court's approach is perhaps consistent with
Robert Bork's theory of the First Amendment. Former Judge Bork seems
to subscribe to cultural jihad thesis recently set forth by Justice
Scalia; 3 6 he has argued that communities should be permitted to
determine the level of deviancy that they will tolerate,327 and to impose
punishments on those who insist on transgressing the established
32
limits. 8

Ironically, however, Japanese sexual mores have not been static; they
have evolved and changed over time. One concurring Justice in the Lady

Chatterly's Lover Case notes that once upon a time, Japanese men and
324.
See MACKINNON, supra note 69, at 103-07. MacKinnon embraces the
Canadian Supreme Court's apparent rejection of the notion that "under the First
Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea." Id. at 106. According to
MacKinnon, "[plerhaps under equality law, in some sense there is." Id. In fairness, she
attempts to create space for public discussion about the proper ordering of social relations,
noting that the embrace of a First Amendment doctrine that permits the prohibition of the
expression of hostile attitudes toward women and racial minorities should not preclude
debate about or expression of "ideas to the contrary." Id. However, the terms of this
debate would be delimited by the community's commitment to the equality ethic: debate
or expression of ideas cannot impose "social inferiority." Id. Yet, as she describes the
relationship of ideas and actions, see id. at 25-29, 33-41, 74, 82-86, 98-100, the mere
expression of viewpoints endorsing inequality based on gender, race, or religion both
causes and helps to maintain social inferiority. Accordingly, MacKinnon's logic
inexorably leads one to the conclusion that bad ideas exist and the state should be free to
prohibit their dissemination as part of a larger project of ensuring social equality.
325.
See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 155-57, 165-66,
212-13 (1987).
326.
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite."); id. at 652 ("When the Court takes
sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than the villeins-and more
specifically with the Templars, reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from
which the Court's Members are drawn.").
327.
See BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH, supra note 67, at 3-4 (arguing
that societies should be permitted to establish and maintain moral norms regarding
acceptable behavior, with the assistance of state power if necessary).
328.
See id. at 140-53 (arguing that government imposed censorship is necessary
right now if Western civilization is to avoid moral ruination accompanied by total social,
economic, and political collapse). In fairness to the Supreme Court of Japan, none of
their decisions regarding the regulation of "obscenity" come anywhere close to justifying
broad-based restrictions on speech based upon a Borkian "society is going to hell in a
handbasket" thesis.
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women regularly engaged in orgies at a sacred mountain. 29 He even
notes references to the practice in traditional folk songs: "[i]n regard to
this 'utagaki,' there is a song in Mannyoshu which goes, 'in kagau-kagai,
may I also participate in intercourse with another's wife, and let others
commune with my wife." 3 Of course, "it must be remembered that
these functions were regular affairs practiced in the spring and autumn in
the sacred compound with divine permission."331

Rather than demonstrating hypocrisy (or senility) on the part of
Justice Mano, I think that these observations tend to confirm that the
Supreme Court's principal concern in this line of cases is preserving
Japanese attitudes and mores regarding sexuality and gender roles.
Indeed, Justice Mano explained that the ancient practices he described
"must be considered as revealing a glimpse of ancient marriage customs
based upon group sentiment and group conscience of that time;"
accordingly "it cannot be adjudged simply by the concept of eroticism or
obscenity as we understand it today."332 What Justice Mano is really
saying is that unlike Lady Chatterly's Lover or the writings of the

Marquis de Sade, erotic Japanese literature may not reflect contemporary
social values or morals, but still retains its Japanese essence; because it
is Japanese it can be tolerated, if not embraced, notwithstanding its

eroticism.
Before assuming the mantel of cultural/legal superiority, would-be
American critics should take care to remember that the United States

Supreme Court has not been consistently vigilant against efforts to enforce
orthodoxy through government actions designed to suppress ideas or
doctrines that it disfavors. In fact, the Supreme Court has from time to
time turned a blind eye on efforts to enforce political orthodoxy, by
329.
As Justice Mano describes it:
According to the marriage customs and practices of old Japan, as may be
perceived from such classic literature as Kojiki, Nihon, Shoki, Mannyohsu,
Fudoki, etc., the method of selecting one's mate apparently was extremely
liberal and completely incompatible with the punctilious method adopted later
in the feudal period. In one particular, according to an ancient custom called
"utagaki" or "kagai," it is said that a group of young men and women went,
hand in hand, up into a mountain, normally regarded as sacred, and there they
feasted, sang, and danced; and at the height of pleasure, they engaged openly
in indiscriminate group sex acts and indulged in the state of ecstasy.
Lady Chatterly's Lover, supra note 120, at 15 (Mano, J., concurring); Cf REINGOLD,
supra note 113, at 103-04 (describing contemporary community enthusiasm for erotica and
noting that "[t]oday, at the Tagata Shrine near Nagoya, regular festivals are held in which
models of male and female genitals are paraded and genitalia-shaped souvenirs are sold
to visitors").
330.
Lady Chatterly's Lover, supra note 120, at 15-16.
331.
Id.
332.
Id.
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discouraging-if not prohibiting-access to persons and materials deemed
dangerous. In the 1970s, for example, the Supreme Court sustained
legislation prohibiting the issuance of visas to foreign nationals who had
been identified as advocates of communism.333 In practice, of course,
this meant persons who identified with Soviet-style socialism. 3 Surely
Justice Marshall was correct in observing that "[n]othing is served-least
of all our standing in the international community-" by excluding foreign
writers and scholars based on their political views.335
More recently, the United States Supreme Court sustained the Reagan
Justice Department's efforts to discourage the dissemination of foreign
books and films deemed undesirable by the government.336 Invoking a

law passed in the 1930s in response to the perceived dual threats of
communism and nazism and recodified during the Red Scare of the 1950s,
the Justice Department required a would-be distributor of foreign films
designated "political propaganda" by the Department to warn potential

recipients of the films that they had been disseminated by "agents" of
"foreign principals." 337 A would-be distributor challenged the labelling
and notification requirements, arguing that he did not wish to be tagged
with distributing "foreign political propaganda" at the behest of the agents
of foreign principals.33s
The Supreme Court concluded that the labelling requirement did not

constitute a prior restraint or undue burden on the dissemination of the
materials in question.339 Instead, the majority opined, the law at issue
simply required would-be distributors to share the government's official
view that the materials in question might reflect a foreign government's
official party line.

333.
See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); see also 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1182(a)(28)(D), (G)(v), & (d)(3)(A).
334.
See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 771 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (affirming convictions of communist party members
for advocating violent overthrow of the United States government, notwithstanding the
complete absence of any concrete actions to implement this point of view).
335.
Mandel, 408 U.S. at 785 (Marshall, J.,dissenting). Justice Marshall also
lamented the Supreme Court's "depart[ure] from its own best role as the guardian of
individual liberty in the face of governmental overreaching." Id. The excluded alien,
Ernest E. Mandel, a prominent Belgian journalist and Marxist scholar, concluded that the
government's decision demonstrated "'a lack of confidence' on the part of our
Government 'in the capacity of its supporters to combat Marxism on the battleground of
ideas.'" Id. at 784.
336.
See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987). The particular films at issue in
Keene hailed from Canada and addressed the subjects of nuclear war and acid rain; one
even received the 1983 Oscar for best documentary. See id. at 467-68, 475.
337.
See 22 U.S.C. §§ 611, 614 (1994); Keene, 481 U.S. at 467-68.
338.
See Keene, 481 U.S. at 467-68.
339.
See id. at 480-85.
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In many respects, attempts to fence out political ideas are more
reprehensible than attempts to preserve common cultural understandings.
As Justice Douglas observed in Mandel, "[t]hought control is not within
the competence of any branch of government." 3 Yet, the results in
Mandel and Keene are hard to square with this proposition.
The Japanese Supreme Court's odd obscenity decisions will probably
do little harm in the long run because Japan maintains a viable system of
political pluralism. If political pluralism exists, cultural pluralism should
necessarily follow. As Professor MacKinnon and other feminists have
noted, the personal is political; one cannot divorce civic life from social
" ' On the other hand, cultural pluralism
life.34
can be suppressed in a
society that lacks political pluralism. A totalitarian regime that prohibits
the free exchange of political ideas can easily annex efforts to control
popular culture to its program of repression.342
The Japanese effort to maintain a sexual Maginot line is silly and
probably ineffectual, but it is hardly the stuff from which dictatorships are
forged.343 Moreover, the Japanese government does not maintain active
and ongoing censorial efforts-with the possible exception of aggressive
customs inspectors bent on ferreting out the latest copy of Hustler.3"
Whatever its precise motivations, the Japanese Supreme Court obviously
views governmental efforts to preserve Japanese cultural norms as
constitutionally permissible in some instances, even if such efforts
ultimately prove to be largely unsuccessful.
Turning from the theoretical to the practical, the obscenity doctrine
set forth by the Supreme Court of Japan potentially yields bizarre results.
Consider, for example, Milos Forman's film, The People Versus Larry
Flynt. Although the movie is about freedom of expression and Larry
Flynt's colorful publishing career, it features erotic dancing, explicit
340.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 772 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
341.
See MACKINNON, supra note 325, at 100; see also Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread
and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1537 n.18; Elizabeth M. Schneider,
The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives From the Women's Movement, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 601-02 (1986). As Professor MacKinnon puts it, "[t]he private is
the public for those for whom the personal is the political." MACKINNON, supra note
325, at 100.
342.
China under Mao provides a case study of the potential for success in such
efforts. Not only did Mao control and define Chinese political life, he also kept tight
control of Chinese cultural life. North Korea under Kim I1 Sung provides a second
example of this phenomenon.
343.
In a rough sort of way, it parallels the French government's attempts to keep

the French language pure and exclusive. See, e.g., Anne Swardson, French Groups Sue
to Bar English-Only Internet Sites, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1996, at Al.
344.
See REINGOLD, supra note 113, at 92-104; see also BEER, supra note 107,
at 335-37; Kristof, supra note 310.
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sexual scenes, rampant drug use, and nudity associated with the
preparation of photographs for publication in Hustler. It would flunk the
Lady Chatterly's Lover/de SadelCustoms Inspection test."' Any work,
however otherwise meritorious, featuring un-Japanese sexual materials,
potentially can be labelled "obscene" and banned.
If the Supreme Court were to broaden the scope of its censorial
project to include all erotic materials, the Lady Chatterly's Lover line of
cases could be made consistent with the "purist" version of the
Meiklejohn theory of freedom of expression.'
As former-Judge Bork
once put it, the objection to excluding non-political speech from
constitutional protection arguably "confuses the constitutionality of laws
with

their

wisdom.

' 347

The

absolutist

approach

to

applying

Meiklejohn's theory of free expression relies upon "the enlightenment of
society and its elected representatives" to protect non-political speech, a
state of affairs that Bork characterizes as "hardly a terrible fate." 348

Thus, at a minimum, should the Supreme Court ultimately elect to
maintain its stance that erotic speech does not merit Article 21 protection,
it should apply this rule to both foreign and domestic materials: "spring

books," "spring movies," and similar fare should not enjoy formal legal
privilege based solely on their domestic origins.349

On the other hand, it is difficult not to be sympathetic toward
Meiklejohn's attempt to extend his theory to encompass artistic, literary,
Can a people be politically free but
and scientific speech.35°
intellectually and culturally repressed? Even if one posits the arts,
sciences, and humanities as independent social goods,35 ' their
relationship to democracy cannot be denied: a society of illiterates will
prove incapable of self-governance.352
Indeed, Thomas Jefferson

345.
Indeed, even the movie CarnalKnowledge, held non-obscene as a matter of
law in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S.
153 (1974), would constitute obscenity as a matter of law in Japan.
346.
See BORIC, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH, supra note 67, at 99-102;
Bork, supra note 67, at 27-28.
347.
Bork, supra note 67, at 28.
348. Id.
349.
See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) (arguing that principled constitutional decision-making
requires even-handed application of doctrines across all cases involving similar facts).
350.
See Meiklejohn, supra note 52, at 262-63.
351.
See Stern, supra note 46, at 932-33.
352.
See THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on Virginia, in 4 THE WORKS OF THOMAS

64-65 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904); see also ALEXANDER
Education as a Factor in Post-War Reconstruction, in ALEXANDER
JEFFERSON

MEIKLEJOHN,
MEIKLEJOHN:

TEACHER OF FREEDOM 185-89 (Cynthia Stokes Brown ed., 1981); Susan H. Bitensky,
Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A
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repeatedly drew the connection between education, enlightenment, and
democratic self-government.353
Democracy presupposes the wisdom, intelligence, and humanity to
make meaningful and informed decisions about who shall govern and

what they shall do. To protect political speech without affording broad
protection to artistic, literary, and scientific speech necessarily constitutes
an incomplete and imperfect project; Alexander Meiklejohn came to
recognize this and, accordingly, modified his democratic self-government

paradigm. One would hope that the Justices of the Japanese Supreme
Court, like Alexander Meiklejohn, will one day come to eschew the
Borkian approach and instead embrace Meiklejohn's "new and improved"
democratic self-governance paradigm for freedom of expression.
VI. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, SOCIAL CONSENSUS, AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW

Examination and analysis of the Japanese Supreme Court's principal
decisions involving freedom of speech presents a mixed picture. The
Supreme Court has been moderately protective of political speech and the
use of public property for mass demonstrations. At the same time,
however, it has proven extremely deferential to governmental
authorities-whether local or national, whether legislative or executive.
An American observer cannot help but wonder why the Supreme Court
of Japan has failed to enforce Article 21 more aggressively. What
explains the reluctance of the Supreme Court to challenge directly
legislative and executive branch actions that burden freedom of
expression?
It would be impossible to demonstrate conclusively that a single
reason, or even a group of reasons, explains this pattern of behavior.
There are, however, at least four possible explanations that merit
consideration. Even if they cannot provide a conclusive resolution to the
Beginning to the End of the National EducationsCrisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 550, 550-51,
588, 628-30 (1992); Susan P. Leviton & Matthew H. Joseph, An Adequate Educationfor
All Maryland's Children: Morally Right, Economically Necessary, and Constitutionally
Required, 52 MD. L. REV. 1137, 1153-54, 1153 n.94 (1993).
353.
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816), in THE
BEST LETTERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 208-12 (J.G. de Roulhac Hamilton ed., 1926);
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Sept. 9, 1817), in 17 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 417, 423-24 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1904); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 160 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899); Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for
the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 1048 (Saul K.
Padover ed., 1943); see also Bitensky, supra note 352, at 628-29.
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question, considered individually and collectively they provide plausible
rationales for the Japanese Supreme Court's course of action.
First, the ghost of Japan's civil law past haunts the common law
constitution and its ostensible guardian, the Supreme Court. Strong
judicial review simply was not a part of the civil law system that existed
prior to 1945. Moreover, since 1945, the Supreme Court has failed to
No strong
assert routinely its authority to "say what the law is."'
Chief Justice has articulated a clear vision of a robust form of judicial
review. Nor has the Supreme Court collectively attempted to carve out
a co-equal constitutional status with the Diet and Ministries. On the
contrary, "[t]he Court has never played the unique role in the country's
political and social life that the United States Supreme Court has
played. "355
The civil law tradition historically has not placed judges at the apex
of government structure. Instead, most civil law traditions include3 5a6
healthy dose of legislative supremacy as a core constitutional precept.
Thus, even the adoption of written constitutions in many civil law
jurisdictions did not necessarily affect the relative authority of judges visa-vis legislatures because "[l]egislative supremacy and a flexible
'
It is possible to maintain a
constitution are companion concepts." 357
constitutional system in which the legislature, rather than the courts,
retains primary responsibility for considering and implementing
constitutional values.35 In many respects, this was the situation that
obtained in Japan under the Meiji Constitution.
Professor Merryman reports that although "[tihe trend toward
judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation in the civil law world
has been strong, particularly in this century," 35 9 the results have not
been particularly encouraging in many jurisdictions. "The tendency has
been for the civil law judge to recoil from the responsibilities and
Indeed, Professor
opportunities of constitutional adjudication. '""
Merryman questions whether it is possible for civil law judges to raise
their sights because "[t]he tradition is too strong, the orthodox view of the
354.
See Okudaira, supra note 13, at 25 ("In Japan... there has been no tradition
of judicial supremacy and no history of Supreme Court achievements."); cf. Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

355.

Okudaira, supra note 13, at 25; see also Luney, supra note 107, at 123, 144-

45; Nathanson, supra note 306, at 323-24; Harold See, The Judiciary and Dispute
Resolution in Japan:A Survey, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 339, 349-50 (1982).
356.
See MERRYMAN, supra note 138, at 22-25, 28-38, 133-37.
357.
Id. at 134-35.
358.
See id. at 135.
359.
Id. at 139.

360.

Id.
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judicial function too deeply ingrained, the effects of traditional legal
education and career training too limiting."361 All that said, however,
the trend within civil law jurisdictions is toward the adoption of what
Merryman characterizes as "formal, rigid constitutions" that vest a power
of judicial review in a judicial or quasi-judicial organ.3"
Through its cases taking up freedom of expression, one can see how
the Supreme Court of Japan has experienced the difficulties associated
with making a transition from a civil law to a common law model. Given
the limited role posited for courts in traditional civil law constitutionalism,
it is not at all surprising that the Supreme Court of Japan has not adopted
an aggressive posture with respect to its relatively new powers of judicial
review.
Professor Okudaira has argued that the Supreme Court's reticence is
self-reinforcing: "Because the Court does not venture to challenge another
branch of the government, its authority is not augmented and its prestige
does not increase." 3" He labels this state of affairs a kind of "vicious
circle."
Thus, one explanation for the Supreme Court's relative
quiescence is a lack of raw political power coupled with a lack of social
consensus regarding the legitimacy of a strong, perhaps confrontational,
form of judicial review. As Professor Okudaira has put it, "[p]erhaps our
Court knows it has neither enough authority nor enough prestige to hand
down decisions such as INS v. Chadha or Texas v. Johnson, which strike
hard blows at the U.S. Congress or at the executive administration.""
A perceived lack of power or concerns about the legitimacy of
judicial review in a democratic polity could support a general posture of
deference. 3" This explanation, however, is plainly incomplete. The
fact of the matter is that the Japanese Supreme Court has struck down
legislation from time to time; indeed, one commentator has noted that in
comparative terms, the Japanese Supreme Court has proven far more
aggressive in its exercise of judicial review than did the United States
Supreme Court in its early years of existence.367 The Court not only
361.
Id.
362.
Id. at 133-41.
363.
Okudaira, supra note 13, at 25.
364.
Id.
365.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
366.
See, e.g., Sonobe, supra note 127, at 167-74.
367.
See See, supra note 355, at 350 ("Whereas the United States Supreme Court
used its power of judicial review to invalidate congressional acts only twice in its first
sixty-eight years of existence, the Japanese Supreme Court has held five statutes
unconstitutional in only half that time."). Of course, the utility of this observation should
not be overstated. The United States Supreme Court had no pre-existing role model to
which it could look for guidance in articulating a meaningful vision of judicial review

(other than perhaps the pre-existing state supreme courts).

In the latter half of the
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possesses, but actually exercises the power of judicial review; its scruples
about overriding the decisions of the political branches have not proven
to be a controlling consideration in all cases. a6
A second possible explanation for the Supreme Court's cautious

nature relates to the selection process for members of the Japanese
Supreme Court. Dean Luney reports that most scholars attribute the
Supreme Court's "conservative trend to the political dominance in
postwar Japan of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and to the Supreme
Court appointment process. " " No doubt, the composition of the
Supreme Court and the manner in which Justices are selected contributes
to the Supreme Court's institutional conservatism.
The LDP selects the persons (to date always men) to be appointed to
the Supreme Court of Japan. More often than not, the nominees share a
common understanding of the institutional role of the Supreme Court and
its proper place in Japan's constitutional scheme. This is not to say that
they are ideological clones, nor that they have identical backgrounds.
Obviously, individual Justices have different philosophical and
jurisprudential leanings. Moreover, the LDP historically has selected
Justices from a variety of constituencies within the legal community,
twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court itself could be seen as such a model.
Moreover, other post-World War II constitutional courts in industrial democracies vested
with the power of judicial review have not exhibited the Supreme Court of Japan's
extreme form of judicial self-restraint. See Tom Farer, ConsolidatingDemocracy in Latin
America: Law, Legal Institutions and ConstitutionalStructure, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 1295, 1317-20 (1995); Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A
Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837, 837-45 (1991). The Constitutional Court of the
Federal Republic of Germany provides perhaps the best example in this regard, especially
given Germany's civil law tradition-indeed, the very civil law tradition Japan
appropriated during the early years of the Meiji Restoration. See HALEY, supra note 16,
at 67-80; INOUE, supra note 13, at 56-67; DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

57-66 (1989).

368.
Nor, for that matter, have Professor Nathanson's concerns about the lack of
use of the power ofjudicial review leading to its "atrophy" come to pass. See Nathanson,
supra note 306, at 324. At the same time, the Supreme Court's general postire of
extreme deference to the political branches cannot be gainsaid. Cf. HALEY, supra note
16, at 83-104 (arguing that, even during the Meiji and pre-war periods, Japanese judges
exhibited significant independence and worked successfully to maintain the rule of law).
369.
Luney, supra note 107, at 145; see also Okudaira, supra note 13, at 24-25;
Ramseyer, supra note 110, at 724-28, 734-38, 743-46. Indeed, Professor Ramseyer
argues that politics not only influences the selection of judges in Japan but also affects
their behavioronce in office. See id. at 724-28. But cf. Haley, supra note 138 (arguing
that the LDP does not maintain any effective system of control over members of the
Japanese judiciary and that judicial selection is not really a function of LDP politics).
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including academia, the lower courts, prosecutor's offices, and the
practicing bar. 3"

Nevertheless, as in Great Britain, persons appointed to the Supreme
Court tend to share a common understanding of Japan's courts and their
proper role in the political system.37 1 "Most Supreme Court justices

have been appointed by the leadership of the LDP or its conservative
forerunners and, for the most part, reflect the social, economic, cultural,
and political values of the party membership."" Just as federal judges
appointed during the Reagan and Bush years tended to share a common
ideological point of view,373 so too judges selected by the LDP's
leadership are likely to have common attitudes and approaches to

constitutional interpretation.
At the same time, however, this explanation seems too thin to explain
the astonishing consistency in the Supreme Court's behavior over the last

fifty years. Even the most zealous ideological selection process
occasionally goes awry.374 The Justices have maintained a unanimity
of style and approach that cannot be attributed to a remarkable string of

"good picks" by the LDP. Something more is afoot here. Perhaps a

more complete explanation is that the Justices' attitudes are generally
indicative not only of the LDP, but also of Japanese society more
broadly.

A perceived lack of relative authority provides a third potential
explanation for the Japanese Supreme Court's caution. Simply put, the
Japanese Supreme Court does not perceive itself to be a powerful
institution vis-a-vis the Diet or bureaucracy-with good reason. As noted
370.
See Haley, supra note 138, at 8-12 (describing the selection process); Luney,
supra note 107, at 132-36 (same).
371.
See P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLOAMERICAN LAW 45-47, 61-63, 222-39, 269-71 (1987).
372.
Luney, supra note 107, at 145; see also Okudaira, supra note 13, at 24-25.
373.
See Joan Biskupic, Clinton Avoids Activists in Judicial Selections, WASH.
POST, Oct. 24, 1995, at Al; David Johnston, Bush Appears Set to Follow Reagan By
Putting Conservatives on Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1989, at B5; Neil A. Lewis, In
Selecting FederalJudges, Clinton Has Not Tried to Reverse Republicans, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 1996, at A20; Neil A. Lewis, Selection of Conservative Judges Insures a
President'sLegacy, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1992, at A13; see also Carl Tobias, Increasing
Balance on the FederalBench, 32 HOUS. L. REv. 137 (1995).
374.
Consider, for example, the examples set by Justices David Souter, appointed
by President Bush, and Harry Blackmun, appointed by President Nixon. Perhaps the most
famous example of this phenomenon was President Eisenhower's decision to appoint thenNew Jersey Supreme Court Justice William Brennan to the United States Supreme Court.
Even if President Eisenhower realized that William Brennan was not a judicial
conservative, it is doubtful that he realized just how liberal Brennan would prove to be.
See HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR 78-84 (1995);
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, MANDATE FOR CHANGE 1953-1956, at 230 (1963).
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above, historically, the Japanese courts have simply enforced the legal

rules established by others.375 In the Meiji period, this meant the edicts
of the Emperor and his ministers. In the post-war era, this means the

laws promulgated by the Diet and the rules and regulations established by
the career bureaucrats in the various government ministries. Neither the
Diet nor the bureaucracy would take kindly to more active interventions

by the Supreme Court in their affairs. Dean Luney goes so far as to
argue that "[t]he judiciary is not in a position to be an instrument for
social, economic, or political change; instead, it performs the conservative
task of preserving basic civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and
recognized by the Diet and a majority of the population. "376

Moreover, the Justices' professional behavior tends to reinforce their
relative lack of power vis-a-vis the political branches. The Justices of the
Japanese Supreme Court keep a low profile; they do not seek out

confrontations with the political branches of government.
Before condemning

institutional chutzpah,"

the Japanese

Supreme Court's lack of

one would do well to bear in mind that the

United States Supreme Court has not always stepped willingly and boldly
In fact, United States history is littered with
into the breach.37
instances in which the United States Supreme Court walked to the edge
of the abyss, peeked over, and quickly stepped back. Marbury v.
Madison,"9 Andrew Jackson's defiance of the Supreme Court's decision
" ' and the Gold
in Worcester v. Georgia,3"' the Legal Tender Cases,38

See supra notes 127-153 and accompanying text.
375.
Luney, supra note 107, at 145.
376.
Cf. Obiora, supra note 10, at 275, 276-78, 284-85 (arguing that universalist
377.
assumptions regarding the transnational content and meaning of human rights and the
proper roles of legal institutions in securing social reforms often reflects unjustifiable
cultural elitism, if not a form of cultural imperialism).
See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 117 S.Ct. 2293 (1997) (refusing to recognize a
378.
constitutional right to physician assisted suicide and opining that this question belongs
more properly to the state legislatures); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) (same).
379.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
380.
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). President Jackson is reputed to have said of this
decision that "John Marshall has rendered his decision, now let him enforce it." GRANT
A. FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL: THE EMIGRATION OF FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES OF
INDIANS 235 (2d ed. 1953); see also Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1363-64 (1997);

Girardeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 602 (1983); Kevin J.
Worthen & Wayne R. Farnsworth, Who Will Control the Future of Indian Gaming? "A
Few Pages of History Are Worth a Volume of Logic," 1996 BYU. L. REV. 407, 423-24.
381.
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870); see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION
IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 320-39 (1985).
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Clause Casesu all provide instances of artful dodging by the Supreme
Court to avoid crossing the President or Congress. Indeed, to some
383 fits into this
extent, even Brown v. Board of Education
overall
pattern: in Brown I, the Court punted away the question of the proper
remedy3" and, in Brown II, the Supreme Court adopted its infamous
"all deliberate speed" mandate to dismantle de jure segregation in the
public schools. 3" The lack of a firm remedy, the lack of a definite
timetable for implementation, and the Court's subsequent unwillingness
to fill in these blanks significantly muted the social and political impact
of the decision.3" 6 Thus, after some reflection, its seems clear that the
United States Supreme Court has established a relatively consistent
pattern, if not a practice, of attempting to avoid creating constitutional
crises.3" 7

In some circumstances, this strategy of prudent avoidance can make
a great deal of sense. Consider that, just twenty-five years ago, there was

more than a little doubt about whether then-President Nixon would
comply with the Supreme Court's order-should it decide to affirm the

district court's subpoena requiring him to hand over the tape recordings
of his oval office conversations. 8 8 Lacking both power of purse and
power of sword, the judiciary is by nature the "least dangerous branch"
in a constitutional democracy.389
The Japanese Supreme Court's efforts to avoid direct confrontation
with the political branches probably reflect, at least in part, concerns
about the ability of the Court to enforce its will. The malapportionment
382.
Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); see also David P. Currie, The
Constitution in Congress:Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI.
L. REV. 775, 806 n.178 (1994); Kenneth W. Dam, From the Gold Clause Cases to the
Gold Commission: A Half Century of American Monetary Law, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 504
(1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 379
(1992).
383.
349 U.S. 294 (1955) & 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown I1].
384.
See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495-96.
385.
Brown 11, supra note 383, at 301.
386.
See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
387.
See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). As Professor Neal Devins has put it, "[miost landmark Supreme Court
decisions cannot be understood without paying attention to the politics surrounding them."
Neal Devins, Foreword, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (1993).
388.
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); see also ARCHIBALD COX,
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 3-9 (1976); Alexander
& Schauer, supra note 380, at 1364-65; Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful
Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV. 389, 397 (1987).
389.

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 522-23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.

Cooke ed., 1961).
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cases are telling in this regard. Over a period of thirty years, the
Supreme Court has demanded that the Diet reduce the relative disparity
that existed in citizens' voting power. Ultimately, it settled upon a ratio
of 3:1 as a constitutional standard.
When presented with a challenge to a district with a 3.18:1 ratio,
however, it indicated that the 3:1 ratio was not set in stone and that its
application would be flexible enough to accommodate shifts in
population.3 ° Once again, the Supreme Court of Japan demonstrated
its willingness to compromise principles in order to avoid interbranch
conflict.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, conflict avoidance is an
important Japanese cultural norm. Thirty years ago, Professor Nathanson
severely criticized the Supreme Court of Japan, arguing that "[wihile it
has generally paid lip service to the principles of Chapter III of the
Constitution, it has not struck any resounding blows for their effective
implementation."391 This observation reflects a gross misconception of
the fundamental nature of Japanese society; "striking resounding blows,"
thereby rushing into direct and open conflict with other branches of the
government, would be profoundly un-Japanese. Neither institutions nor
individuals gain much ground in Japan by rocking the wa, or social
harmony. 3' Direct confrontation is to be avoided and mediation of
disputes is to be preferred over formal court adjudication."
In many respects, the Japanese Supreme Court attempts to mediate,
rather than decide, constitutional disputes. As Justice Sonobe of the
Japanese Supreme Court has explained "there is a tendency to emphasize
the aspect of balance, that is, of harmony and collaboration, in applying
the principle of checks and balances. ' Rather than broadly endorsing
the positions of either the government or the challengers, it often finds a
390.
See Judgment Upon Case of Constitutionality of the Provisions of the Public
Offices Election Law on Electoral Districts and the Apportionment of Seats, Series of
ProminentJudgments of the Supreme Court of Japan upon Questions of Constitutionality
No. 27 (General Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan, 1996) (decided Jan. 20, 1993).
391.
Nathanson, supra note 306, at 323. Professor Nathanson's language calls to
mind the advice Lady Macbeth offered her husband Lord Macbeth: "screw your courage
to the sticking-place." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH, act 1, sc.
7. She predicted that if he did so, good things would follow for both. See id. Lord
Macbeth decided to take Lady Macbeth's advice, struck a "resounding blow" against his
Lord and Liege Duncan, and ultimately suffered terrible consequences as a result.
392.
See JOHN L. GRAHAM & YOSHIHIRO SANO, SMART BARGAINING: DOING
BUSINESS WITH THE JAPANESE 25-27 (rev. ed. 1989); KIM, supra note 21, at 49-50, 5253; NAKANE, supra note 21, at 49-50; ROSALIE L. TUNG, BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS WITH
THE JAPANESE

393.
394.

46-49 (1984).

See REINGOLD, supra note 113, at 63.
Sonobe, supra note 127, at 138.
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third way that splits the difference: "[a]s to the specific exercise of the
power of judicial review, the courts have been keen to balance many
competing claims." 395 The Tokyo and Niigata Ordinance decisions
reflect this sort of approach, as do the Court's cases on defamation.
A radically revisionist account of the Supreme Court of Japan's
behavior is also tenable. One could view the Supreme Court's practice
of providing limiting constructions as a form of judicial activism, rather
than as the product of extreme judicial deference . 3a' At least arguably,
the Supreme Court has a bad habit of simply rewriting constitutionally
problematic laws to suit its liking. Perhaps the Diet or, for that matter,
the general electorate, would prefer no law to the watered-down statute
that the Supreme Court has drafted. If a statute lacks a constitutionally
necessary limiting principle, then arguably the Supreme Court should
simply strike down the legislation and tell the Diet to try again.
The revisionist account accurately identifies a substantial activist
streak in the Supreme Court of Japan's overall posture of deference. It
misplaces, however, the proper point of emphasis.
The Supreme Court of Japan wishes to avoid interbranch conflict and
the use of limiting constructions provides a convenient means of enforcing
constitutional limitations without ever having to declare specific legislative
work product invalid. The Court's motivation is not the covert exercise
of legislative power, but rather an escape from what the Justices view as
a Hobson's choice: abandoning constitutional principles or directly
challenging the authority of the political departments of government.
As it happens, Professor Merryman predicts just such judicial
behavior in his seminal work on the civil law. In jurisdictions featuring
a "flexible" constitution, Merryman posits that "[w]here a possible
conflict between a constitutional provision and a statute appears to have
occurred without conscious legislative consideration, the tendency of the
courts will be to interpret the provision and the statute in such a way as
to avoid the conflict." 39 According to Merryman, this and similar
kinds of devices permit the courts in a civil law system to respect
constitutional commitments without upsetting settled understandings of the
proper relationship between the courts and the political branches of
government.398
In the final analysis, the Japanese Supreme Court probably knows its
institutional limitations much better than an American observer.
Undoubtedly, the Japanese Supreme Court's non-confrontational approach
395.
396.

Id.
at 173.

397.

See supra notes 169-222, 231-237 and accompanying text.
MERRYMAN, supra note 138, at 135.

398.

See id. at 134-35.
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stems from more than one source or rationale, but the end result seems
to reflect an institutional reality rather than a consistent and endemic lack
of courage or fortitude on the part of the Justices. 399
VII. CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's "careful and cautious " '
approach to enforcing Article 21, freedom of speech is a meaningful
reality in Japan. This observation has been almost universally endorsed
for the last twenty-five years."' Simply put, the Japanese government

does not engage in regularized attempts to squelch freedom of expression.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court's failure to issue opinions striking
"resounding blows" in favor of freedom of expression has not adversely

affected the social landscape, even if it has left more constitutional
questions dangling than some commentators think wise.'
Even in the
case of pornography, the Supreme Court's failure to protect serious
literary or artistic works featuring erotic themes has not seriously impeded

access to such materials. 403

399.
See, e.g., Sonobe, supra note 127, at 172 ("To my understanding, the
description that the Japanese courts are taking 'avery careful and cautious approach'
toward constitutional review seems to be more preferable and appropriate [than
descriptions such as judicially passivist or restrained].") (footnote omitted).
400.
Id. The judiciary's "cautious" approach may also reflect the lack of an
effective and easily accessed system of formal enforcement of legal rules. As Professor
Haley has explained, under such a system the effectiveness of new legal norms may
"depend upon consensus and thus, as 'living' law, become nearly indistinguishable from
nonlegal or customary norms." Haley, supra note 145, at 276. The Supreme Court may
wish to avoid articulating legal norms that are unlikely to receive community support, for
such rules are more likely to be honored in the breach than in the observance. See id. at
276-79.
401.
See, e.g., Beer, Freedom of Expression, supra note 21, at 246-47
("[l]rrepressible group actions involving workers, media companies, students, housewives,
farmers, and other components of society seem as perennially essential to the nation's
constitutional democracy as periodic elections and restraints on government power under
law."); Masao Horibe, Press Law in Japan, in PRESS LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES

315, 316 (Pnina Lahav ed., 1985) (arguing Japanese citizens enjoy a high degree of
personal freedom); Nathanson, supra note 306, at 323-24 (noting that "freedom of
association and assembly, including demonstrations of social and political protest, have
not been banished from the Japanese scene" and observing that "vigorous political debate
and outspoken criticism of public officials continue"); Okudaira, supra note 13, at 26
("[P]olitical freedom is greatly safeguarded and subjected to almost no direct restraint by
the government. There is no legal impediment to criticism of the government, politicians,
and bureaucrats.").
402.
See Sonobe, supra note 127, at 173-74, 174 n.60.
403.
See Burgess, supra note 310; Kristof, supra note 310; see also BEER, supra
note 107, at 339-40, 345-47.
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The Japanese Supreme Court's Article 21 cases are, nonetheless,
quite important. Time and again, the Supreme Court has drawn the
connection between democratic self-governance and freedom of
expression; indeed, it is almost a reflexive gesture. Given the Court's
inherent caution, it would not repeatedly invoke this observation were it
not consistent with the prevailing views of the political branches of
government and the general public. Thus, one can view the Supreme
Court of Japan's free speech opinions as both reflecting and ratifying the
Japanese people's embrace of free expression as a necessary incident of
democracy. The government's general laissez faire approach to regulating
speech and speech-related activities also seems consistent with this
conclusion.
To the extent that freedom of speech faces challenges in Japan, they
tend to stem from non-governmental sources. As Professor Beer has
noted, strong social traditions and cultural values mitigate against the
expression of individualism.'
"Japanese culture values individual
reticence and, in many contexts, views aggressive assertion of personal
opinion as reprehensible."'
Professor Haley argues that this
"groupism" is not genetic, but rather stems from the complex systems of
mutual interdependence that characterized both traditional Japanese
villages in the past and modern Japanese corporations in the present.0
Once again, it is possible to learn from the Japanese example.
Although the United States is undoubtedly a more individualistic society
than is Japan, freedom of speech in the United States also suffers from
informal economic and social forms of control. A worker employed by
Lockheed-Martin probably will not march in a mass protest demanding
an immediate nuclear freeze and unilateral disarmament. Similarly, a
teacher in a Catholic high school may be more than a little reticent to
share her view that abortion on demand should remain legal, not only
with her students and colleagues, but also with members of the general
community. To speak out on this issue would jeopardize her social
standing within her workplace-if not her job. To be sure, these informal
mechanisms of control are less pervasive and operate less effectively in
the United States than in Japan. They do, however, exist.
In conceptualizing freedom of expression, American commentators
tend to ignore non-governmental pressures. As a matter of formal legal
404.
See Beer, Freedom of Expression, supra note 21, at 224-26.
405.
Id. at 225; see also NAKANE, supra note 21, at 34-35, 102-03, 146-51.
These cultural traits are also reinforced though active interest group efforts to restrict
speech deemed inimical to a particular group's interests. See Nelson, supra note 111, at
71-84.
406.
See HALEY, supra note 16, at 170-91, 195-97; see also NAKANE, supra note
21, at 58-61, 120-24.
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analysis, this is entirely understandable, given the state action
Because the federal courts have cast the Constitution as a
doctrine.'
charter of negative rights, that is a set of freedoms from rather than
affirmative rights to particular things, Americans naturally overlook
Professor
corporate and community power over freedom of speech.'
Owen Fiss has questioned the rationality of this approach, arguing that the
state could be seen as the friend of free speech rather than its enemy: "At
the core of my approach is a belief that contemporary social structure is
I would
as much an enemy of free speech as is the policeman. "'
argue that the Japanese example demonstrates the salience of Fiss's
concerns about the dangers of defining the free speech project solely in
terms of prohibiting governmental censorship.
A second, and arguably more important, potential lesson from this
exercise in comparative law relates to the vitality and power of Alexander
Meiklejohn's theory of the First Amendment. In the space of a halfcentury, the Supreme Court of Japan has articulated a clear and coherent
vision of freedom of expression. For the most part, it embodies
Alexander Meiklejohn's vision of freedom of speech as a necessary
corollary of democratic self-governance. The Supreme Court of Japan
also has extended this vision of freedom of speech beyond the obvious
examples of direct government censorship to include elements of private
law, such as tort, that burden the free exchange of information and ideas.
On the other hand, the Holmesian "marketplace of ideas" model has
not really taken hold in Japanese legal thought. The Supreme Court of
Japan consistently relates free expression to matters of self-governance,
not individual freedom or autonomy. Moreover, it has observed that
restrictions on commercial speech "do not ipso facto impair freedom of
thought and freedom of conscience. "41° This result comports with the
the
Meiklejohn theory of the First Amendment, but not with
41
ideas.
of
marketplace
Holmes's
of
contemporary understanding
The Japanese Supreme Court's apparent rejection of the marketplace
of ideas paradigm may in part reflect cultural values that emphasize
community over individualism.4 2 Political pluralism requires that
407.
See Krotoszynski, supra note 50.
408.
See generally David P. Currie, Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights,
53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864 (1986).
409.
Fiss, supra note 31, at 20; see also Fiss, Why the State, supra note 112, at
787, 793-94.
410.
Ono v. Japan, 15 KEISHO 2, at 347 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 15, 1961), reprintedin
ITOH & BEER, supra note 122, at 217, 219.
411.
See supra notes 34-73 and accompanying text.
412.
See NAKANE, supra note 21, at 143-51; cf. UPHAM, supra note 313, at 22324 (arguing that U.S. legal formalism, with its reliance on value and content neutral rules,
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citizens be permitted to meet and discuss issues of civic concern. It does

not require the community to tolerate speech activities unrelated to
democratic self-governance, such as dial-a-porn services or hard-core
pornography.4 1 3 Given the importance of consensus and harmony in
contemporary Japanese society, it is easy to see why the notion of an

open and unregulated marketplace does not fit:14 the community both wants
and expects the ability to maintain decorum.

The Japanese Supreme Court's concern for community potentially
explains not only its embrace of Meiklejohn's essentially communitarian

vision of freedom of expression, 415 but also its relatively sparing use of
the power of judicial review. In a democratic state, the elected branches
of government should generally establish major social policies.

Moreover, judicial review need not inexorably lead to a state of constant
conflict between the judiciary and the citizen's elected representatives.
Over one hundred years ago, Harvard law professor James Thayer

argued that judicial review should be limited to instances of "clear error,"
in which the legislature has not only transgressed, but has badly
transgressed, a particular constitutional limitation.4 6 Professor Mark

Tushnet has noted that Thayer's vision of limited or "minimalist" judicial
reflects and incorporates the core social values of pluralism and individual autonomy).
413.
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Japan could place its obscenity jurisprudence
on a sounder philosophical footing by shifting its justification for upholding restrictions
from the foreign nature of particular ideas to the lack of a concrete relationship between
the speech activity at issue and the project of democratic self-governance. Of course, the
results in Lady Chatterly'sLover and de Sade would still be problematic, because these
works advance ideas-albeit unconventional ideas-about proper social values. See
Kinglsey Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959).
414.
This value could be seen as related to Meiklejohn's analogy of a town
meeting in which a parliamentarian enforces rules to keep order. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra
note 23, at 22-27. As Meiklejohn puts it, "[t]he First Amendment, then, is not the
guardian of unregulated talkativeness." Id. at 25. On the other hand, "unwise ideas must
have a hearing as well as wise ones, unfair as well as fair, dangerous as well as safe, unAmerican as well as American." Id. at 26.
415.
See supra notes 52-73 and accompanying text.
416.
See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893); see also Symposium, One
Hundred Years of Judicial Review: The Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1 (1993). As Thayer put it, a reviewing court "can only disregard [an] Act when
those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made
a very clear one,-so clear that it is not open to rational question." Thayer, supra, at
144; see also id. at 148:
The judicial function is merely that of fixing the outside border of reasonable
legislative action, the boundary beyond which the taxing power, the power of
eminent domain, police power, and legislative power in general, cannot go
without violating the prohibitions of the constitution or crossing the line of its
grants.
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review has not proven persuasive in the United States.417 Thayer's
argument, however, has more than little logic: if courts exercise restraint
in exercising judicial review, then legislative and executive branch
personnel should be more attuned to constitutional values; they will not
be able to rely on the judiciary to correct their constitutional
To some extent, Great Britain's system of
transgressions."'
parliamentary supremacy, coupled with a limited (if not non-existent)
system of judicial review resembles Thayer's model.9 It may be
overly optimistic, however, to expect individual legislators to elevate
constitutional responsibilities over short-term political opportunities.
One could view the Japanese Supreme Court's approach to judicial
review as largely consistent with Thayer's "minimalist" approach. The
Japanese Supreme Court works to avoid finding incompatibility between
legislative or executive work product and the Constitution because of a
strong belief that this approach will best protect community values-if not
constitutional values. Moreover, this approach also respects the
community's decision to vest legislative and executive responsibilities with
a particular set of officeholders. As Professor Tushnet has put it,
"[m]inimal judicial review does, almost by definition, provide a wider
domain within which legislators and the public have an opportunity to
articulate constitutional norms." 4' The exercise of judicial review to
strike down legislative work product or an executive action necessarily
entails displacing decisions made by persons elected by the community to
make precisely those decisions. Although a written constitution should
cabin the discretion of elected officials, the question of an appropriate
balance of power remains open.421
In a fashion consistent with Thayer's maxim, the Supreme Court of
Japan simply declines to interpose its will over the will of the Diet absent
an extraordinarily compelling reason for doing so. This is not to say that
the Supreme Court makes no effort to protect or defend constitutional
rights. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has repeatedly used
interpretative devices, such as limiting constructions, to minimize the
See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 245-47.
417.
See Thayer, supra note 416, at 151-56; see also Frank M. Johnson, Jr., In
418.
Defense of JudicialActivism, 28 EMORY L.J. 901, 910-12 (1979) (arguing that the best
way to avoid instances of "judicial activism" is to encourage "legislative activism" in
defense of civil liberties); Frank M. Johnson, The Alabama Punting Syndrome, JUDGES'
J., Spring 1979, at 5-7, 53-54 (arguing that judges cannot turn a blind eye on legislative
intransigence in the face of proven constitutional violations if constitutional guarantees are
to have any real meaning).
See Krotoszynski, supra note 2, at 4-10.
419.
Tushnet, supra note 1, at 300.
420.
See id. at 299-301.
421.
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impact of government regulation on constitutionally protected rights.4'
This approach to the judicial function does not reflect contemporary
practice in the United States federal courts, but it is certainly a defensible
theory of judicial review.'
At the same time, the Supreme Court of Japan's approach to
enforcing Article 21 also reflects a communitarian cast. By locating
freedom of expression as an incident of democratic self-government, the

justices have effectively linked freedom of speech to the citizenry's
sovereign status. The Japanese Constitution makes it quite plain that the

"sovereign power" resides with the people. 4'

As Alexander

Meiklejohn explained almost fifty years ago, effective popular sovereignty
necessarily entails the ability to discuss and debate questions regarding
who should hold office and the policies that those persons should pursue

once in office.42
Consistent with this approach, it is not the
individual's interest in self-expression, but rather the community's interest
in a full and robust debate, that undergirds Japanese society's protection
of freedom of expression.

The Japanese Supreme Court and the other branches of the Japanese
government have achieved remarkable success at incorporating freedom

of expression as a basic tenet of Japan's civic faith. 26 When one
considers the near complete absence of rights-consciousness among the
422.
See supra notes 166-208 and accompanying text.
423.
See Thayer, supra note 416, at 153-56; Tushnet, supra note 1, at 299-301.
424.
KENPO, art. 1 ("The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the
unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides
sovereign power."); see Okudaira, supra note 13, at 1-8 (discussing the Constitution of
1947's shift in paradigm from a sovereign emperor to a sovereign electorate).
425.
See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 23, at 1-27.
426.
See ABE ET AL., supra note 109; BEER, supra note 107, at 393-99; BEER &
ITOH, supra note 107, at 7-12; ITOH & BEER, supra note 122, at 20; MAKI, supra note
124, at xli; Beer, Public Welfare, supra note 21, at 210-20; John M. Maki, Japanese
ConstitutionalStyle, in THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 194767, supra note 21, at 13, 16-18, 35-39; Okudaira, supra note 13, at 25-32.

1998:905

Chrysanthemum, Sword and FirstAmendment

991

Japanese citizenry in pre-war Japan,4 27 this achievement seems all the

more amazing.
Moreover, it would be wrong of Americans to expect the Japanese
people to have incorporated U.S. constitutional values in a lockstep
fashion. As Professor Ruth Benedict cautioned in the immediate
aftermath of World War II, "[i]t is not easy to work out new assumptions
and new virtues."' Accordingly, she concluded, "[t]he Western world

can neither suppose that the Japanese can take these [new democratic
values] on sight and make them truly their own, nor must it imagine that
Japan cannot ultimately work out a freer, less rigorous ethics."4 29

History has borne out Professor Benedict's prophecy. Although the
United States could not "create by fiat a free, democratic Japan," 430 the
Japanese people themselves have elected to establish and maintain such a
polity, a polity in which freedom of speech is an integral component of
their experiment in democratic self-government.
Seven years after the adoption of the First Amendment, Congress
passed the Alien and Sedition Act. 43' Needless to say, this marked an

inauspicious beginning for the United States's experiment with freedom
of expression. It took the better part of two hundred years (166 years to
be exact) for the Supreme Court of the United States to hold that good-

faith criticism of government officials could not be made actionable in
427.
Indeed, for many years the Japanese language did not even contain a word
that expressed the concept of rights against the state. See KIM, supra note 21, at 53-54
(arguing that giri, or "duty," is far more important to dispute resolution in Japan than any
notion of individual rights); Yosiyuki Noda, Nihon-Jin No Seikaku To Sono Ho-Kannen
[The Character of the Japanese People and Their Conception of Law], in THE JAPANESE
LEGAL SYSTEM 295, 305 (H. Tanaka ed., 1976) (describing selection of word kenri to
describe the concept of rights); Kevin Yamaga-Karns, Note, Pressing Japan: Illegal
Foreign Workers Under International Human Rights Law and the Role of Cultural
Relativism, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 559, 572 (1995) (discussing etymology of words to
describe human rights in Japan); BEER, supra note 107, at 45-46, 110-11 (same); see also
Beer, Public Welfare, supra note 21, at 211-18; Ford, supra note 121, at 13-16;
Okudaira, supra note 13, at 8; cf. Okudaira, supra note 13, at 27 (describing the
enthusiastic and varied use of the term "human rights" in contemporary Japan).
Similarly, the word used to express the ideas of liberty and freedom, jiyu, has "overtones
of selfishness and license." ABE ET AL., supra note 109, at 207-08; see INOUE, supra
note 13, at 51-55; Kahei, supra note 143, at 5, 7-8.
BENEDICT, supra note 18, at 295.
428.
Id.
429.
430.
Id. at 314.
See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 1-39 (1920); ZECHARIAH
431.
CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 27-30, 497-505 (1946); LEONARD W.
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY 236-48, 258-309 (1960); see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.

254 (1964); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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tort.432 The Japanese Supreme Court reached this conclusion a scant
twenty-two years after Article 21 came into effect.
In the case of freedom of expression, Judge Calabresi's admonition
that Americans should take the time to learn from the constitutional
experiences of other nations that have come to share our constitutional
values makes a great deal of sense. We can learn from the example of
Japan-not only by avoiding some of the pitfalls that have hampered the
Japanese Supreme Court's efforts to articulate a coherent and meaningful
doctrine of freedom of expression,433 but also by recognizing some of
the limitations and implicit assumptions that underlie free speech
jurisprudence in the United States. Indeed, if the Japanese people and
their legal institutions make as much progress in the next fifty years as
they have in the preceding half-century, the constitutional "child" may
well come to surpass the constitutional "parent" in wisdom and
understanding.

432.
at 204-10.
433.

See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 273-75, 282; Kalven, supra note 30,
See supra notes 306-353 and accompanying text.

